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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a special
interest group at the 7thTriennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our membership base
has expanded rapidly, and includes nearly 600 active transportation researchers, policy-makers, industry
executives, major corporations and research institutes from 28 countries. Our broad base of membership
and their strong enthusiasm have pushed the group forward, to continuously initiate new events and
projects which will benefit aviation industry and research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG holds an international conference at least once per year. As
you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers, panel discussions and
invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a consecutive stream of 14 aviation
sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17: Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the
ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of
the University College of Dublin.
In 1999, the City University of Hong Kong has hosted the 3rd Annual ATRG Conference. Despite
the delay in starting our conference sessions because of Typhoon Maggie, we were able to complete the
two-day conference sessions and presentation of all of the papers. On behalf of the ATRG membership, I
would like to thank Dr. Anming Zhang who organized the conference and his associates and assistants for
their effort which were essential for the success of the conference. Our special thanks go to Professor
Richard Ho, Dean of the School of Business and Economics of the University for the generous support
for the conference. Many of us also enjoyed the technical visit to the new Hong Kong International
Airport (Chep Lok Kok).
As you know, Professor Jaap de Wit and I look forward to welcoming you to University of
Amsterdam on July 2-4, 2000 for the 4 th Annual ATRG Conference.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute of the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent Bowen,
Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1999 ATRG Hong Kong
Conference (being co-edited by Dr. Anming Zhang and Professor Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG
members, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen, Mary M. Schaffart
and the staff of the Aviation Institute of University of Nebraska at Omaha for the effort to publish these
ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to thank and congratulate all authors of the papers for their fine
contribution to the conferences and the Proceedings. Our special thanks are extended to Boeing
Commercial Aviation - Marketing Group for the partial support for publication of this proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG website
(www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations and forthcoming
events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would appreciate it very much if you could
suggest others to sign up the ATRG membership. Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2Canada
E-mail: Atrg(dJcommerce.ubc.ca
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]'he Conference Volume 1
The ATRG held its 3 rd Annual Conference at the City
University of Hong Kong Campus in June 1999.
The 1999 Conference contained 13 aviation and
airport sessions. Over 40 research presentations were
featured on topics pertaining to airports and aviation;
these titles are listed on the ATRG wcbsite
(http://www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/).
The Proceedings
Once again, on behalf of the Air Transport Research
Group, the University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation
Institute has agreed to publish the Proceedings of the
ATRG Conference in a four-volume monograph set.
Proceedings Order Intbrmation
Thc Proceedings of the 1999 ATRG Conference are
contained in a four-volume monograph set. Orders
within the U.S. are $7.50 (U.S.) per monograph
volume, and international orders are $10.00 (U.S.) per
monograph volume to cover the costs of printing,
shipping, and handling. Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
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Through the early months of 1999, the country's major airlines have continued to enjoy
an unprecedented prosperity. Low fuel costs and rock-bottom interest rates have
combined with the fruits of past labor concessions and the on-going American economic
boom to create an extremely favorable operating environment. Add to this the increase in
industry concentration due to airline mergers and alliances, and the sizable built-up
operating and financial leverage that characterizes the industry, and it is no wonder that
record profits have been the recent rule. In our view, this last factor--the prevalence of
substantial built-up operating and financial leverage in the airline industry--is of
particular interest. Having been widely blamed for creating past industry problems, these
high-leverage positions now serve to magnify the beneficial influence of the other cited
factors to swell current airline profitability. However, even in such prosperous times the
potential danger of these positions should not be ignored.
This study highlights by example the effects of varying leverage positions on airline
profitability. To accomplish this, we've applied previously-developed measures of risk to
three major U.S. air carriers-- Southwest (SWA), Delta (DAL), and U.S. Air (USAir))
These particular carriers offer significant contrasts: SWA has always been a strong
performer, conservatively financed; USAir has had several bouts with severe financial
problems due to excessive debt finance; Delta is a carrier between the two extremes in
both performance and philosophy, but a carrier considered by most analysts to be one of
the strongest in the industry.
Background
It is no secret that the air transport is among the more volatile of American industries. _ On
the operating side, demand for air transport is highly cyclical. In many markets, carriers
face intense competition. Add to this significant fixed operating costs and it is not
difficult to appreciate the inherent instability of the industry's operating profits. Such
conditions are typical of an industry which exhibits a high degree of what financial
analysts would label "business risk." On the financial side, the high debt loads of most
carriers create a significant fixed-charge burden (in the form of interest) which leaves
them extremely vulnerable to both interest rate increases and economic cycles. As a
consequence, most industry members show a high degree of"financial risk." As will be
demonstrated, high levels of both risks can result in dramatic changes in profitability.
The Nature of Risk
The paper is an update and revision of research published by the authors last year. See: "Measuring the
Degrees of Operating, Financial and Combined Leverage for the Major U.S. Air Carriers: 1979-1995,"
Transportation Law Journal, XXVI No.l (Fall 1998), 51-71.
: This has been documented in several prior studies contrasting the airlines to other industrial groups, both
before and after deregulation: Richard D. Gritta, "An Unresolved Issue in Setting the Cost of Capital to the
U.S. Domestic Airlines," Journal of Air Law & Commerce. XL(Winter 1975), 65-74, especially Chart I;
Richard D. Grirta, Garland Chow, and Todd Shank, "The Causes and Effects of Business and Financial
Risk in Air Transportation," Journal of Transportation Management, VI No. l(Spring 1994), 127-149.
To understandthespecialrisk-relateddangers associated with the airline industry, it is
important to recognize that all firms and industries face three different levels of risk:
business risk, financial risk, and total (or combined) risk. Business risk reflects the
variability in a firm's operating profits, or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), over
time. Such risk is primarily a function of demand volatility, the inherent cost structure of
the industry of which the firm is a member, and the level of intra-industry competition
faced by the firm. In most industries, fixed costs are seen as the principal culprit in
producing high levels of business risk since their presence magnifies the effects of
revenue changes on operating profits. The airline industry is considered to be especially
high in business risk because it is highly cyclical, intensely competitive, and exhibits a
significant level of fixed costs.
Financial risk is usually defined as the added variability in earnings to stockholders due
to the use of long-term debt finance to acquire assets. Similar to the exacerbating
influence of fixed costs on business risk, interest acts as a lever to magnify returns
(positive and negative) and thus increase a firm's level of financial risk. Because most air
carriers utilize significant amounts of debt, the industry is generally high in such risk.
Combined risk, as its name suggests, is the result of the interaction of business and
financial risk. It is important to note that the two risks combine in a multiplicative--
rather than a simple additive--way. As will be demonstrated shortly, it's this fact that has
contributed to the precarious position of many of the country's major carriers in the past.
Measuring Business and Financial Risk
Elasticity measures borrowed from microeconomic theory can be used to quantify
business and financial risk. With such measures, it's possible to trace directly the effects
of leverage on operating and net profits, as well as on returns to assets and returns to
equity. 3
The appropriate measures are defined below:
For a complete discussion of the nature and measurement of risk and return, see any standard f'mancial
management textbook. For example: R. Charles Moyer, James R. McGuigan, and William Kretlow,
Contemporary Financial Mznagement. 7th edition, (St. Paul, MN:West Publishing Co., 1997). Ch.13-
14.




where R = operating revenue
V = variable costs
F = fixed costs




where I = Interest
EBIT = R-V-F
(3) Degree of Combined Leverage (DCL)




As an elasticity measure, DOL=% change in operating profits (EBIT) divided by %change in operating
revenues (OR). Operating revenues can be defined as pq (price per unit of output times ou_ut) and
variable costs (V) equal vq ( variable cost per unit times output). Thus, if the values of p and v remain
constant, and freed costs (F), by definition, are constant
DOL =
Aq(p - v)
%AEBIT _ q(p- v)- F _ Aq(p- v) x q - q(p- v)




The other leverage measures are derived in a similar fashion.
R-V
R-V-F-I
DOL is adirectmeasureof businessrisk, whileDFL andDCL gaugefinancialrisk and
totalrisk,respectively.As elasticities,thesemeasuresindicatetherelativeratesof change
in one variable,given changesin another.DOL measuresthe % changein operating
profit or EBIT (R-V-F) givena 1%changein operatingrevenue(R). [For example,if
DOL = +4.0,thenEBIT will increase(decrease)4%for each1%increase(decrease)in
operatingrevenues].Similarly,DFLmeasuresthe%changein netprofit (R-V-F-I) given
a 1%changein EBIT. DCL measuresthe% changein netprofit givena 1%changein
revenue.(Sincetax ratesareconstant,weusenetprofitsbeforetaxes.) In eachease,the
higherthe valueproduced,the greaterthe relativerisk. Crucially, since DCL is the
multiplicativeresultof DOL andDFL,it isasoundprincipleof financethatfirmshighin
businessrisk shouldavoid significantlong-termdebtfinance)6
The Leverage-Performance Connection
For this study, ROA (retum on assets) and ROE (return on equity) have been used as
primary indicators of carrier profitability. More specifically, baseline cartier performance
is indicated by average ROA and ROE values over the period of the study; the standard
deviation and coefficient of variation of the ROA and ROE values are used to measure
performance stability/volatility.
As will be seen from study results, business risk directly impacts the stability of ROAs
over time. The higher the level of business risk, the more unstable the return on assets
(and the greater its standard deviation/coefficient of variation). Financial risk acts to
further destabilize the ROEs over time, given the mean ROAs and their variability. The
higher the level of financial risk, the greater the incremental change in ROEs given
changes in ROAs. Finally, combined risk impacts the overall stability of ROEs over time.
Importantly, high levels of combined risk result in very unstable returns (large standard
deviations, or coefficients of variation, over time).
5 Ibid.
6 Two earlier studies have examined this principle and its effects on stockholder returns: Richard D. Gritta,
"The Effects of Financial Leverage on Air Carrier Earnings: A Break-Even Analysis," Financial
Management. VIII(Summer 1979), 53-60, and; Richard D. Gritta, Garland Chow, and Ron Hockstein,
"Airline Financial Policies in a Deregulated Environment," Transportation Journal. XX\qI(Spring
19S8), 37-48.
Data and Analysis
The analysis in this study is based on data for the three carriers identified above (SWA,
Delta and USAir) for the years 1979 to 1997. This period represents the entire history of
the carriers since the deregulation of the industry in 1978.
The raw data, compiled from DOT's Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly,
appear in Tables I, II, and III. For purposes of the study, variable costs are defined as the
cost of flying operations, maintenance, passenger service, and air traffic. The remaining
costs are classified as fixed: depreciation, general and administrative costs, and traffic
related expenses. It should be noted that the ratio of fixed costs to operating revenues
(%F/R) for the carriers in the study was typically in the mid-20% range. 7 While this ratio
is not as high as in some of the classic fixed-cost industries such as auto manufacturing, it
does indicate that fixed costs are a significant factor in the airline industry.
The tables show computed leverage measures for each of the airlines, as well as rates of
return on assets and return on equity. Charts I-III show graphically the computed DOL,
DFL, and DCL values that appear in the tables.
Before discussing in detail the implications of the tables, several preparatory comments
may be helpful. It is important note that the sign, as well as the magnitude, ofDOL, DFL
and DCL are both significant indicators of risk. If operating revenue (R) exceeds the sum
of variable plus fixed costs (V+F), then the carrier is operating above its break-even point
and DOL will be positive. This means that if revenues increase (decrease), operating
profits will increase (decrease) as well. In general, when R>V+F, DOL will take on
values of+oo to +1. Low DOLs indicate a relatively low level of business risk-- that is, a
low volatility of EBIT as revenues change. The value of (V+F) will exceed R when the
carrier is below its operating break-even point. In this case, DOL is negative and can
range fi'om -oo and 0. The negative sign simply means that as R increases, profits
increase (that is, losses decrease). Large negative values of DOL indicate greater
variability, but very low values are far more threatening. The reason is that, in such a
case, the loss base is very large and the carrier is far below its break-even point. The same
is true for DFL and DCL. As a final note, it should be pointed out that if either DOL or
DFL is negative, or if both are negative, DCL will be negative.
A comparison of the derived leverage measures for the three carriers is revealing. The
contrast between SWA's figures and those of the other two carriers is especially telling.
It's clear, for example, that SWA shows far more stable DOL values than the other
carriers. Recall that DOL measures the relative volatility in EBIT given changes in
revenues. As a case in point, in 1997 SWA's EBIT changed by only 3.2% for each 1%
7 It should be noted that fuel, a classic variable cost, behaves in a constant or step-variable manner. That
is, it is a "sticky" cost in the economic sense. As traffic declines, fuel costs cannot be cut immediately in
response. The first to recognize this behavior was Caves. See: Richard Caves, Air Transport and Its
Regulators, (Cambridge, NLA:TheHa_'ard University Press, 1962), 82. To the extent that this is true, our
analysis would tend to understate the trueimpact of leverage.
5
changein revenues.With the exceptionof 1990(whenDOL was 11.1),thecarrier's
stability is remarkable.In general,SWA hasmaintainedan industry-lowcost-per-
available-seat-mileratio (usuallyin the neighborhoodof $.073-$.075per ASM). The
airline'soperatingstrategyof point-to-pointservice,useof oneaircrafttype(theB737),
and its selectivemarketpenetrationhascertainlybeenvalidatedby its performance.
Perhapsmostremarkableandmostrelevanto ourstudy,however,is SWA's aversionto
long-termdebtfinance.As evidentfromTableI, SWA's debt/equityratiohasfi'equently
beenbelowthe1:1standardusedbymostbankers,andis the lowestof themajorcarriers
byaconsiderablemeasure.Thelow DFLsareevidenceof theresultingstability. Add to
thisthefactthatthecarrier'sDCLshavebeentheindustry'smoststable.
USAirshowsadistinctlycontrastingpattern.Whileits leveragemeasuresweregenerally
favorablethroughoutmostof the 1980s,the carrierexpandedrapidly in the late1980s
andchoseto financemuchof this expansionwith debt. The adverseeffectsof this
decisioncan be seenin the table.Operatingbelow its break-evenpoint (which is
evidencedby the negativeDOLs), USAir found its problems compoundedby its
excessivedebtfinance(its debt/equityratioreached5.8in 1994). Thecarrierwasheavily




the industry,Delta'sDOLs havebeensignificantly higherthan thoseof SWAoverthe
19-yearperiodof thestudy.In somecases,theseDOLshave beennegative. In spiteof
this higher business risk, however, the cartier has often resorted to the use of large
amounts of debt finance. ( The exception was in the mid-1980s period and during the last
several years-- years in which the carrier's profitability has been helped by that strategy,
the direct result of the positive magnification caused by debt. ) DAL's DFL measures
have, in some years, also been negative, and the effects on DCLs, especially in the period
1990-1994, have been quite severe. Although the record profits earned by the carrier in
the last two or three years have returned Delta to a more stable footing, it is notable that
such a dominant player in the industry has experienced such sharp fluctuations in its
profitability, g
As noted, higher degrees of operating leverage will result in less stable pre-tax returns on
assets (ROA). The upper section of Table IV shows the mean returns for all the major air
carriers for the 1979-1997 period, as well as the standard deviations around those means.
To better enable comparisons, the coefficient of variation (CV, or the standard deviation
divided by the mean), and the range are also provided. Once again, SWA clearly stands
out. Not only does SWA show the highest average ROA (9.93%) for the horizon of the
study, but its CV (.406) is the lowest. ( Delta's average ROA is 3.58%, with a CV of
1.61; USAir's ROA is 4.45%, with a CV of 1.60.)
s This carrier has been typical of several of the other healthier carriers, such as American and United. See:
Gritta. ct. al., "Measuring the Effects of Operating, ...," Transportation Law Journal. especially Table
VII.
Thefiguresatthebottomof TableIV suggesttheimpactof debt. Financialriskhasbeen
definedastheaddedor incrementalvariabilityin returnsto equity(ROE),givenchanges
in ROA. Increasedrisk canbeenseenin the incrementalCV values(A CV). SWA's
average18.03%ROE is thehighestof thecarriersandits CV the lowest(.545). More
importantly,its incrementalCV is quite small whencomparedto the othercarriers,
increasingfrom .406to .545,or A.139.Delta'saveragereturnon equityis only 2.73%,
and theincrementalchangein Delta'sCV ishigh,increasingfrom 1.60to 8.06,orA7.46.
USAir has a negative average ROE (-22.58%), with a CV that changes from 1.61 to -
3.28. ( It is worth noting that if one were to look at data for all the major carriers, one
would see that all but SWA show large incremental changes in CV values, accompanied
by wide spreads (ranges) between high and low returns over the period of the study. )
Conclusions:
In this paper, operating and financial data for three major air carriers were examined to
identify the effects of varying leverage positions on airline profitability over time. Three
types of risk were defined: business risk, financial risk, and combined risk. Measures of
risk and return for the three major carriers selected were computed for the period 1979-
1997.
It has been argued that business and financial risk interact in a multiplicative fashion.
The effect of this interaction can be highly volatile profit levels for those who mix high
levels of debt finance (financial risk) with high levels of business risk, especially in an
industry with the structure and competitive characteristics of the airline industry. The
results of our analysis validate the sound principle of finance which holds that firms high
in business risk should avoid excessive debt finance. SWA, generally recognized as a
model of sound financial policy within the airline industry, has consistently followed this
principle. In contrast, the performance of USAir over the period of the study serves to
demonstrate that the penalty for violating this principle can be severe.
While the aggressive, high-leverage financial strategies of some carriers have served to
enhance profitability in the current favorable economic climate, the overriding lessons of
the not-so-distant past need to be remembered. The profitability of the airline industry is
very fragile. Should fuel and interest costs increase, or should demand decrease, the
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A Factor Analytical Study of Airline Management:
The Case of New Entrant Airlines
Dr. Sveinn Vidar Gudmundsson t
Univcrsiteit Maastricht
Management is usually considered the single most important determinant of the finn Is
success or failure. However, an overall approach to classify underlying factors of
management characteristics has been lacking in airline research, making it difficult to
select and associate constructs when researching management performance through
qualitative instruments. This paper determines through exploratory factor analysis such
underlying factors characterizing new entrant airlines. The determinant factors are
then used to test, through regression analysis, the relationship of conceptually based
critical performance factors with performance indicators and environmental influence
factors. The study is longitudinal, based on a survey among new-entrant airlines,
performed first in 1993 and then repeated in 1998199.
Hennann Korn, having survived with a friend, Hanno Martin, for )'ears in total isolation in one
of the most hostile environments on Earlh the Namib Desert, came to the conclusion (Martin,
1970) that Any form of life which insulates itself too successfully against pain fails to notice
change in its environment until it is too late." This is in no doubt the fallacy of many managers
rising to prominent positions witlfin corporations, experiencing an element of surprise when
market-share starts to erode in a growth market, profit-levels drop or other indicators of
declining performance start to emerge. To take the pulse by x_,'andering about ' your company,
to experience your competitor's products and to listen ', can never be overemphasized as means
for feedback on performance. To identify formal performance indicators further down the line
is, however, a source of debate as to what indicators provide the most effective feedback.
Eccles (1991) argued that alternative methods of performance measurement was needed,
stressing the point that traditional financial performance indicators are too simplistic and
backwardly orientated to serve their purpose. Whether a contingency approach or a more lucid
structured approach should be used instead of the traditional financial indicators remains a
question in the general approach to performance measurement.
Controversy arises as we move away from financial devices towards more ttualitative '
measuring devices. Various research on poor corporate performance places blame on the
managers above most other factors without having an uniformly explanatory and acceptable
framework of management performance measurement. Leaving us the question xt,'hat
constitutes poor management' and hence x_,'hatcauses poor management '. Leaving the first
question aside at the moment, the answer to the latter question has to lie in the psychic of the
manager, as a finding by Dun & Braadstreet 0980) suggests. The study found that 44 percent
of corporate failures are linked with ihexperience, unbal,'mced experience or incompetence of
managers'. As a student of corporate performance leaning tow_ds the failure phenomena I
have found the managers' psychic is a troubled area for constituting relationships with
corporate performance. As a result, it started to emerge that in performance analysis of
corporations it would be more effective to concentrate on management actions i.e. x_,'hat
happens if I take action X on variable A?', rad_er than asking whether experience, education
or an)' other psychic factors influenced the action taken. To substantiate this point fiat.her, we
can agree that corporations are constantly facing new situations calling for new ways of action,
consequently there will ahvays be an element trial and error. Putting it in an other way we can
assume a crystallized element (I know what happens when I apply action X on A, because I
have done it before) or a post-trial experience in change processes and a fluid element
(uncertaint). or risk awareness associated with the unknown) based on intuition about What I
assume will happen if I apply action X on A. although I have not done it before'. Albeit a
worthwhile research area I came to the conclusion that the first step would be to depict a
performance measurement method dealing with xl,'hat happens when action X is taken on A'
and define l_oor management' as o_bviouslv wrong action on a variable given the crystalized
l C,_t1,dllCllt. i OII lhl:¢ carl,." dral: .xr: highly'.' ai,pr,:clat:d: ,_ qudmundsson a m_ unimax, nL t,.'l -31 43 3S3 3442. Full addres_s:
l'a:uk', oi" kconotIlt,:s ._nd Eusm=_ .-\dli_ini:,tration. PO B,:"_ I;lli. 6200 \IT) 5,l.Lt_lri,:l',l. "] h_: N_'tllerland_
I
o .
clcmcnt in the decision-making, but not the fluid elemcnt. This cffcctivcly means that drrors '
are assumed to be part of the change process and should therefore not be associated with I_oor
management', given that risk management is part of the crystallized knowledge base, i.e. _ou
do not place all you apples in the same basked' as an underlying anecdote. As a result the
attention is moved towards the change process rather than the managers' persona as such in
determining dauses 'of variation in corporate performance.
Turning to the unanswered question '_,hat constitutes poor performance ' we can not
make the assumption that most managers at poorly performing companies are poor managers
or vice versa. The envelope of factors associated with the concept of good or bad management
is just too great, dynamic and subject to fashions of tile time. Hence, we should focus on the
process itself and tile factors that the manager can actually handle in order to cause change to
tile better. Logically this will shift the attention from performance indicators of financial
orientation towards integrative decision-making involving one or more factors that can be
manipulated to cause change in the performance of the organization.
The Concept of Critical Performance Factors
In the past various concepts have emerged to assist in the analysis of corporate performance.
For example, the concept of Critical Success Factors (CSF) used as the basis for management
information systems planning (Boynton & Zmud, 1984; Rockan, 1979; Daniel, 1961) and now
increasingly in strategy formulation (King & Zmud, 1982; Hardaker & Ward, 1987). Although
the concept has been found useful for MIS planning (Mar'fin, 1982) and reliable as technique
(Munro, 1983), concern has been voiced relating to the complexity of the attitude
measurements and the inability of managers to deal with complexity, bias by recent events, bias
caused by manager's and analysts, and also that CSF's may not represent causal relationships
(Davis, 1979, 1980). Various other questions arise namely whether an organization in a state
of decline should be emphasizing the same Critical Success Factors ' as an organizaUon doing
very well. The complexity must surely be greater than implied allowing us to propose caution
as to the validity of CSF's for organizations across industries and even when applied to
individual comp,'mies with diverse financial performance within an industry sector.
An other more conceptual approach to performance analysis was the segregation of
causes from the symptoms of failure, proposed by Argenti (1976). The proposition has been
much cited in the literature dealing with corporate failure, but has lacked in terms of further
development and empirical investigation.
In this research a concept of Critical Performance Factors (CPF) is proposed (see
Figure 1), aimed at identifying factors that are influential on the organization's performance
taking into account some of the limitations of available concepts in qu,'ditative performance
analysis.
Although Argenti (1976) pointed out the distinction between the causes and symptoms
of corporate collapse: there is a lack of structure as to how to distinguish the causal factors
effectively from the symptoms, an issue which the CPF concept covers, namely by assuming
that the factor must be manipulatable and therefore directly changeable by management.
Factors identified as CSFs may differ according to the performance level of the
organization necessitating segregation of terms i.e. success vs. failure factors. In this respect
one can revisit Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) and project that organizations
struggling for survival will be more prone to pay attention to basic needs while those
considered highly successful will be occupied by self-actualization. Although. this example is
not an attempt to suggest or prove that Maslow's theor7 can be adopted to organizational
behavior, it is however a convenient frame,york to point out why there may be an important
difference in identified CSFs according to organizational performance level. To put the
argument further, a study was carried out by Kr_er (1989), covering 96 successful and
unsuccessful companies, to explain success and failure of companies. He came to the
" Argenti _ findings have been criticized due to their lack of research backing. D 'Aveni (19S9) concludes that Argenti Is
lindings may not necessarily be defectiv.: but. nevertheless, in a need of confirmation and further development. It must be
recoglfized ho',ve,.er that even though a conceptual framework explaining corporate failure and su,:cess is much needed,
Argenti's _ork as such may be considered to be an imponan: step in that direction, The ha._ic idea that analysts need to
distinguish hct',_ _ei_ cau_,al ', crsu:_ rcacti'. ,: l_l,:tors in the systcn| must thcref,_re he int_'gratcd into ,t t'ran'.e,._ork supposed to
identitY." tn_e causal inl['_act ol';',,:ti'o!l'; on management t_)ol_ I.e f.'PF_
conclusion that fewer factors were cited as successfactors than failure factors and success
factors and failure factors were not necessarily thesame. This being the case it may be more
important to identify CPFs linked to failure in organizations having difficulties, than to identify
the factors linked to success. Thus, enhancing the organization's attention to what is needed
rather than what is fashionable at the time. When the organization has gained control over its
destiny by manipulating tile failure linked CPFs successfully it can start to identify the success
linked CPFs.
The third assumption must be adopted in order to reduce the manager's and
researcher's bias. If the factor can differentiate statistically a dichotomous performance state of
the organization or its sub-components the factor has consequently a value approaching the
critical. Due to the complexity of organizations the identification of CPFs is subject to fads of
the period 3 and the possibility of looking at factors in isolation d or even mixing together causal
and reactive factors. Thus the factors generated must be tested against a dichotomous
performance state for a large sample of organizations in order to identify a statistically
significant difference in management emphasis on relevant factors.
Figure I
The Concept of Critical Performance Factors
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Following what has been suggested so far we c,'m postulate that Critical Performance
Factors (CPF) are factors that are directly controlled by manipulation. There are of course
additional factors, firstly those related to the external environment that cannot be influenced
(by a single company in ordinary circumstances), and secondly factors that affect the quality of
management decisions. As we covered earlier we can agree that management ability will affect
management actions. The problem is, however, how management ability can be measured.
Many would mention education, experience and so forth. The problem arises when we observe
inexperienced managers with basic education that excel in their management responsibilities.
Thus, it is, as discussed before, well founded tlmt the only true measurement of management
abilities is how the manager applies his decision-making capacity vested in his position within
the firm to various factors that can be directly manipulated. Decision making invoh, ing these
factors then collectively becomes the true cause of the corporations ' destine. As a result, any
research dealing with the causes of corporate success or failure has to identify the CPFs, the
factors that really constitute change (to the better or the worse) in the organization. Critical
Performance Factors can therefore be defined as: those factors that can be directly altered by
management decisions resulting in, either individually or collecttvel.v, performance change of
the whole organization or any of its sub-components. In other words CPF are true causal
factors that can be statistically associated with the dichotomous perfonu,'mce state of the
organization.
Scc a good account on this issu,: in: Abraharnsoi_. 1995
To atla,:h too much meaning to a single fa,:tor as a cau:,ality m a complex s?,st:m
Having made this distinction between CPF and performance indicators accordiilg to
tile CPF method, one needs to decide where to place the business environment. Because the
manager has no control over the environment variables (generally speaking) and can
consequently not manipulate environment factors as CPF, leads to the conclusion that the
environment can be neither CPF (causal) nor a PI according to the framework.
If the enviromnent factors can not be adjusted by the management there are
consequently not going to be any symptomatic or success PIs associated with the environment
variables. One can nevertheless not ignore that the external environment is often cited as a
contributor to fluctuations in the failure rate of companies (Goudie & Meeks, 1991; Desai &
Montes, 1982) and as a cause (Newton, 1985). Nevertheless, it is argued here that the external
environment can only pose influence on the manager's decision-making, while the actual cause
will always rest with the application or non-application of the CPFs available to managers.
Only will the environment become a CPF when the firm can influence the environment to its
benefit, like securing favorable treatment or monopolies from the Government. An example of
such a situation would be when the industrialist Ivan Kreuger provided large loans to various
governments around Europe in the 1920's, to secure monopolies in the match market
(Management Today, 1997). One must assume that most firms are not in such a position,
while the availability of a management tool of such caliber today is probably linked to the firm
reaching such a size that its well-being becomes of a national importance. For majority of firms
the environment poses constraints at its worst, that result in the necessity to apply the CPFs if
the firm's well-being and economic rent is to be secured. It is certainly not unknown that
firm's have been under such intensive environment constraints that the only possible decision is
to pull out of markets.
To illustrate the CPF concept we can take an example (see Figt, re 2): managers of an
airline can increase flight frequency in an attempt to improve the profitability of a specific
route. Such change in the causal factor flight frequency' (CPF) can affect the airline in a
number of ways that appear as changes in performance indicators (PI). Performance Indicators
are not causal but symptomatic factors that can take two states depending on where the
manipulation of the CPF is taking the organization i.e., to a symptomatic or success state. If we
examine the negative effects we might see deteriorating load-factor and REVEX ratio. In other
words an emerging symptomatic state of PIs, while movement in the other direction would
constitute an emerging success state of Pls. Taking this example further we c,'m infer that a
change in load-factor is a direct PI, while a ch,'mge in the REVEX ratio would be considered
indirect PI. This stems from the fact that profitability as such is a collective measurement of all
activities within the company, while a change in load-factor on a single route can be traced
directly to manipulation of the CPF route frequency.
It must be made clear, however, that negative manipulation (poor application) of CPF
or even inactivity can lead to misleading positive effects on the PIs, that is make them appear as
emerging success indicators. T_e for example, a reduction in frequency that causes high load
factors (emerging success PI) but poor aircraft utilization, if we assume that the excess of
available aircraft hours can not be applied elsewhere in the network. This stems from the fact
that there is hardly an increase in the overall number of passengers wishing to fly on the route
when frequency is reduced, in fact there is usuall.v a reduction as fewer passengers will lind
convenient flights, causing defection to the competitors or other transport modes. If the aircraft
hours reduced can not be applied elsewhere the end result will be lesser aircraft utilization at a
greater cost than the benefits from an increase in load-factor -_.
The higher the level of a PI (i.e. further from the CPF) the more general and
important it is in terms of indicating the overall performance of the firm. Therefore, it follows
that the causal relationship becomes more complex as the level of the PI is higher. However, it
is important to emphasize that CPFs are all one level factors accessible to management like a
keyboard on a piano is to the player.
Looking at the literature in search for parallel we will see that frequently cited causes
for corporate failure are: poorftnancial information (Clutterbuck. ct al. 1990) lack of control
(Ch,tterbuck. et al, 1990', Slatter. 1984: Buccino. 1991), insufficient working capital
' It is _cll kno_sn in Lh¢ airline industry flint aircraft utilization i., or" an out most import;met due to the higJl fixed costs
as,,ociated '.'.ith th.: air,:ralL Thus. an aLrlinc operating once ;_ da'.. ,ina "_ix hmlr round-trip with g7 percent Ioad-fador and
;u_ ,_ir,:ral_ on th,: _T'Otlt'tt I. for ciL_,'hl,:cn hot_rs, i_ d.'tirtit,.:l:, i_._'.U_ ,)['craticn.d problc._,_ _r',d I_',ai,_r inclli,;i,rncics
(Clutterbuck et al, 1990), management deficiency (Slatter, 1984) and insufficient
margins pricing (Clutterbuck, et al, 1990; Buccino, 1991; Wood, 1989). Using the CPF concept,
insufficient working capital could be regarded as a symptomatic P1 stemming from numerous
factors, including inadequate accounting and m,'magement information system.
Figure 2
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The defective information system then leads to poor financial information, a
symptomatic P1 on level 1. Poor financial information then impacts symptomatic P1 on level 2,
namely working capital and margins. In both cases it can be assumed that the latter two PIs are
negatively impacted due to inadequate information. The final stage in the P1 - Chain is overall
losses, symptomatic P1 on level 3.6 The factors evaluated with the concept of CPF are therefore
_mptomatic Pls rather than causal CPFs. The concept lends itself also well to the analysis of
empirical data as the follo_ng section shows.
Figure 3
Application of The Concept to Existing Findings
(..Accounting system _<) MIS
Decision --_ Inactivity (no development) _ CPFs
Insufficient working capital J Insufficient margins ]
The levels are not necessarily limited to three.
Symptomatic PI: Level 1
Poor financial information 1
Symptomatic PI: Level 2
Losses ]
Symptomatic PI: Level 3
Empirical Identification of Critical Performance Factors
Table 1 shows the results of a research performed on new-entrant airlines in tile United States
and Europe. The airlines where divided into two groups depending on their performance:
distressed if it had made operating losses in the last two years or during any three of the last
five years counted from the year of last available financial data, if not the carrier was judged
non-distressed.
The factors listed have been divided into two parts, Critical Performance Factors
(CPF) and Performance Indicators (PI). The importance of this exertion is to learn first of all
whether organizations at different performance levels differ as to the emphasis placed on
various factors, and secondly in what direction the difference lies. If there is a statistically
significant difference between distressed and non-distressed carriers for that particular factor it
can be declared as either CPF or PI, depending on whether the factor is causal or reactive as
discussed before.
Table 1
Critical Performance Factors for Airlines
T_epe Statement Group Ivlean
CPF + Expansion into new markets Distressed 6,450 v
Non-Distressed 7,550
CPF + Ivlediaadvertising Distressed 5,500 ""
Non-Distressed 7,300
CPF + Cost reduction Distressed 7,500 "
Non-Distressed 8,700
CPF - Hub and spoke operation
CPF - Job rotation
CPF - Alliance with the incumbents
CPF - Computer reservation system
C PF - Yield management system
CPF - Merger/acquisition to gain market-share
CPF - Ma.rket-intelligent information- and communication system

















Note I: = p < .001; ""= p < .01 ;" = p < .05; s, = P <. 1. The factors were rated on a scale from 0 (no importance) to 10
(most important). Note 2: The table is based on the 1993 Survey only.
Source: Gudmundsson. 1998.
On the basis of the direction of the difference it is possible to segregate the CPFs and
the PIs into two groups (see Table 1), i.e. positive or negative difference for non-distressed
carriers. According to the approach positive difference would indicate that the CPF is
associated with non-distress, and can therefore be classified as sttccessfactor (CPF+), while if
the difference is in the other direction it would be classified as failure factor (CPF").
It is important to emphasize that the CPFs whether success or failure orientated do not
necessarily mean that when ,a CPF is emphasized that particular airline is more prone to
failure than an airline not emphasizing tile factor. Rather it means that the airlines observed
having financial difficulties are more likely to emphasize this factor than an airline not under
distress. This can be interpreted in a number of different ways, namely that the airline
emphasizes this factor in order to turnaround its fortunes, or it is emphasizing a factor that does
adversely influence its well-being Looking at the PIs a similar pedagogic applies, namely that
failure Pls are more important to distressed carriers than non-distressed ones.
Table 2
Performance Indicators for Airlines
_e Statement Group Mean
PI + Aircratt utilization Distressed 7,950 w
Non-Distressed 8,850
PI + Decentralized organization structure Distressed 6,250 "
Non-Distressed 4,263
PI + Brand image Distressed 5,895 w
Non-Distressed 7,333
PI + Service quality Distressed 6,350 "
Non-Distressed 8,167
Pl - Achieving critical mass Distressed 6,850 ,e
Non-Distressed 4,824
PI - Investors Sattitudes towards the new-entrant Distressed 7,100 "
Non-Distressed 4,710
PI - Favorable attitude of travel agents Distressed S,300 ,e
Non-Distressed 7,250




The objective of the analysis was to explore the construct reliability of pre-determined scale
divided into three levels according to classification of items into Critical Performance Factors
(CPF) on one hand and Performance Indicators (PI) and Environmental Influence ('El) on the
other hand. Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) was then used to test hypothesis pertaining to
the relationship of first and second order factors.
Population description and response statistics
Questionnaires were used to gather data about the sixty-two component items. The whole world
population of dew-entrant airlines'was identified through the March 1992, and 1997 issues of
Flight International that publishes brief historical and contact information for the world
airlines. The questionnaires were administered twice once in 1993 to 40 airlines and 242
individuals, and again in 1998 to 60 airlines and 282 individuals. The su_'eys 'mailing strategy
was designed in such a way that response rates by airlines would be maximized. Tltis led to an
average of 6 mailings to each airline in 1993 and 4.7 in 1998. Response rates by airlines (see
Table 3) was 65 percent in 1993 and 40 percent in 1998. The lower proportional response rate
in 1998 was probably due to a larger number of airlines included located in areas of the world
not represented previously. Mean testing was used to assess whether there was difference
beV,veen the two groups and significant differences were found for ten items and five items that
were relevant to the models presented here. These items that are identit3 marked in the tables
(see Tables 4 and 5).
Geographicaldispersionf mailings in the 98 Survey was ranging from 50% US,'40%
EU and 10% other countries, while in the 93 Survey it was 49% US and 51% EU. Another
important element was that in the more recent survey about 37% of the airlines have had
operating losses for two or more years preceding the survey and are classified as distressed as a
result. In the first survey this was different with a major half or 55% being in distress. Age
distribution is quite similar for both surveys with most respondents clustering in the 30 to 59
age groups. Education was as expected with most respondents having earned an undergraduate
or graduate degree. In the more recent study ti_ere were however slightly more respondents in
the pilot license group but fewer in the undergraduate group or 35% opposed to 51% in 1993.
Job categorization revealed the most dramatic drop in responses from marketing managers,
while there was an increase in top managers'and the operations managers 'groups.
Data Collection Procedures
The questionnaires for both surveys were almost exactly the same, although the 1998
questionnaire was simplified by eliminating the usage of three time dimensions for the items,
wlfich proved to be of limiting value in the previous research. Furthermore, items were added
and other eliminated on the basis of factor analytical research. However, in the research
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Response rate by airlines 42% (60/25) 65% (40/26)
Age
20- 29 2 2
30-39 12 12
40- 49 12 17
50-59 9 10




Some college 3 2
High school 2 3
Pilotlicefise 5 2
Job categorization
Top managers 9 6
Marketing managers 2 1 l
Operations managers 12 9
Finance managers 6 6
Commercial managers 4 0










The questionnaire was divided into three parts, with the third part acting as means to classify
respondents into various groups. In the research presented here v,e will only deal with items in
part II. In that part the respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 0 to 10, the
i]nportance' placed on the items at the airline. The reason for emphasising the rating of
ihlportance ' placed on each factor at the airline was to distance the respondent from the terms
distress' a,ld don-distress' and attempt to reveal underlying factors that could be associated
with distress and non-distress of new-entrant airlines. This approach was also deemed
appropriate in order to prevent the manager from judging his/her own performance, e.g. what
importance should be placed on the item opposed to what importance is placed on the item, as
such a measurement is potentially biased, especially, in the face of losses or failure. 7
The factors in the questionnaire were all developed on the basis of intuition, and
literature research (see Gudmundsson, 1998) and comments on a pilot questionnaire
(conducted as part of the 1993 Survey). The ten point numerical scale is subject to controversy
such as most attitude scales. Hoinville and Jowell (1989, p.35) conclude in a widely used book
on survey research practice, that much literature is available on the advantages and defects of
attitude scaling methods, but
...since a rating scale is not an absolute measure of attitude but a way of placing people
in relative positions on a dimension, there is no particular way of presenting scales
that is intrinsically better than others. The object should be to find the way that
discriminates most effectively between respondents.
Having this in mind and the original characteristic of the task (discrimination) the
selected scale was considered to suit its purpose well. The questionnaire can be considered to be
of medium length, although, the answering process may have placed considerable demand on
the respondent 's attitude to various issues. However, no statement or factor required
information that was necessary to search for in company records. Due to the possible
sensitivity of information provided by respondents much emphasis was placed on
confidentiality and to identify the questionnaire with a reputable organisation in order to
facilitate a sense of security for respondents.
RESULTS OF EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Estimates
Coefficient alpha was used to assess scale reliability for each subscale constructed, based on the
latent factors. Reliability for subscales varied for Alpha from (o_ =.52) to good internal
consistency (eL= .86). Nunnally (1978) suggested, an alpha of 0.5 or 0.6 being sufficient at the
outset of research and all 17 factors extracted met the minimum criteria. One factor had only
one item and was as a consequence excluded from further analysis. A number of factors had
three items loading but one item with a loading of less than 0.40, such items were deleted from
the analysis. This deletion raised the number of factors with two items only from four to six.
Spector (1992) argues that factors of less than three items are likely not to be useful. This
argument was deemed to be valid in terms of the two item scales needing further development
in future research, but not substantiating the deletion of the factors from further consideration.
Measure purification in the construction of theoretical scales was not made into an aim
in itself, although correlation matrixes were constructed to see if any of the items used in the
scales had non-significant correlation with all of the other items. Nunnally (1978)
recommended that items with consistently low correlation (< .30) to be deleted, this led to a
number of deletions from the item list. Furthernlore. according to Churchil] (1979) items with
low factor Ioadings (< .40) xvere deleted from the analysis.
Models
"['his h,:lievc el manager',' '._ilitn_less to justif 3 their a,:tion, or "..:ok ,2xptanatlolx:, lrom th_ ct_,.irormlent for losses or
l'tlitire, is clearly apparcm l'rottl the literature
Thefirst level ,,_:ploratoryfactor analysis (see Table 4) was rooted in the CPF analogy and as
such is constnlcted from observed items that can be directly manipulated by airline managers.
The factor anaJysis resulted in 10 factors (see Table 4). The first factor was labeled _ervice
strategy '(c_ = .86) explaining 22.4% of the variance and consisting of five items. The name of
the factor was based on the items being related with items important to serve business
passengers. An airline that is high on this dimension will tend to believe in the importance of
high yield passengers. The factor loading r,'mged from 0.77 to 0.46. Tile second factor was
labeled goute strategy/(o_ = .67) and explains 11.1% of the total v,'uiance. This dimension
consists of three items with factor loading ranging from 0.88 to 0.42. One item had a loading
below 0.40 and was deleted. Items in this factor seemed to measure issues associated with
setting up and maintaining efficient routes. An airline that scores high on this factor will tend
to believe in the importance of setting up and maintaining efficient route structures with well
connected flights. The third factor was labeled dost competitiveness '(tx = .69) explained 7.0%
of the total variation. This dimension consists of three items with factor loading ranging from
0.86 to 0.47. One item had a loading below 0.40 and was deleted from consideration. An
airline scoring high on this factor tends to believe in the importance of relative cost
competitiveness, by keeping costs in check and research the competitors ' actions.
Table 4
Factor Results for Critical Performance Factors (CPF)
Component
...D._t._.t..f_._o_ ...............................................c..o..me..o_.t..9._...........u.._........so ....._!_:.....L.o._L._._.!..v.._:.
Service strategy 7.613 22.392
Alpha = .8550 Frequent flyer programs 5.25882 3.40921 .770
Business passengers 6.89412 3.17739 .751
Yield management system 7.0 [ 190 2.77958 .637
Hub and spoke operations 5.06129 3.48176 .464
Feeder airline agreements 4.41667 3.16682 .45g
Route strategy 3.763 l 1.066
Alpha = .6665 Matching of aircraft size with route 7.38095 2.46357 .g75
requirement
Interlining agreements 5.76471 2.94249 .586
Acquisition ofairport slots 6.36471 3.38360 .417
(Commission overrides)
Cost competitiveness 2.363 6.950
Alpha = .6922 Increase margins* 8.23529 1.79050 .g59
Cost control 8.84706 1.41847 .615






Employe_' incentive program 5.51765 2.81836 .762
Managers'incentive program 5.g5714 2.8g734 .757
(Management teams)
Cycle-fleet-debt awaren. 1.91 g 5.64 l
Alpha = .6594 Debt reduction* 6.11111 3.07834 .g76
Acquisition of new aircral_ 7.12941 2.77226 .502
Forecasting adverse effecls of the 6.42000 2.14593 .475
economy on the airline
Fuel costs 7.05952 2.16768 .432
Information systems 1.725 5.074
Alpha= .7072 Logisticssystents 6.42169 2.20994 .715
Control systems 6.88095 1.97246 .534
Inter departmental communication 6.55294 1.98510 .414
Labour flexibility 1.390 4.088
Alpha= .6191 Flcxible job descriptions* 6.38824 2.46931 .884
Job rotation* 4.04788 2.31694 .551
Market demand 1.237 3.640
Alpha = .5439 Media advertising 6.20238 2.29793 .902
Market research 6.36905 2.15903 .471
Price leadership in served markets 6.86747 2.73762 .433
(Expansion into new markets)
Financial restructuring I. 142 3,359
Alpha = .6178 Cost reduction 8.1411g 1.94050 .756
Reduction of labor costs 6.6904S 2 76016 .654
External grox_.h 1.025 3.015
_97._, .631.Mpha = ,5462 .Merger acquisition to gain market share 3.11271 _ "_'r"
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Alliance with the incumbents* 5.3421.2 3.04764 .522
Diversification into other industries 1.50094 2.21154 .412
• Significantly different between 93 ,and 98 Surveys.
The fourth factor was labeled performance incentives (ct = .82) and explained 5.7% of
the total variation. This dimension consisted of two items with approximately the same factor
loading of 0.76. One item had a loading below 0.40 and was deleted from consideration. An
airline who scores high on this factor will emphasize incentive programs as a tool to motivate
employees. The fifth factor labeled dycle-fleet-debt awareness '(ct = .66) explained 5.6% of the
variation. This dimension consisted of four items with loading ranging from 0.88 to 0.43. An
airline which scores high on this factor tends to have high awareness of the impact of economic
cycles and debt in tile fleet acquisition process. The sixth factor labeled ihformation systems '
(or = .71) explained 5.1% of the total variation. It consists of three items x_ith loading ranging
from 0.72 to 0.41. An airline that scores high on tiffs factor tends to believe in the importance
of organizational integration as well as control through information systems.
The seventh factor labeled lhborflexibility '(or = .62) explained 4.1% of the total
variation. It consists of two items with loading of 0.88 and 0.55. An airline that scores high on
this factor tends to believe in the importance of flexible workforce and job rotation to motivate
employees and achieve responsiveness to customers' needs, e.g. service quality. The eight
factor labeled _arket demand'(et =.54) explained 3.6% of the total variation. The factor
consists of three items with loading ranging from 0.90 to 0.43. One item had a loading below
0.40 and was deleted from consideration. An airline scoring high on this factor places high
importance on stimulating demand though advertising and price leadership that is well
grounded through market research. The ninth factor labeled financial restructuring '(or = .62)
explained 3.4% of the total variation. Two items loaded on this factor with loading of 0.76 and
0.65. Airlines scoring high on this factor are in the process of reducing costs opposed to
keeping costs in check, as a result high ranking implies restructuring. The tenth factor labeled
as external growth _(ct = .55) explained 3.0% of the total variation. Tiffs factor consists of
three items with loading ranging from 0.63 to 0.41. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend to
seek growth through external means such as mergers and alliances.
The second level ,,_:ploratory factor analysis (see Table 5) was rooted in tile Performance
Indicator and External lnfluence analogy, and as such is constructed from observed items that
can normally not be directly manipulated by airline managers.
Table 5 .
Factor Results for Performance Indicators and External Influence (PUEI)
Productivity
Alpha = .7830
Deten'ninant factors Component Items Component
Mean SD Ei_._mv. Loadin_
5.713
Employees'productivity 8.23529 1.72273 .730
Shared company vision 6.65882 2.58914 .687
Company culture 7.51765 2.02138 .674
Aircraft utilization 8.53571 1.40955 .523
Service quality 8.12941 1.85670 .517








Brand image 7.70024 2.18913
Favorable attitude oftravelagents 7.30588 2.38559
(Quality of terminal space and
ground facilities)


































Achieving critical m_s.s 5.6707[ 2.97675




Alpha= .5620 Comput,._r,.'.s,:rvationsyslems 7.25882 2.61020
Passenger load factors 7.57647 2.07236






The first factor labeled p'roductivity '(or = .78) 28.6% of the total variation. This
factor consists of six items with loading ranging from 0.73 to 0.40. Airlines scoring high on
this factor tend to believe that high productivity, quality and long-term profitability, is achieved
through shared employee beliefs, reflected in vision and culture. The second factor labeled
Brand image/(o_ = .67) explained l l.0% of the total variation. This factor consists of two
items with loading of 0.73 and 0.60. One item had a loading below 0.40 and was deleted from
consideration. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend to emphasize brand image, believing in
its importance in the distribution network in terms of favorable attitude of travel agents. The
third factor labeled dmpowerment ' (or = .69) explained 7.5% of the total variation. It consists
of three items with loading ranging from 0.69 to 0.54. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend
to believe in employee's autonomy and the practice of delegation. The fourth factor labeled
dxternal constraints '(ct = .64) explained 6.9% of the total variation. The factor consists of two
items with loading of 0.80 ,and 0.53. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend to believe in the
importance of facilitating the airline's wellbeing through external influence. The ftRh factor
labeled dzarket power t(ot = .52) explained 6.1% of the total variation. It consists of three items
with loading ranging from 0.94 to 0.42. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend to believe in
the importance of size in order to auract investment in the airline. The seventh factor
distribution effectiveness t(ct = .56) explained 5.0% of the total variation. The factor consists
of two items with loading of 0.87 and 0.41. Airlines scoring high on this factor tend to believe
in the importance of computers reservation systems to boost passenger load factors.
RESULTS OF CORRELATION
AND MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Hypothesis
A number of hypothesis were formulated based on literature review and case studies in order to
predict relationships between the factors, identified across the two levels: CPF and CI/EI.
The second level factor productiviO" is assumed to represent how airlines believe that high
productivity, quality and long-term profitabilit)' is achieved through shared employees ' beliefs,
reflected in vision and culture. As a result, it is assumed that the factor is related to first level
factors that have positive impact on employees'productivity, while factors such as financial
restructuring will either have negative or non-significant relation with productivity. This stems
from the assumption that employee reduction or other forms of cost reduction will. create
tensions (Doherty and Horsted, 1996) associated x_sth reduced productivity in the respondents '
mind, this assumption is made regardless of whether such negative productivity, impact occurs
or not. What is clear, however, is that cost reductions and employee redundancies will most
likely affect the business culture and vision in an adverse way in the short-term.
H_: Productivity will be significantly related to se_'ice strateg3, route strategy,
performance incentives, ixfformation systems and labor flexibility.
The factor brand inmge is assumed to represent airlines that believe in the importance of the
brand to penetrate the distribution netxvork in tenus of favorable attitude of travel agents (TA).
An important fact here is that an estimated 41% of business travelers and 55% of leisure
travelers leave carrier choice to their TAs. while 51% of TAs selected the carrier the'," had
eoumfission override xxith (Traxcl Agency Nl;lrkct Surae_. 19S7) Brand image as such has to
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workasselectionadvantagein a case of two similar choices, not only with the TA but also the
passenger depending on who exercises the decision poxver. Tile creation of brand image in the
minds of these two groups is probably somewhat different although no studies exist to support
that assumption. As a result, it is expected that the factor is significantly related to service
strategy because service is an important function of brand image. Another service element is
route strate_' providing for as close a match as possible with what the TA expects, e.g. good
connections (function of interlining agreements), convenient departure times (function of
airport slots) and frequency (function of matching aircraft size with route requirement). The
last item can imply two things: i) that more frequency with smaller equipment is more
favorable especially in terms of business passengers; it) that the airline should be competent in
adjusting aircraft size with demand to reduce the probability of passenger diversion from
specific flights (involves more time spent on behalf of the TA finding a flight). Brand image is
also expected to be related to labor flexibility, as positive staff willing to walk that extra mile
for the benefit of the passenger has a strong impression on the customer (Airline Executive,
1990). This is what Carlson (1987) termed as turning the organizational pyramid upside down,
empowering the front-line staff to take unprecedented decisions for the customers ' benefit at
their specific level. Further, if the concept is expanded one can assume that flexible job
descriptions increase the responsiveness of the organization a potentially important element in
facilitating brand image and proactive service provision. Finally, market demand is expected to
be related to brand image. The factor market demand is composed of items dealing with
advertising and market research, both of which shape the ability of the airline to build its brand
image. In the past new-entrant carriers, with PeoplExpress being file prime example, have had
brand image conflicts due to changes in strategy, such as no-frills to frills, projected to the
market through advertising (Davidow and Uttal, 1989). Based on past case histories
(Gudmundsson, 1998) new-entrants should be aware of the impact of service strategy on brand
image in the long-term.
H_,: Brand image will be signific,'mtly related with service strategy, route strategy,
labor flexibility and market demand.
Airlines scoring high on the factor empowerment tend to believe in employee's autonomy
(Thomas & Velthouse, 1990) and the practice of delegation to achieve higher performance. As
such the factor is expected to be significantly related with labor flexibility. Labor flexibility
increases the necessity to cooperate, just as job rotation as a function of empowerment
introduces to the employee different functions and stimulates proactive (Spreitzer, 1995)
behavior and cross-departmental knowledge. Labor flexibility as an element of empowerment is
also a crucial cost saving tool, by cross-training staff to perform various functions and make
decisions. As a result, empowerment is expected to be significantly related cost
competitiveness.
H3: Empowerment will be significantly related to labor flexibility and cost
competitiveness.
Airlines scoring high on e.rternai conslraints tend to believe in the importance of facilitating
the airline's well-being through external influence. Policy making in air transport is high on
the agenda in most countries, although, one can assume that the nature of airlines 'influence on
governments and agencies has changed in liberalized and deregulated markets. For new-
entrants, opposed to large incumbents, we can expect some variation in interest, with two issues
high on the agenda being CRS biases (Beuvais, 1993) and lack of slots (Morrell, 1998). As a
result, it is expected that route strategy will be significantly related to external constraints.
Furthermore. external constraints influence costs and governmental influence, federal or local,
is often necessar) when entering or protecting markets. As a result, external constraints are
expected to be positively related with cost competitiveness.
Ha: External constraints will be significantly related to route strategy and cost
competitiveness.
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It was assumed that airlines scoring high on market power tcnd to bclicvc in the importancc
of size in order to attract investment in the airline. As a result, it is expected that factors
dealing with the nct_vork, competitiveness, routes, grov_1h, integration and reputation in the
financial community to be important. The following factors arc expected to have significant
relationship with market power: service strategy, route strategy, cost competitiveness,
information systems, market demand, financial restructuring and external growth. Service
strategy includes items such as hub and spoke networks that are important to create scale
(Bania, Bauer and Zlatoper, 1998) usually ,assumed necessary to achieve market power. Route
strategy includes items such as acquisition of slots that is necessary.' to achieve nmrket-share.
Cost competitiveness is a vehicle towards market power, allowing the airline to offer
competitive prices in order to build market share. The PIMS (Buzzel & Gale, 1987) program
identified low prices without cost competitiveness and quality as ,an vehicle towards market
share as being non-sustainable strategy. Information systems are necessary to keep the
organization integrated, especially if it grows fast, which is a characteristic of market-share
driven businesses. Market demand is the vehicle towards market power, composed of
advertising, market research and price leadership. Financial restructuring such as cost
reduction and labor cost reduction especially is important to show firm control (Flint, 1999) in
the business, in turn creating favorable image within the financial community that provides
capital necessary expansion programs to reach critical mass and market share. External growth
is the final factor expected to be related to market power. This factor was not emphasized
highly by most respondents as can be seen from the item averages. However, ,alliances is most
prominent and especially important for an airline wishing to achieve critical mass quickly.
Us: Market power will be significantly related to service strategy, route strategy, cost
competitiveness, information systems, market demand, financial restructuring
and external growth.
Airlines scoring high on distribution effectiveness tend to believe in the importance of
computers reservation systems to boost passenger load factors. For new-entrants the attitude on
this factor should be diverse as some do not participate in CRSs, while those that do have
strong views on a partial stand of the CRS owner airlines (Feldman, 1997). It is expected that
this factor is significantly related to service strategy, route strategy and market demand.
Computer reservation systems are important to communicate information about products, e.g.
distribute the product. Service strategy creates the right product that is pushed through the
distribution systems and ,affects load utilization. Route strateg3' provides is composed of items
pertaining to capacity, connections, and convenient departure times and routes through
availability of slots. As all of these items are communicated through the CRS as an distribution
element (product) it is expected that route strategy is significantly related to distribution
effectiveness. The final factor expected to be Significantly related with distribution effectiveness
is market demand. Advertising, market research and price leadership that compose the factor,
are items that are communicated through the CRS and impact loads.
H6: Distribution effectiveness will be significantly related service strategy, route
strategy and market demand.
The testing of the hypotheses will be conducted through correlation analysis across the mo
levels CPF and PI/'EI and then followed by multiple linear regression analysis to explore further




(r = .34, p <
.01). Brand
S\StClllS [r =
analysis (see Fi_lrc 4 and Table 6) revealed that the second level factor
was significantly correlated with sen'ice strategy (r = -.21, p < .05) route strategy
.0 I). cycle-fleet-debt awareness (r = .44, p < .01) and labor flexibility (r = .32, p <
image was significantly related service strategy (r = .35. p < (')l), in_formation
-.3(L p < .I)5) and labor flexibility (r = 25. I' < .05)
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Empowerment was significantly related with route strategy (r = .44, p < .01) and cost
competitiveness (r = .41, p < .01). External constraints was significantly related only with cost
competitiveness (r = .38, p < .01). Market power was significantly related with service strategy
(r = .32, p < .05), cost competitiveness (r = .26, p < .05), information systems (r = .31, p < .05),
external growth (r = .25, p < .05) and weak significance with financial restructuring (r = .21, p
< .1). Distribution effectiveness had significant correlation with service strategy (r = .37, p <
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-1ailed).
,e Correlation is significant at the 0.l level (2-tailed).
Results of Multiple Linear Regression
Stepwise approach was used for variable entry in the Multiple Linear regression (MLR) analysis.
Collinearity was examined through tolerance and VIF analysis and no factor posed problems in
the analysis. The MLR models explanation power of the dependent variables ranged from 7 to 49
percent.
The outcomes of productivity. The results of the stepwise MLR analysis supported
Hypothesis 1 and the factors in the model explained 49 percent of the variation in the depended
variable. The results showed that productivity was significantly related to route strategy (33 = .33,
p < .001), labor flexibility (,/3 = .29, p < .01) and service strategy (,8 = -. 19, p < .05). Other factor
that entered the model were cycle-fleet-debt awareness (/3 = .41, p < .001) and market demand (13
=. 16, p < .05). Variable contribution to the model was detected through change in R e (cycle-fleet-
debt awareness, dR" =. 195, p < .001; route strategy, dR" =. 130, p < .001; labor fle:dbility, dR-" =
.097, p < .01; service strategy, dR-" = .037, p < .05; market demand, AR e = .033, p < .05).
Hypotheses 1 is supported, but two factors performance incentives and information _'stems did
not enter the model, while two other factors did: cycle-fleet-debt awareness and market demand.
The outcomes of brand image. The results of the MLR analysis partially supported
Hypothesis 2 and the factors in the model explained 31 percent of the variation in the depended
variable. The results showed that brand inmge was significantly related to service strate_, (/3 =
17
.32,p < .01) and labor flexibility (,6' = .2 I, p < .05). However, two other factors contributed to the
explained variation in brand image, namely information systems (/5' = -.26, p < .01) and
perfonnance incentives (,8 =. 17, p <. 1). The change in R" was examined to detect each factors
contribution to the explained variation in R 2 (service strategy, dR" = . 124, p < .01; information
systems, ,dR 2 = .090, p < .01; labor flexibility, zlR" = .055, p < .05; performance incentives, AR 2 =
.040, p <. I). Hypothesis 2 is supported by two expected factors but two factors did not enter the
model, route strategy and market demand, while two theoretically unexpected factors entered,
information systems and performance incentives.
The outcomes of empowerment. The results of the MLR analysis partially supported
Hypotheses 3 ,and the factors in the model explained 35 percent of the variation in the depended
v,'u'iable. The results showed that empowerment was significantly related to route strategy (,8 =
.35, p < .001) and cost competitiveness (,8 = .33, p < .001). The change in R 2 was examined to
detect each factors contribution to the explained variation in R 2 (route strategy, AR 2 = .19, p <
.001; cost competitiveness, AR 2 = .16, p < .01). The model supports Hypotheses 3 in terms of
factor cost competitiveness entering the model. However, an theoretically unexpected factor route
strategy entered instead of the expected labor flexibility.
The outcomes of ,,rternal con_tralnts. The results of the stepwise MLR analysis
supported Hypotheses 4 and the factors in the model explained 15 percent of the variation in the
depended variable. The results showed that external constraints was significantly related to cost
competitiveness (fl = .31, p < .01). No other factors entered the model.
Table 7
Results of Multiple Regression Analysis
ZX,R_ p SE Beta t Sig.

































.409 .080 .446 5.146 .000
.333 .080 .361 4.175 .000
.288 .080 .313 3.620 .001
-.185 .081 -.198 -2.288 .025
.164 .078 .182 2.105 .039
Adj. R= .455 F = 13.187 Sig. .000
.319 .090 .354 3.636 .001
-.262 .067 -.299 -2.989 .004
.208 .089 .234 2.340 .022
.173 .087 .200 1.997 .050
Adj. R2 .270 F = 7.737 S_. .000
.351 .078 .430 4.507 .000
.327 .077 .403 4.225 .000
Adj. R2 .334 F = 19.330 S0. .000
.314 .089 .383 3.522 .001
Adj R2 .135 F =12.404 Sig.
.298 .097 .298 3.061 .003
.292 .094 .300 3.093 .003
.258 .095 .264 2.720 .008
.240 .099 .235 2.415 .018
.197 .094 .202 2.083 .041
A_.R 2 .313 F = 7.651 Sig. .000
.373 .094 .388 3.984 .000
.343 .095 ,351 3.604 .001
.207 .092 .220 2.254 ,027
Adj. R2 .307 F = 11,790 Sig. .1300
The outcomes of market power. The results of tile MLR analysis supporled H)l_otheses
5 and the factors in the model explained 36 percent of the variation in the depended variable. The
results showed that m_ket power is significantly related to service strategy (,8 = .30, p < .01),
i_ormation systems (fl= .29, p < .01), cost competitiveness (,6'= .26, p < .01), external growth (/3'
= .24, p < .05) and financial restructuring (/7 = .20, p < .05). Variable contribution to the model
was detected through change in R: (service strategy, AR: = .103, p < .01; information systems,
AR: = .097, p < .01; cost competitiveness, AR 2 = .067, p < .05; external grm,,1.h. AR -_= .052, p <
.05; financial restructuring, AR" = .041, p < .05). All factors entering the model were expected,
but two additional factors expected did not enter, route strategy and market demand.
The outcomes of distribution effectiveness. The results of the stepwise MLR analysis supported
Hypotheses 7 and the factors in the model explained 34 percent of the variation in the depended
variable. The results showed that distribution effectiveness was significantly related labor
flexibility (,6'= .37, p < .001), service strategy (j3 = .34, p < .01) and market demand (,8 = .21, p <
.05). Variable contribution to the model was detected through change in R 2 (labor flexibility, AR 2
= .159, p < .001; service strategy, AR -_= .128, p < .01; market demand, AR-" = .048, p < .05).
Hypotheses 7 is supported but an unexpected variable entered the model, labor flexibility instead
of the expected route strategy.
DISCUSSION
Practical implications
The major findings are that a PI factor labeled productivity has the strongest relationship with
CPF factors labeled cycle-fleet-debt awareness, route strategy, labor flexibility, service strategy
and market demand. The first factor cycle-fleet-debt awareness that explains comparatively most
of the variation in productivity, can be related to its proactive nature of preparing for industry
downturn in order to preserve the overall airline productivity. The second factor route strategy
deals the matching of resources x_ith requirements and binding together the various components
of a route to provide optimum service given tile resources available. As such, it is quite logical
that route strategy has positive relationship with productivity. Labor fle.,dbility is another clearly
related factor, as has been demonstrated by so many new-entrant airlines, such as PeoplExpress
that were able to achieve lower costs through greater staff fie,,dbility. Service strategy had a
negative relation with productixSty. After close examination, this is not an unexpected finding, as
service strategy is composed of items related to business passengers that require more service in
terms of time, ex-pensive se_ice features such as empty middle seat, reducing the overall
perceived productivity although the revenue implications might be positive. The last factor
market demand deals with the generation of demand through advertising but also research and
price leadership. As such it has spill-over effect on how the employees view the airline they work
for - a well researched marketing campaign reinforces the employees sense of purpose. What is
more such campaign is essential to generate demand to maintain utilization of resources,
especially at the outset of opening new routes.
There were four factors that were related to brand image: service strategs', information
systems, labor flexibility and performance incentives. Service strategy deals with what product the
airline is offering as is, therefore, logically associated _ith brand image. Positive brand image has
important impact on demand, whose interaction with the airline is in most cases through travel
agents. The pull of brand image is therefore through systems that must be well integrated to
reinforce the image created through an effective service strategy. Labor flexibility is crucial for
creating a good impression while experiencing a brand that has viewed highly before use.
Flexibility allows the emplo.vees to react quickly and effectively to acute situations, creating a
good impression with tile passenger, e.g. employees ability to react to special situations will either
reinforce or destroy a good brand image during the consumption stage. This is a well documented
de facto in services marketing Performance incentives was the last factor contributing to the
variation in brand image. Here again the expected relationship is the motivation of employees to
provide good impression in the process of their jobs - to _alk that extra mile to make a difference.
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Two factors contributed to the explanation of the variation in empowerment:..route
strategy and cost competitiveness. Route strategy, docs not have an obvious theoretical
relationship with empowennent. However, cost competitiveness has as it is expected that
empowennent will have positive impact on the airline's effectiveness and flexibility.
External constraints was related with one factor, cost competitiveness. Here it seems that
management 's external contacts and ability to influence government policy can have cost
implications for the airline. It was expected that there would be difference between European and
US carriers on the items composing factor external constraints, but a t test showed a non-
significant difference between the two groups. As such the factor must, therefore, be viewed as
having communality between both groups and constitute an element in achieving cost
competitiveness.
Five factors contributed to the variation in market power: service strategy, information
systems, cost competitiveness, external growth and financial restructuring. Market power
represents the emphasis the airline levies on size and investor's attitudes towards the airlines. The
investors, of course, playing a crucial role in raising capital necessary for market-share building
and the resulting critical mass. The vehicle towards sustainable market power has to be service
strategy, which attracts business passengers, keeps them loyal (frequent flyer programs), captures
customers through economies of density and scope (hub and spoke) and pro,,-ides maximum yields
through a yield management system, in the face of potentially fierce competition. Information
systems become increasingly important as the organization grows. Thus, it is not surprising to see
a relationship between market power (size empluasis) and information systems (organizational
integration). Cost competitiveness is another important vehicle towards market power as it is
unlikely that the airline will reach size without cost competitiveness. This is more relevant ot
new-entrant airlines as such airlines emerge from size disadvantage (subject to the market power,
of incumbents) and must as a consequence acltieve substantial advantage on this factor. External
growth is an external means to an end. Where the airline emphasizes quick expansion through
alliances and mergers. Diversification into other industries one of the items in the sub-scale was
not emphasized much by any of the airlines but showed nevertheless correlation with the
underlying factor. Financial restructuring was the fifth and final factor that was found to be
related with the factor market power. Here it is assumed that financial restructuring is an vehicle
towards positive image in the financial community to maintain capital influx for further
expansion and increased staying power during industry recession.
Three factors contributed to the explanation of the variation in distribution effectiveness:
labor flexibility, service strategy and market demand. An obvious theoretical explanation for the
explanatory power of labor flexibility to distribution effectiveness was not found. However,
service strategy' is an important element in the distribution system as such. This stems from the
fact that distribution system presence is not enough, there has to be a sellable product in order for
travel agents to search the CRS and sell the airline. The third and last item market demand is
obviously related as it deals with targeted advertising of the airline's products, with most of the
selling going through the TA's and the CKS.
Limffafions
The results should be viewed in the light of the data's limitations. The population of new-entrant
airlines is small, necessitating a longitudinal approach to boost the number of cases. To validate
the scales with higher degree of certainty still more cases are needed, although, this study almost
reached the recommended (Spector, 1992) minimum of 100 cases.
The longitudinal approach necessitates high degree of concurrence between responses
over a period of time. The study sho_ved that similarity in rating strengths is de facto for the two
studies as few items showed statistical difference of the means, implying an important trait in the
constructs. For the items showing significant difference the explanation appears to be that the
fonner study was done during an industr7 recession and the second during an industry up-turn.
As a result, items associated with the financial aspects of airLine management were basically the
only ones showing a significant difference between the two studies.
Findings of previous research are sometimes related to the symptoms that result from the
application of management tools Thus. one must make it clear that managers should not attempt
to forge changes in the s3mptomatic indicators but emphasize changes in the actual tools
2q)
according to concrete analysis as to the impact that such change will have on the organization.
The research presented here attempted to link together the tools and the indicators. Although the
instrument administered to the airline managers may still need improvement it is important as an
initial step to identify useful constructs and underlying factors that can provide for a standard
qualitative scale measuring airline management. What is important to note is that the scale takes
external approach in order to make the association of actual variation in strength applied to the
items easier to associate with the airline's performance. This approach was taken to reduce the
impact of sbcial desirability' (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964) on the rating strength, e.g. ratings
according to what is generally accepted in the industry or to make one look good externally.
The factor analytical approach identified a number of sub-scales that showed good
internal consistency among items and therefore worthwhile to research further in a wider context,
such as among managers of other airline populations. Furthermore, the relationship among
factors at the two levels showed interesting trends that need further confirmation. However, it
must also be made clear that, as with all factor analytical, studies there may be a number of
different factors possible based on the data. What is more the elimination of one item from the
analysis can substantially change the final outcome of the analysis. This fact does, however, not
undermine the value of factor analytical study as a factor that is proved to be stable in separate
studies and measure what it allegedly is supposed to measure is valuable to researchers.
Conclusion
In this study the first steps have been taken in creating scales according to a concept of multiple
levels of qualitative factors explaining airline management performance. A number of constructs
have been suggested that will need further research. It is hoped that this attempt at creating
constructs for qualitative research into airline management will spark interest in validation and
further research into qualitative measurement instruments in airline research. The results of this
study support the viability of the concept of CPF and PI for qualitative research.
The relatively simple framework presented in the paper on distinguishing between causal
factors, performance indicators and environment influence, should be considered by researchers
and practitioners wishing to research and understand the qualitative factors related to airline
management.
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STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND FIRM VALUE: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF THE BRITISH AIRWAYS/USAIR ALLIANCE
ABSTRACT
This study examines the effects of an international alliance on the value of partner firms as
well as their rival firms. We find that over a series of events leading to the British
Airways/USAir alliance, partner firms' abnormal returns respond positively to "promising"
events that increase the likelihood of that alliance, whereas they respond negatively to
"discouraging" events that decrease the likelihood. In contrast, rival firms' abnormal returns
decrease following promising events while they increase following discouraging events. Our
further analysis, however, does not reveal evidence for degree of rivalry with partner firms
as a moderator in explaining the effects on rival firms' value. Our findings suggest that
international alliances appear to strengthen partner firms' competitive positions which in
turn threatens the competitive positions of rival firms, thus decreasing the rivals' value.





selection,governancestructure,andevolutionof alliance(e.g.,Burgers,Hill, & Kim, 1993;
Hamel, 1991;Inkpen, 1995;Parkhe,1991).The otherinvestigatesthe consequences of
alliance itself such as alliance duration, stability, and longevity, and its influence on the
performance of firms entering alliances (e.g., Dussauge & Garrette, 1995; Geringer &
Herbert, 1989). Unlike the procedural issues of alliance heavily examined by conceptual and
empirical research, the aspects of alliance consequences have received relatively less attention
from scholars. In particular, the question of whether alliance formation increases or decreases
the value of participating firms has been scarcely tested. A few empirical efforts (Chan,
Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997; Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998) studied changes in partner
firms' stock prices when the partners announced new alliances. Yet the consequences of
alliance formation on rival firms rather than partner firms, with a few exceptions (Singh &
Mitchell, 1996), have been neglected in the alliance literature. In the international context,
the question of whether international alliance formation affects rival firms' as well as partner
firms' value has been even hardly tested by empirical as well as conceptual works.
This study aims to expand the alliance literature into the effects of alliance
announcements on the value of partner firms as well as their rival finns in the international
setting. A firm's strategic position in an industry may be jeopardized by the alliances
established by its competitors since the competitors take advantage of economies of scale or
scope by pooling similar facilities or combining complementar-?, assets (Hamel, Doz,
Prahalad, 1989; Kogut, 1988). In particular, international alliances may be more influential as
comparedto domesticalliances.Internationalalliancesenabledomesticfirms to access




This study also expandsthe extanteventstudieson alliance formation into the
longitudinalsetting.A longitudinalapproachis desirableto examinestock price changes
whenfirmsreleasea seriesof promisinganddiscouragingannouncementsabouttheir future
alliances.Previous.studiesusedcross-sectionalapproachesby focusing on stock market
reactionsto thefinal announcements of alliance formation (Chanet al., 1997; Das et al.,
1998). Yet, when there are prior announcements about a future alliance, the contents of those
announcements may affect investors' evaluation on the likelihood of that alliance. In contrast
with promising announcements that favorably affect partner firms' value, discouraging ones
may reveal negative influences on their value. Consequently, stock market reactions to the
final announcement may be diluted by the previous announcements. Hence, the cross-
sectional method relying on only the final announcement is problematic in such cases.
We focus on a particular alliance rather than developing a sample of many
international alliances due to the following reasons. The requirement of our research design,
international alliances should have a series of announcements that ideally include both
promising and discouraging contents, strictly constrains the available sample size for our
study. The requirement further complicates how to aggegate different international alliances
with varying numbers and series of events into a sample. Varying series of events for each
alliance affect investors' assessments on the likelihood of an alliance being consummated at
different levels. Further, a large-sample approach creates empirical issues that are difficult to
manage.It appearsvagueto distinguishbetweenpartnerandrival firmsandishardto control
for interactionamongallianceformationwhena largenumberof firms are involvedin the
formationprocessesof multiplealliances.Thus,wechoosean internationalalliancebe_veen
BritishAirways (BA) andUSAir asthe researchsettingfor this study.First, thealliance
createdninedifferentannouncementsovernearlyeightmonths,five of thempromisingand
fourdiscouraging.Thisallowsusto conducta longitudinalstudythatexamineshowaseries
of announcementsaffectthevalueof partnerfirmsaswell astheir rivals.Second,thestock-
marketdata for both partnerand rival firms areavailablefor the periodof the alliance
formation.Further,partnerandrival firms werelistedin thesamestockmarketduringthe
allianceformationperiod,whichallowsustocontrolformarket-specificfactors.
In this study, we define internationalalliancesas voluntary and continuous
arrangementsbetweenfirms from differentcountriesthatinvolveexchange,sharing,or co-
developmentof products,technologies,or services(Gomes-Casseres,1996;Harrigan,1988).
Partnerfirms refer to firms enteringan internationalalliancewhereasrival firms to firms
outsidethatallianceandcompetingagainsthepartnerfirms. A promising(a discouraging)
eventreferstotheannouncementthatincreases(decreases)the likelihoodof analliancebeing
consummated.Basedon sucha premisethat firms enteringanallianceexpectits potential
benefitsto begreaterthanits potentialcosts,we proposethat abnormalretumsto partner
firmsincrease(decrease)followingpromising(discouraging)events.By contrast,wepropose
the oppositerelationshipbe_veeneventtypesand abnormalreturnsto rival firms, since
partnerfirmsmayharmtherivals'competitivepositionsthroughenteringanalliance.Further.
weproposethatdegreeof rivalry with partnerfirmsaffectsabnormalreturnsto rivat firms.
Specifically,weexpecthatpromising(discouraging)eventsdecrease(increase)theabnormal
returnsof closerrivalsmoresignificantlythanthoseof lesscloseones.
We find that over a seriesof announcementsleadingto the BA/USAir alliance,
promisingeventsincreaseabnormalreturnsfor partnerfirmswhile theydecreaseabnormal
returnsfor rival firms. Concurrently,discouraging events decrease abnormal returns for
partner firms while they increase abnormal returns for rival firms. However, our findings
provide no significant evidence for degree of rivalry with partner firms as a moderator in
explaining the effects of alliance announcements on rival firms' value. Instead, firm size
appears to be a better moderator for the effects on rival firms' value. The value of smaller
rival firms is more sensitive than that of larger rivals to both promising and discouraging
events. Overall, our results suggest that international alliances appear to strengthen partner
firms' competitive positions which in turn weakens rival firms' competitive positions,
decreasing the rivals' value.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE IMPACTS ON PARTNER AND RIVAL FIRaMS
Value of Partner Firms
A substantial literature concerning alliance impacts on firm performance has
identified a range of benefits from alliances. The benefits include cost- and risk-sharing,
access to markets, obtaining required capital and complementary assets, improved capacity
for rapid learning, knowledge transfer, sales increase, and external legitimacy (Arora &
Gambardella, 1990; Baum & Oliver, 1992; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Miner, Amburgey,
& Steams, 1990; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). These benefits are more important
when alliances provide timely access to necessary and/or scarce resources in different
countries. As such, entering alliances will help firms not only improve their operating
efficiency but also strengthen their market positions (Hamgan, 1985; Kogut, 1988) which
will have a positive effect on profitability (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).
Within thecontextof domesticmarket,a fewstudiesanalyzedtheimpactof alliance
formationon partnerfirms' stock values.Koh and Venkataraman (1991) found that the
announcements of joint-venture a_eements led to positive abnormal returns on the
participating firms' stocks. Chan et al. (1997) found that average abnormal returns to partner
firms increased by 0.64% on the day of announcement of alliance arrangements. Das et al.
(1998) found that announcements of technological alliances increased partner firms'
abnormal returns by an average of about 1%, while those of marketing alliances did not
increase partner firms' abnormal returns.
Yet alliances may also reduce partner firms' value due to the potential costs of
alliances. Alliance partners may behave opportunistically because of a possible future break-
up (Hamel et al., 1989; Kranton, 1996). Such inherent opportunistic behavior is likely to lead
to various transaction costs of searching reliable partners, designing contracts, and especially
monitoring the behavior of the partners. The concept of alliances as a learning race in which
each participant tries to learn as much as possible from its partner while divulging as little as
possible, implies that alliance formation can reduce participating firms' value (Kharma,
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). Some studies have shown that alliances have a negative impact on
partner firms' performance. Berg and Friedman (1980) found that joint ventures for
knowledge acquisition had a negative impact on the rate of return. Uzzi (1997) reminded that
a large number of previously linked alliances decreased firm value. An alliance may risk a
firm leaking its firm-specific knowledge to its partner. As such, firms may lose control of
important assets to their partner (Hamel, 1991; Hamel et al., 1989; Williamson, 1991). While
appropriate use of alliance governance mode ameliorates these concerns (Bleeke & Ernst,
1993; Gulati, 1995), intra-alliance rivalry, between partner firms potentially disrupts an
alliance and dampens partner firms' value.
However,despitethepotentialcostsof internationalalliances,a firm is likely to enter
allianceswhenit expectsthepotentialbenefitsof thealliancesto exceedthepotentialcosts.
Hence,for promisingannouncementsabouta futureinternationalalliance,investorsexpect
the likelihood of the alliancebeingmaterializedto increase.As a result, this updated
expectationin thestockmarketwill increasethepartnerfirms' stockprices.Conversely,in
caseof discouragingannouncements,the partners'stockprices will likely decreaseas a
consequenceof investors'downwardadjustmenton the perceivedlikelihood of alliance
formation.Thus,wepropose:
Proposition la: For a series of announcements, promising announcements will be
positively associated with abnormal returns for partner.firms.
Proposition lb: For a series of announcements, discouraging announcements will
be negatively associated with abnormal returns for partner firms.
Value of rival firms
International alliances are likely to reduce the value of rival firms. First of all, partner
firms' alliance may jeopardize rival firms' competitive advantages. As mentioned above,
international alliances enable partner firms to obtain a wide range of benefits. Accordingly,
international alliances provide partner firms with varying sources of competitive advantages
because it is difficult for rival firms to replicate similar alliances due to barriers to
international alliances such as time, financial, and legal constraints. As such, the enhanced
competitive advantages of partner firms will deteriorate rival firms' competitive positions.
Singh and Mitchell (1996) found that firms were more likely to shut down if they did not
form similar cooperative relationships after their partners formed an alliance with a third firm.
Thus, these international alliances decrease rival firms' value.
Second, international alliances enhance partner firms' strategic position in markets
because the distribution channels and buying power of the partners can be combined (HameJ
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et al. 1989; Jorde & Teece, 1990; Shan, 1990; Teece, 1987). Partner firms' strategic positions
also improve through new market entry and market entry deterrence (Hagedoom, 1993;
Vernon, 1983; Vickers, 1985). This improved market position leads to increases in partner
firms' value (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996) and in turn decreases in rival firms' value.
Park and Cho (1997) found that international alliances decreased rival firms' market share due
to the strengthened market positions of partner firms.
Furthermore, international alliances allow partner firms to communicate easily with
each other due both to trust-building between partners and to their past experiences (Dyer,
1996; Gulati, 1995; Parkhe, 1993). The enhanced communication channel helps partner firms
coordinate their strategic activities as well as pricing policy in markets, enabling them to
charge more competitive prices than rival firms. Accordingly, the competitive positions of
firms will become weaker when their rivals enter an alliance.
If investors expect that alliances increase partner firms' competitive edges which in
turn decreases rival firms' competitive positions, rival firms' stock prices decrease following
promising announcements of alliance formation while they increase following discouraging
announcements of alliance formation. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 2a: For a series of announcements, promising announcements will be
negatively associated with abnormal returns for rival firms.
Proposition 2b: For a series of announcements, discouraging announcements will
be positively associated with abnormal returns for rivat firms.
Degree of rivalry
Previous studies have suggested that degree of rivalry among competitors play an
important role in firms' strategic reactions. Degree of rivalry among airlines varied according
to their market overlaps and fleet structures, indicating that an airline did not equally compete
xxith all other airlines {Chen. 1996). Besides, previous studies showed that a firm's strategic
actionssuchasallianceformation,pricecuts,andpromotionscouldpromptquickerreactions
from head-to-headcompetitorsthan from other competitors(Chen& MacMillan, 1992;
Miller & Chen,1994;Smith,Grimm,Garmon,& Chen,1991).
Propositions1 and 2 suggestthat an internationalalliance will likely affect
competitiveenvironmentsin a waythatenhancesthecompetitivepositionsof partnerfirms
butdeterioratesthoseof rival firms.Wefurtherconjecturethatanalliancewill likely worsen
thecompetitiveedgesof closerrivalsto agreaterdegreethanthoseof lesscloseones,since
thecloserrivalswill facerelativelystiffercompetitionwith partnerfirmsthanwill theother
rivals.As such,for analliancetobeconsummated,thevalueof closerrival firms is likely to
decreaseat a lower level thanis thatof lesscloserivals,all otherthingsbeingequal.Thus,
followingpromisingannouncementsof alliances,decreasesincloserrival firms'valuewill be
greaterthan decreasesin less close rivals' value. In contrast, following discouraging
announcements, closer rivals' value will increase more than increases in less close rivals'
value. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 3a: For a series of announcements, promising announcements of
partner firms'alliance will decrease abnormal returns of closer rival firms more
than those of less close rival firms.
Proposition 3b: For a series of announcements, discouraging announcements of
partner firms' alliance will increase abnormal returns of closer rival firms more
than those of less close rival firms.
METHOD
Description of events
To identify a series of events leading to the BAJUSAir alliance, we searched the Dow
Jones News Retrieval Service database, which included the Dew Jones News Wire. the Wall
S_reet Journal. the New York Times. the Financial Times. and other journals, for the 1991-93
period. We used key words such as "British Aitavays," "US:kit." and:or "strategic alliance" to
extractrelevantannouncementsassociatedwith thealliance.Over200articleswerecollected,
from whichweexcludedirrelevantannouncementsandselectedtheveryfirst announcement
from a group of newspapers. The reason for choosing the first one is based on the efficient
markets hypothesis which suggests that the same, subsequent news will have no additional
effect on the stock prices of the firms involved (Fama, 1970). Finally, we identified nine
events that influenced the likelihood of the alliance being consummated. Table 1 summarizes
the nine events.
Insert Table 1 about here
The first event that increased the likelihood of the alliance being materialized was
announced on July 21, 1992. BA and USAir proclaimed that BA a_eed to invest $750
million in USAir, which was struggling with financial problems. According to the first
announcement, BA would obtain 21% of voting stock and 44% of equity in USAir and have
four seats on USAir's 16-member board. BA and USAir would link their computer
reservation systems and implement codesharing operations on trans-Atlantic routes. USAir
would lease its three routes to BA, from Philadelphia, Baltimore and Charlotte to London,
along with aircraf_ and flight attendants. The agreement was subject to regulatory approval
from both the U.S. and the U.K. governments. About a week later (July 29, 1992), a second
event occurred when Seth Schofield, chief executive officer of USAir, mentioned that the
airline would contribute to the alliance. The second event appeared to increase the likelihood
of the alliance being consummated.
Yet four consecutive events took place that decreased the likelihood of the proposed
alliance. In August 1992, so called the "Big Three" (i.e., American, United and Delta
Airlines) startedfuriously lobbyingtheU.S.governmentto withdrawits likely approvalof
theproposedalliance(events3 and4). Forexample,StephenWolf, chairmanof UAL Corp.
(parentcorporationof UnitedAirlines), told the government, "if it approves the proposed
alliance without securing a fair, balanced exchange of opportunities for its carriers, it will be
the most monumental mistake that the government has ever made in air transportation" (Wall
Street Journal, August 11, 1992). Following these events, on September 17, 1992, the U.S.
Transportation Secretary demanded that the U.K. would liberalize its aviation market in
return for U.S. government approval for the alliance (event 5). Furthermore, U.S. presidential
candidate, Bill Clinton, said that he would not approve the proposed alliance (Wall Street
Journal, October 30, 1992: event 6). The proposed alliance appeared to be a dead issue.
News about the proposed alliance attracted broad attention again in January 1993.
According to the Financial Times on January 18, 1993, BA was expected to announce a
revised partnership deal with USAir, following the inauguration of President Bill Clinton
(event 7). On January 21, 1993, BA did indeed purchase a 19.9% voting stake in USAir for
$300 million and formed a de facto alliance with USAir (event 8). By reducing the size of
BA's investment in USAir, two partners sought to avoid controversies over foreig, n
ownership that caused a long delay on their previous proposal. On March 16, 1993, the U.S.
administration approved BA's $300 million investment in USAir (event 9). The
administration also authorized, for a year, a computer reservation linkage and codeshared
flight operations that linked USAir's domestic routes to BA's international destinations.
USAir also planned to lease aircraft and crews to BA for two trans-Atlantic routes. In fact,
two partners inaugurated their first codesharing flight on May l, 1993.
We treated events 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9 as promising events, each of which increased





We collected daily stock-return data for BA and USAir (hereafter the partners) and
their U.S. rivals from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) files from June 20,
199! to March 31, 1993. We also collected equally weighted market return data from the
CRSP files for the same period.
To measure the alliance impacts on rival firms, we defined the U.S. rival airlines as
the airlines that provided domestic and/or international services on the same routes served by
BA, USAir, or both. Relying on Official Airline Guides: Worldwide Edition, we identified 16
major trans-Atlantic routes served by BA. We selected seven U.S. airlines serving those 16
routes during the 1991-93 period. These rival airlines include American Airlines, Continental
Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Pan Am Airlines, Trans World Airlines, and
United Airlines. Using Official Airline Guides: North American Edition, we also identified
four U.S. domestic airlines serving USAir's domestic routes, such as Alaska Airlines,
Hawaiian Airlines, Pacific Southwest Airlines, and Southwest Airlines. We excluded
Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Pan Am Airlines, and Trans World Airlines from
our sample because substantial data for these airlines were not available from the CRSP files.
We also excluded Pacific Southwest Airlines from our sample because the airline cannot be
regarded as a rival airline to USAir. USAir purchased the firm in 1987 and sold it to the PS
Group in 1991. Since then, the PS Group has leased some aircraft to USAir. Thus. the six
rival airlines were selected for our study: American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Airlines.
Southwest Airlines, Alaska Airlines, and Hawaiian Airlines (hereafter the rivals).
ll
Table2 showsdescriptivestatisticsfor all theairlinesanalyzedin this study.The
combinedsizeof the partnerswasapproximatelyequalto that of AmericanAirlines, the
largestrival, in termsof revenues,operatingincome,or total assetsin 1992.Basedon the
distributionof NorthAtlantic marketshares,wedichotomizedthreelargerrivals (American
Airlines,UnitedAirlines,andDeltaAirlines)ascloserrivals to the partners and three smaller
rivals (Southwest Airlines, Alaska Airlines, and Hawaiian Airlines) as less close rivals.
Insert Table 2 about here
Method of Analysis
An event-study method was employed to measure the airlines' stock-price responses
associated with the nine events leading to the BA/USAir alliance. In an efficient capital
market, investors revise their expectations of a firm's future cash flow as they learn about
events from public announcements (Fama, 1970). Hence, the returns attributable to an event
associated with an alliance are composed of both investors' probability assessments for the
alliance to be consummated and an estimate of the impact that the consummated alliance may
have on a firm's future cash flow. The event-study method was commonly used in the
accounting, economics, finance, and management literature to examine the value implications
of firm-specific events (for review, see Brown & Warner, 1985; Thompson. 1985).
Following prior event studies (e.g., Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998), we adopted
the market model:
Rit =c-xi +[3i Rm t +Eit
where Rit is firm i's daily stock return on day t. Rm_ is the daily stock return of the market
portfolio on day t, and Eit is a random-error term with E[git]=O and Var[E,t ] =_. We first
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tested whether or not each of the nine events changed firms' beta coefficients. The beta
coefficients were estimated as stable for all sample firms (e.g., for BA, beta = 1.47 with the
1% siggnificance; for USAir, beta = 2.09 with the I% significance), providing little evidence
of structural changes in firms' beta coefficients due to the nine events. We then obtained the
ordinary-least-squares estimates for the market model using the 250 trading days that end 20
days before event 1. For each of the nine events, we set the event day as day 0. To allow for
possible information leakage prior to each announcement, we estimated two-day abnormal
t
returns over the event window ranging from day - 1 to day 0 for each of the nine events. Yet, I
.......---
for robustness of the analysis, we checked whether extending or contracting the event
window significantly changed the signs of the sample firms' abnormal returns over the nine
events. We found that the signs of the firms' abnormal returns generally remained stable for
one-day window (i.e., day 0 only), two-day window (i.e., day -1 to day 0), and three-day
window (i.e., day -1 today 1).
Having estimated two-day abnormal returns to sample firms for each of the nine
events, we were able to test our propositions. For the test of Propositions 1 and 2, we used t-
tests to examine the individual effects of each event type (i.e., promising or discouraging).
We also conducted a non-parametric test, based on a contingency-tables approach, to jointly
test the effects of both event types. For the test of Proposition 3, we used both a t-test and
Wilcoxson rank sum test to compare the abnormal returns of the two groups (i.e.,.closer rival
firms vs. less close rivals). Yet, in testing Propositions 2 and 3, some observations were
eliminated from our sample since some rival firms announced substantial price cuts during
some of the nine events. It was hard to decompose the effects of the events on the rivals'
abnormal returns from the effects of the price-cut announcements. From the search of the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service database, we found the following announcements made
13
by rival firms. During event3, Deltaannouncedthat it wouldcut faresby about I0 to 30
percentsto all of its 33European destinations. American and United also announced that they
would match the cuts (The Washington Post, August 5, 1992). This ticket-price battle was
escalated by Northwest Airlines announcing fare cuts for five European destinations by up to
44 percent. During event 4, American, Delta, and United Airlines announced that they would
match the cuts (The Washington Post, August 11, 1992). During event 5, Hawaiian Air
announced that it cut round-trip fares to the West Coast to $199 from $299 in the wake of
Hurricane Iniki (Dow Jones News Wire, September 18, 1992).
RESULTS
Table 3 presents abnormal returns to the partners for the nine events leading to the
BA/USAir alliance. Overall, the partners experienced positive abnormal returns following
promising events and negative abnormal returns following discouraging events (see Panel A
of Table 3). The stock prices of BA increased following four out of five promising events,
whereas they dropped following three out of four discouraging events. Similarly, the stock
prices of USAir increased following four out of five promising events, while they decreased
following all four discouraging events. On average, the partners' stock prices increased by
4.9%, 1.7%, 1.2%, and 1.6%, respectively, for the periods of promising events 1, 7, 8, and 9.
In contrast, the partners' stock prices fell by an average of 0.6% to 2.9% when discouraging
announcements were released.
..............................
Insert Table 3 about here
..............................
Tile test results for Proposition I are reported in Panel B of Table 3. For promising
events, the average abnormal returns of the partners were estimated as 1.736% at the iO'_;_
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significancelevel. This impliesthat thevalueof the partners increased by an average of
1.74% due to the promising events. In contrast, discouraging events decreased the partners'
abnormal returns by an average of 1.78%, which is sig-nificant at the 1% level. These findings
provide support for both Propositions la and lb. Similar results were obtained from a
contingency-tables test. Developing a two-by-two contingency table, we classified 18
observations into four groups: i) promising events/positive abnormal returns (N=8), ii)
promising events/negative abnormal returns (N=2), iii) discouraging events/positive abnormal
returns (N=I), and iv) discouraging events/negative abnormal returns (N--7). The more
observations belong to both cell i) rather than cell ii) and cell iv) rather than cell iii), the more
likely Proposition 1 will be supported. The test result revealed strong evidence of supporting
Proposition 1 (X 2 = 7.73, d.f.=l, p<0.01).
Table 4 reports abnormal returns to the rivals for the nine events. As shown in Panel
A of the table, the rivals generally experienced negative abnormal returns following
promising events and obtained positive abnormal returns following discouraging events. For
the first two promising events, all rival firms experienced negative abnormal returns (except
Delta in event 1). For three out of four'discouraging events (events 4, 5, and 6), the rivals'
stock returns slightly increased by an average of 0.13% to 0.58%. For event 7 that increased
the likelihood of the BAAJSAir alliance, three rival firms had negative abnormal returns. For
event 8, all the rivals had negative abnormal returns ranging from -0.2% to -4.7%. On
average, they lost about 3.2% due to this promising event. For the final event, three rival
firms experienced negative abnormal returns.
..............................
Insert Table 4 about here
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Propositions 2a and 2b were separately tested by t-tests. The test results are reported
in Panel B of Table 4. The average abnormal returns of the rivals decreased by 1.22%
(significant at the 1% level) following promising events. By contrast, they increased by
0.85% (significant at the 10% level) following discouraging events. These findings provide
support for both Propositions 2a and 2b. Further, we tested jointly both propositions by using
the contingency-tables approach. 47 observations were classified into four groups: i)
promising events/positive abnormal returns (N=7), ii) promising events/negative abnormal
returns (N=23), iii) discouraging events/positive abnormal returns (N=10), and iv)
discouraging events/negative abnormal returns (N=7). The more observations belong to both
cell ii) rather than cell i) and cell iii) rather than cell iv), the more likely Proposition 2 will be
supported. The result of the contingency-tables test provided significant evidence for
Proposition 2 (Z 2 = 5.92, d.f.=l, p<0.05).
Finally, we examined whether degree of rivalry with the partners moderates the
effects on the rivals' value as postulated in Propositions 3a and 3b. To do so, we divided the
rivals into two groups. As mentioned earlier, based on the level of competition in North
Atlantic markets, American, United, and Delta were classified as closer rivals and Southwest,
Alaska, and Hawaiian as less close rivals. Table 5 compares the average abnormal returns
be_veen these two sets of rival firms. Unlike Proposition 3a, promising events did not
decrease the value of the closer rivals (-0.95% with the 5% significance level) more than the
value of the less close rivals (-1.48% with the 5% significance level). Besides, discouraging
events did not increase the value of the closer rivals (-0.54%) more than the value of the less
close rivals (1.61% with the 5% significance level). Hence, this result does not support
Proposition 3b. Similar results were obtained from the Wilcoxon rank sum test, providing no




The study examines changes in partner firms' and their rival firms' value in reaction to
both promising events (i.e., announcements that increase the likelihood of an international
alliance being consummated) and discouraging events (i.e., announcements that decrease that
likelihood). Our results confirm that both promising and discouraging events matter for the
value of partner firms as well as rival firms. We find that promising events increase the
abnormal returns of partner firms by 1.74% (Proposition la) whereas discouraging events
decrease them by 1.78% (Proposition lb). These findings suggest that firms entering alliances
expect that the potential benefits of the alliances exceed the potential costs and the stock
market confirms such an expectation. That is, investors in the stock market expect that the
alliances, once consummated, will add value to the participating firms. Accordingly, partner
firms' abnormal returns rise following promising announcements about a future alliance while
they fall following discouraging announcements.
Both promising and discouraging announcements, however, affect rival firms' value to
the opposite direction. It is foundthat promising events decrease the abnormal returns of rival
firms by 1.22% (Proposition 2a) whereas discouraging events increase them by 0.85%
(Proposition 2b). These findings indicate that promising events are perceived as bad news to
rival firms whereas discouraging events as good news to the rivals. This further implies that
investors in the stock market expect that the formation of alliances will facilitate competitive
environments rather than collusive ones. If investors believed that collusive environments
were created by an alliance through partner firms' tacit collusion in pricing, rival firms would
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benefitfromthedecreasedcompetition(Scherer& Ross,1990;Tirole, 1988)andthevalueof
rival firms would increase (decrease) following promising (discouraging) events. Hence, our
results on Propositions I and 2 suggest that an international alliance appears to strengthen the
competitive positions of partner firms through cost-sharing, risk-sharing, information-sharing,
and various complementary activities. Moreover, the enhanced competitive edges of partner
firms appear to deteriorate rival firms' competitiveness through increased competition,
resulting in decreases in the rivals' value.
Yet, our further analyses concerning degree of rivalry with partner firms provide no
support for Proposition 3, that is, promising (discouraging) events decrease (increase) the
abnormal returns of closer rival firms more than those of other rival firms. We find that
promising events decrease (although insignificant) the value of less close rivals more than
that of closer rivals, whereas discouraging events increase (significant at the 5% level) the
value of less close rivals more than that of closer rivals. These results imply that firm size
rather than degree of rivalry may moderate the effects of alliance announcements on rival
firms' value. As indicated in Table 2, the closer rivals" are larger than the other rivals. Firms
entering alliances can risk the competitive positions of smaller rivals than those of larger
rivals since the larger rivals have more resources and capabilities than the smaller rivals to
defend their competitive positions from the strengthened partner firms. As a result, the value
of the smaller rivals is more sensitive than that of the larger rivals to both promising and
discouraging announcements of an alliance, since investors expect that the consummated
alliance will damage smaller rival firms more severely than larger rival firms. In a similar
vein, some previous studies found that, from a specific alliance, relatively smaller partner
firms benefited significantly more than larger partners (Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998:
Koh & Venkataraman, 1991). Yet, these are subject to further investigation.
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Thisstudyhasseveraltheoreticalandpracticalimplications. At the theoretical level,
the study makes an original contribution to alliance research by investigating the value
implication of rival firms' alliances. It is of great interest for both managers and scholars to
understand strategic implication of rival firms' alliances. However, despite its importance, the
issue of whether or not the value of firms is jeopardized by their rivals' alliances has received
little attention in the literature. Secondly, the study makes a methodological contribution by
using a longitudinal approach rather than a cross-sectional approach in examining the effects
of alliance announcements on firm value. Previous studies that used cross-sectional
approaches focusing on only the final announcements of alliance formation demonstrated that
the value of partner firms generally increased following the final announcements (Chan et al.,
1997; Das et al., 1998). This study further illustrates that both previous and final
announcements affect the value of partner firms as well as their rivals. The results from our
longitudinal approach suggest that the overall effects of international alliance formation on
firm value should be derived from all announcements leading to the alliance formation. At the
practical level, this study reveals managers that a firm's poor response to ongoing alliance
formation pro_essed by its rivals can jeopardize its stock value and future profitability.
Moreover, this study shows that smaller firms may be more vulnerable than larger firms to
rival firms' international alliances, although it is subject to further tests.
Some limitations of this study guide researchers for future studies. This study
considers only one moderating variable, de_ee of rivalry with partner firms, in examining the
effects of alliance announcements on rival firms' value. There may exist other moderating
variables such as firm size, financial status, product mix, and strategic similarity. Future
studies can concentrate on competitor characteristics and identify which factors moderate the
effects of international alliance announcements on rival firms' value more sig-nificantly.
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Anotherlimitation of this studyis the limited numberof observations due to our
longitudinal research requirement. As mentioned earlier, the setting enables us to examine
sequential changes in firm value in response to a series of promising and discouraging
announcements leading to the ultimate announcement of alliance formation. Yet, this setting
significantly confines the available sample size for this study. As a result, the limited number
of available observations may deteriorate the statistical test results for our propositions.
Overcoming these issues provides more opportunities for interesting future research.
The negative effects of alliance formation on rival firms' value can be better
understood by investigating conditions under which the impacts are stronger or weaker. This
contingency approach on the alliance impact on rival firms provides more practical
implications to field managers in several industries. Finally, a global economy makes
international alliances more important since intensified competitive pressures force firms to
focus on their core skills and competencies. Thus, international alliances are one of the fastest
strategic alternatives to access or utilize external resources in other countries. Future research
may investigate whether cultural distance between partner firms moderates current findings
(e.g. Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997), whether economic development status between partner
countries makes any significant impacts, and whether alliances within a specific geo_aphic
region have any differences from other alliances between different geo_aphic regions.
To conclude, this study sheds additional light on alliance research in a sense that it
investigates international alliance impacts on rival firms as well as partner firms. Considering
mixed findings from previous studies examining alliance performance itself, we believe that
this study contributes in a fundamental way to the study of inter-organizational alliances as
well as strategic management of international alliances.
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Events leading to the alliance between British Airways and USAir
Event Announcement day Event description
A 1 (+) 7/21/92
A2 (+) 7/29/92
British Airways (BA) and USAir announced a proposed deal in which BA
would invest $750 million in USAir and the two airlines would form a
strategic alliance. Source: Dow Jones News Service.
The CEO of USAir said, "USAir is a very equal participant in the
BA/USAir alliance and we have a lot of values." Source: Washington
Post.
A3 (-) 8/4/92
American Airlines and Delta Airlines said that the U.S. government should
not approve BA's plan to invest $750 million in USAir unless the U.S.
secures equal opportunities for U.S. carriers. Source: Dow Jones News
Service.
A4 (-) 8/11/92




American Airlines and United Airlines have advised the U.S. Department
of Transportation that they will fight the proposed BA/USAir alliance.
Sources: Wall Street Journal and Dow,lones News Service.
U.S. Transportation Secretary, reversing his position, signaled that the
U.S. may demand aviation concessions from Britain in connection with
the plan by BA to take a stake in USAir. Source: Wall Street Journal.
U.S. presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, opposed the proposed BA/USAir
alliance. The U.S. administration pressed Britain to liberalize its aviation
market but the talks between U.S. and British officials ended yesterday
without an agreement. Source: Wall Street Journal.
BA and USAIr were expected shortly to announce a revised partnership
deal. Source: Financial Times.
BA bought a 19.9% voting stake m USAir, for $300 million. At the same
time, the partners set up a 2-step structure under which BA could increase
its investment over next 5 years to a total $750 million and its equity
ownership to 44%. Sources: Wall Street ,Journal and Dow Jones News
Service.
A9 (+) 3/16/93
The U.S. administration approved the revised BA/USAir alliance. The
administration also authorized for one year a computer reservation and
codesharing agreement. The new partners would begin code-sharing on
May 1. Source: Financial Times.
(+) refers to promising events, each of which increased the probability, ot the alliance, and (-) refers to
discouraging events, each of which decreased the probability..
"),_-._.
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics for sample firms for the year 1992
1. Revenues 2. Operating 3. Total assets 4. Total debt (2)/(1) (4)/(3) North Atlantic
($M) income ($M) ($M) ($M) market share _
• Partners
BA 8,399 939 9,587 7,584 0.11 0.79 0.12
USAir 6,686 97 6,595 4,698 0.02 0.71 0.02
• Rivals
American 14,396 955 18,706 12,558 0.07 0.67 0.09
United 12,890 195 12,257 8,458 0.02 0.69 0.07
Delta 10,837 -39 10,162 6,375 -0.04 0.63 0.11
Southwest 1,685 291 2,293 1,068 0.17 0.47 0.00
Alaska 1,115 3 1,208 824 0.03 0.68 0.00
Hawaiian 395 -59 106 206 -0.15 1.95 0.00
_I'he market shares are computed based on 1993 scheduled revenue passengers.
Sources: COMPUSTAT.
IATA (International Air Transport Association) North Atlantic Passenger Traffic Report (1994).
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TABLE 3
Abnormal returns to partner firms and test results for Proposition 1
Panel A: Abnormal returns to partner firms
Sequence of events leading to the alliance
Partner A 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9
fu-_m (+) (+) (-) C-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+)
BA -1.003 1.733 -0.130 -1.096 -2.461 0.483 0.030 0.116 1.211
USAir 10.722 -3.116 -1.038 -3.715 -3.407 -2.837 3.451 2.187 2.027
Average 4.860 -0.692 -0.584 -2.406 -2.934 -1.177 1.741 1.152 1.619
Panel B: T-test results for Proposition 1
Average abnormal returns to panner fmrts (%)
Type of event Mean Standard error Min Max Proportion of positive
abnormal returns
(+) event (N=I0) 1.736" 1.159 -3.116
(-) event (N=8) -1.775"** 0.548 -3.715





Abnormal returns to rival firms and test results for Proposition 2
Panel A: Abnormal returns to rival firms
Sequence of events leading to the alliance
Rival A 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9
fmm (+) (+) (-) (-) C-) (-) (+) (+) (+)
American -1.264 -0.623 iO_'_ -_{J -0.017 -2.076 -0.755 -2.725 -0.317
United -0.318 -3.828 i_'_._ b._ 1.213 0.447 -0.431 -2.738 1.251
Delta 0.074 -1.073 -:1_4-6_ _] -0.351 -2.449 1.926 -2.973 -0.484
Southwest -1.394 -4.766 -2.143 4.446 2.739 -0.316 0.117 -4.685 -0.050
Alaska -2.710 -1.084 0.144 -1.116 1.714 3.520 -1.616 -0.218 2.259
Hawaiian -3.521 -0.558 1.850 5.195 ._i_..92, 1.642 1.792 -6.101 0.361
Average -1.522 -1.989 -0.655 0.321 0.584 0.128 0.172 -3.240 0.503
Panel B: T-test results for Proposition 2
Average abnormal returns to rival firms (%)
Type of event Mean Standard error Min Max Proportion of positive
abnormal returns
(+) event (N=30) -1.215"** 0.371 -6.101 2.259 0.23
(-) event (N=17) _ 0.850* 0.547 -2.449 5.195 0.59
:'Therivalfirms'abnormal returnshadedinPanelA areexcludedfrom thetestofP2b sincetherivalsleased
their own announcements such as substantial price cut during the events.
*p<0.1, ***p<0.01 for a one-tailed t-test of H0: no abnormal return vs. P2.
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TABLE 5
Degree of rivalry and test results for Proposition 3
Panel A: Abnormal returns to close and less close rival firms
Sequence of events leading to the alliance
Rival A 1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9
firms (+) C+) (-) C') (-) (') (+) C+) (+)
n/a n/aCloser -0.503 -1.841 0.282 -1.359 0.247 -2.812
rivals (N=3) (N=3) 0"/=3) (N=3) (N=3) (N-3)
Less close -2.542 -2.136 -0.050 2.842 2.227 1.615 0.098 -3.668






Panel B: T-test results for Proposition 3
Type of event
(+) event (N=30)
1. Abnormal returns to 2. Abnormal returns to (1) - (2)
closer rivals (%) less close rivals (%) (%)
Mean Standard error Mean Standard error Mean difference t-statistic
-0.952"" 0.405 - 1.478"* 0.630 0.526 0.70
(N=I5) (N=I5)
(-) event (N=I7) -0.539 0.587 1.607"*
(N=6) (N=I 1)
*'p<0.05 for a _vo-tailed t-test of H0: no abnormal return.
0.696 -2.146"* -2.36
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Abstract:
Customs preclearance facilities are a distinctive feature of the larger Canadian airports.
Passengers can clear US Customs while still on Canadian soil. This provides a benefit to
US airlines because it eliminates delays in passenger transfer at their hubs. Intransit
preclearance facilities allow for the transfer of international passengers from intransit
lounges through US preclearance facilities, without requiring them to officially enter
Canada. This arrangement allows airports like Vancouver to compete as international
hubs for US-destined passengers. The establishment of intransit preclearance was a key
demand in the Canada-US Open Skies negotiations in 1991-92, but was opposed by some
US stakeholders, and was specifically not addressed in the 1995 Open Skies Agreement.
This paper describes the concept, and the negotiations that led to the 1998 agreement on
intransit preclearance, and issues that arose in the creation of domestic enabling
legislation.
Intransit Preclearance at Canadian Airports
Introduction
The intransit preclearance accord of 1998 resolved the last key issue that Canada had
sought to address in the 1991-92 air service negotiations with the United States.
Although specifically addressed in the Elliot-Kaplan Framework talks, the issue had been
excluded from the 1995 Open Skies Agreement.
This paper discusses the concept and development ofpreclearance and its effects on the
transborder market. The importance of the issue in the air service negotiations of 1991-
92, and the difficulties this posed for the US-DOT are examined, since intransit
preclearance was one of the key unresolved issues when the talks collapsed. The Elliot-
Kaplan Framework Talks of 1994 all but established the 1995 Open Skies Agreement,
but intransit preclearance was excluded with the belief both trade and diplomatic issues
could be negotiated more effectively if treated separately.
The establishment of a pilot project in Vancouver preceded the implementation of
Canadian enabling legislation. This arrangement struck a delicate balance between the
needs of US Customs and the Canadian requirements that US law not be applied
extraterritorially and that it not abridge the rights guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. The Senate of Canada passed the Preclearance Bill in April 1999.
Concerns raised by the Canadian Bar Association and the changes made in Senate are
also examined.
The Development of Intransit Preclearance
The Preclearance Agreement
Preclearance facilities became a feature of the CanadaUS transborder in 1952, but the '
arrangement was formalized in the 1974 Preclearance Agreement. The arrangement has
been in place so long that it few Canadians flying across what has is often referred to as
"the world's longest undefended border" even recognize its distinctiveness.t Travelers
entering the US from Canada are "pre-cleared" by US federal inspection agencies while
on Canadian soil. These agents may deny a traveler the right to enter US, but may not
extraterritorially apply US law, meaning that they have more limited search and seizure
powers than they would have on US soil.
The arrangement has been criticized over the years, and Canadian carriers have
occasionally called for its repeal. This stems from the contention that it benefits only
competing US carriers. Passengers at the US arrival airport do not have to clear customs,
which would othe_vise induce delays in transferring passengers at the hubs for US
carriers. Since Canadian carriers do not carry passengers beyond the initial US airport,
this presents no benefit to them. Since preclearance facilities do not exist in the US, they
have to clear their US origin passengers at their Canadian hub airports before they travel
on to other domestic destinations.
The United States has preclearance facilities in Canada (25 U.S.T 763: T.I.A.S No. 7825), Bermuda (25
U.S.T 288; T.I.A.S No. 7801), and Bahamas (26 U.S.T 646; T.I.A.S No. 7816).
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Successive Canadian governments, of all stripes, have ignored these complaints. Perhaps
because clearing foreign customs in one's own country is reassuring, or perhaps because
it is more convenient to go through this procedure at the beginning of the journey,
Canadian consumers like preclearance.
Intransit Prec/earance in the 1991-92 Transborder Negotiations
The bilateral in place at the beginning of the 1991-92 air service agreement (ASA) talks
had been in place since 1966, with minor alterations concluded by way of diplomatic
notes. The 1966 agreement had been so contentious that only by the intervention of the
Canadian Prime Minister, the US President, and John Kenneth Galbraith (a Canadian-
born economist and former US ambassador) was the agreement concluded at all. 2
The 1966 agreement pre-dated US and (somewhat later) Canadian domestic airline
deregulation, and the hub-and-spoke routing systems that it spawned. Many stakeholders
felt that the rigidity of the bilateral was restricting air service development and limiting
the economic benefits of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (and later, NAFTA).
There was appetite for change on both sides of the table, but that is where the agreement
ended.
The US Department of Transportation (US-DOT) sought an 'Open Skies' agreement with
unrestricted international freedoms, including 'beyond rights', and no capacity
restrictions. If this were not on offer, the US carriers were fragmented on which markets
and routes that were to be sought and offered. Management of these many interests was a
significant challenge to the development of cogent positions.
Canadian carriers, with considerably different market access under the 1966 agreement,
and locked in bitter rivalry in which the survival of Canadian Airlines hung in the
balance, were predictably at odds over what should be on the table) Air Canada stood to
gain very little from the negotiations. 4 After 50 years of government favoritism, it had
every route authority it had a strong interest in, with the exception of Toronto-
Washington National. Canadian, with few US route authorities, wanted a larger share.
The key Canadian demands did not change throughout the period. There were issues
related to access to slots at congested US hubs, "safeguards" issues, which came to be
-"However difficult the negotiations leading up to the 1966 agreement had been, Galbraith found the
negotiations less onerous: "I ,,vent into a room. I talked with myself, and I came out with a deal"
(Blanchard. (1998) Behind the Embassy Door: Canada, Clinton and Quebec, p. 162).
3 See Kaduck (1996) Break in Overcast: the Negotiation of the 1995 Canada-US Open Skies Agreement for
a detailed description of bargaining issues, using a Putnam two-level game analysis.
' Interestingly. Air Canada changed its view of the transborder and has proven to be the most aggressive
player in the market. Kaduck (1997) Canadian Carrier Strategies and the 1995 Open Skies Agreement,
describes the changing approach to the market.
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understood as a need for phase-in periods in US access to the three Canadian hubs, and
intransit preclearance.
Intransit preclearance was an augmentation of the preclearance agreement that would
allow passengers originating outside Canada and bound for the US, to enter US
preclearance facilities without first clearing Canadian Customs and Immigration. The
advantage of such an arrangement would be that Canadian carriers could then compete
for non-hub traffic in the US, using a Canadian hub, without an innate competitive
disadvantage.
For example, a Kansas City passenger bound for London does not have the option of a
non-stop flight, and will have to transfer at a hub airport. Air Canada operates Kansas
City-Toronto and Toronto-Heathrow direct flights, and so may compete for that
passenger's business with US carriers who transfer passengers at Chicago, New York or
Pittsburgh. Outbound there is no particular difference between a flight over the Toronto
hub or a US hub. The passenger clears UK Customs at Heathrow. If the transfer is made
in Toronto, the passenger remains in the in-transit lounge, and never enters Canada.
The return trip is a different matter. In the case of a US hub airport, the passenger must
clear US federal inspection agencies at the port of arrival, before continuing to the final
destination. At Toronto, US-bound passengers have to clear Canadian Customs first, and
then enter US Customs preclearance, even though they have no intention of entering
Canada. In other words, the reason for the problem is the very existence of the pre-
clearance facility. Carriers may not take cleared and uncleared passengers on the same
flight, therefore all passengers must be pre-cleared which, under the current arrangement,
means that all passengers must be legally in Canada before entering US preclearance. The
problem is exacerbated if Canada has a visa requirement for persons of the traveller's
nationality.
Canadian carriers felt that this diminished their ability to compete for passengers against
US competitor airlines, even though they had route authorities that allowed them to offer
such services. They also felt that the putative advantage US carriers gained by the
preclearance arrangement contributed to a diversion of Canadian passengers. US airlines
carried more than 60 percent of Canadian origin traffic to the US. Intransit preclearance,
it was argued, would help offset this imbalance.
For a number of reasons, the 1991-92 talks broke dovm after 18 rounds with virtually no
progress on any of these issues. Furthermore, the negotiations had been so rancorous that
neither side had much appetite for a repetition of the processJ
The level of bitterness was high on both sides. US Ambassador Blanchard, _ho was instrumental in the
achievement of the 1995 agreement, was initially told by his bureaucrats that he was wasting his time on
the file (Blanchard. p. 166). The Canadian view was that the US negotiators were ahvays willing to accept
their own terms, but had made few substantive concessions in 18rounds in 199t-92.
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The Elliot-Kaplan Framework and the 1995 Open Skies Agreement
In 1994, the Clinton administration, and the newly installed Chretien government in
Ottawa decided to see if there was potential for even a few of the issues to be resolved.
Secretary Federico Pefia and Transport Minister Doug Young were both inclined to see
the ASA modernized, but Young, leading an aggressive commercialization and
deregulation of Canadian domestic transportation, was unwilling to invest resources in
what had been, traditionally, a contentious and non-productive process.
At an initial meeting, the two senior officials reached an agreement on process. Each
government would send a single negotiator to conduct exploratory and non-binding
approaches to the various issues. The delegates would produce recommendations, and
only after substantial agreement was reached would full negotiation teams meet to
hammer out the details.
The two negotiators, Geoffrey Elliot and Steven Kaplan, were both well acquainted with
the file, but had not had substantial involvement in the previous failed talks. Elliot, a
former Canadian Chief Air Negotiator, had retired from the diplomatic service to take a
vice-presidency at a large forestry firm. Kaplan was US-DOT Legal Counsel. In a few
meetings over the course of several months, the two produced the so-called "Framework
Document", which in 13 pages delineates the substance of the 1995 ASA.
One key issue was detached from the Framework. Intransit preclearance could only be
implemented with the agreement of US Customs, and the significant issues it had raised
in the 1991-92 talks had contributed to both the failure of the talks and the bitterness of
many Canadian stakeholders. No matter what the economic arguments in favour of
liberalization, US-DOT.had no leverage over Customs, and there was a very real fear that
the scenario would repeat itself if Customs could use the leverage of the negotiations to
press its demands.
Elliot's brief from Minister Young had been clear. He was to bring back an agreement
that was assured of success, or no agreement at all. Elliot and Kaplan had solved the
other contentious issues, but intransit preclearance was a potential showstopper. Atthis
point, Canada took a significant gamble. Severing the issue of intransit preclearance, and
leaving it to a separate diplomatic negotiation process was the only way of preserving the
benefits to both parties contained in the Elliot-Kaplan Framework. 6 If the subsequent
negotiations failed, Canada would lack an issue big enough to bring the US back to the
trade table. Within a year, as the Framework document had agreed, the countries met to
discuss the means by which intransit preclearance could be achieved.
° Government of Canada. (t994) Framework tbr Resumption of Canada-US TransborderAir
Negotiations.
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Issues and Solutions
US Customs Issues
There was no single Customs-related issue that dominated the 1991-92 talks. Some of
the more contentious issues had no relationship to air transport, but represented a blatant
attempt by US Customs to extract tax and duty concessions for its personnel. Others
were legitimate attempts to achieve the enforcement powers that Customs officers enjoy
on US soil. The former produced resentment, while the latter presented difficult legal
challenges, since they touched on the sensitive issue of sovereignty, and in particular,
because they ran afoul of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 7
The issue of search and arrest powers was perhaps the most significant challenge. US
Customs is a law enforcement agency. It is charged with the duty of defending US
borders against criminals and dangerous aliens. The US Customs web site, for example,
advertises the service as "America's Frontline". US border guards are armed for
protection against the elements they seek to interdict: drug smugglers, international
criminals and terrorists.
Canadian Customs also has these duties but in the context of Canadian law they are civil
servants, not police officers. They have the power to detain persons suspected of criminal
acts until police officers arrive, but they do not have the broad arrest, search and seizure
powers the US grants its Customs officers, and they are not authorized to carry weapons.
There is therefore a great divide between what Canada and the US consider to be
reasonable Customs activities.
The further complication is that the broad powers US grants its Customs officers clearly
contravene the legal guarantees contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Canadian police officers are considerably more restricted with respect to
searches and detention of suspects, and the Charter guarantees right to legal counsel,
which is not the case in US Customs law. "Probable cause" is also more restricted in
Canadian law and precedent and foreign law enforcement officers, of course, have no
powers at all)
At the root of these concerns lay the fact that, because preclearance facilities are not on
US soil, if the a person chose to walk away rather than submit to a search by Customs,
there was no way of detaining them. This incensed Customs officers, who felt that they
7 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms became law in 1982, thirty years after preclearance began at Toronto
and six years after the Preclearance Agreement. The Charter guarantees legal rights of people in Canada,
not only citizens.
s On the other hand, as the Canadian Bar Association points out, the US also enjoys the advantage of being
able to enforce their laws in an area in which their own constitutional protections are not available to the
traveller, and where deportation is less costly (The Senate of Canada. (1999) Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Issue 30 - Evidence p. 2). The present author doubts that US
Customs would systematically deny US rights under these conditions any more than Canadian Customs
would cease to apply the Charter rights merely because they were on foreign soil.
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were handicapped in the performance of their duty to apprehend any person who
attempted to enter the US in violation of any US law.
US Customs also felt that there was a substantive difference between travellers who were
entering from Canadian soil and those who were not. Entering from Canada meant that
either they were either citizens of Canada or the US or, at one time or other, had been
subject to Canadian Customs screening. Intransit preclearance, it was argued, allowed
passengers an avenue for entering the US in which there was a lower standard of
enforcement available to the US, and for which it was more difficult to prepare. Some
form ofpre-screening mechanism based on ticket or computer reservation system (CRS)
data would assist Customs in separating the most likely potential law-breakers from the
others.
This was a difficult issue under Canadian law because of privacy rights and issues related
to potential discrimination inherent in any sort of profiling. Information disclosure was
also a concern to the airlines because not only was it proprietary data, but disclosure
might lead to litigation based on invasion of privacy, or be a disincentive to passengers
who considered it unreasonably invasive.
US Customs had also demanded the right to carry firearms, but that was a political non-
starter in Canada, as it would have been in virtually any country. US government
personnel enforcing US law on Canadian soil was similarly infeasible. Both of these
issues were seen as vital to performance of Customs mandate. They argued that
preclearance on Canadian soil ought not to mean that the Customs officers were not
allowed to perform their duties to the same extent as they would at any other port or
border crossing point. While history was not on their side, linkage to an important trade
negotiation allowed US Customs to re-argue a traditional grievance. The 1991-92
negotiations produced no solution, however, and probably more firmly entrenched
Canadian officials.
The other issues brought by US Customs were less substantive. It was argued, for
example, that their personnel should have the right to import substantial amounts of US
goods duty-free. The rationale for this was somewhat opaque to Canadians, since the
Customs officers are clearly not diplomatic personnel. Ambassador Blanchard later
attempted to broker exemptions from sales tax for Customs agents in exchange for
preclearance facility in Ottawa. He was surprised that Ottawa officials did not more
enthusiastically receive this subsidy proposal, which he describes as 'win-win' and
'sensible'. 9
9Blanchard, pp. 174-175. The maneuver speaks to the difficulty in getting Customs to buy into a trade-
enhancing mechanism. Even though the deal was in the interest of US carriers, Customs would have to
spend money on it and, as Blanchard puts it, "Clearly they had to have something in return" (p.174). The
issue was later solved, on the US side, by H.R. 3644, which allowed for the elimination of spending
authority limitations by allowing user fee proceeds to fund preclearance facilities, even if fees were not
collected there (Air Transport Association (1997) Statementof Carol Hallett, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Air Transport Association of America, before the House Ways and Means Committee's
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Canadian Legal and Pofitical Issues
The mere presence of US Customs at the table in 1991-92 still raises hackles among
many of the Canadian participants. Customs' contribution was considered at best
irrelevant, and often undesirable. The air transport stakeholders had little patience for
lengthy pontifications by Customs on why its officers needed the right to carry firearms,
for example. They were there to trade aviation goods for aviation goods.
Extraterritoriality is almost always controversial. Under international law there are few
exceptions to the rule that another laws of one state cannot be enforced on the soil of
another. Canada had never ceded jurisdiction in the preclearance areas, and any
perception that this was the case would have been the death of the arrangement.
Canadians preserve their sense of national identity with great vigour, especially where the
United States is involved. Despite almost 200 years of peaceful coexistence, the fear of
US domination is never far from the surface, and Canadians are never more self-righteous
than they are on this topic.
These general differences were compounded at the time of the 1991-92 talks by a
simmering conflict between Canadian carriers and US Customs. The airlines argued that
Customs was interpreting and enforcing the existing agreement in a manner that
deliberately discriminated against them.'° This was seen as a blatant attempt to support
US carriers in the transborder charter market, which Canadian carriers dominated, and
which was the only segment of the market in which they had a cost advantage.
Intransit Preclearance Negotiations
As Kaplan and Elliot had hoped, the severance of Customs issues from the main trade
negotiation allowed the rapid development of the 1995 'Open Skies' agreement, which
was signed in February 1995. Neither side attempted to change any substantive part of
the Framework Agreement, and DOT was able to achieve its objectives without relying
on the consent of Customs. The economic benefits were significant for both sides, and
the market grew at double-digit rates for the next three years.12
Subcommittee on Trade, on US Customs Service Passenger and Merchandise Processing Issues). This
legislation, and the continued maintenance of preclearance facilities, was endorsed by the employees union
(Statement of RobertM. Tobias, National President, National Treasury Employees Union, Committee on
Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, 4-30-98). Airlines are charged the 'reimbursable excess cost'
[the cost of preclearance in excess of the cost that would have been incurred to process the passengers in
the US] of the preclearance locations outside the US by a prorated formula (19CFR24.18).
_oCustoms had unilaterally interpreted a clause requiring 90 days advance notice of schedule changes in
the most restrictive fashion. For example, an additional aircraft flying the same schedule would require 90
days notice. Charter operators, who require flexibility in their operations, perceived this as selective
interference.
_tThe volume of US-Canada air traffic increased37.2% from 12.1 mil passengers in 1994 to 16.6 mil
passengers in the 12 months ended 8/97. Open Skies Pact Boon to Canada, U.S. Aviation Week & Space
Technology, March 02, 1998.
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The Framework Agreement called for the commencement of negotiations on intransit
preclearance within a year of the agreement coming into force)' The resulting
negotiations were time-consuming and difficult, but eventually reached an approach that
was acceptable to both sides. Before the domestic legislative changes were made, a pilot
project was commenced to demonstrate the viability of the concept, and the benefits it
could provide.
The Vancouver Intransit Preclearance Pilot Project
The pilot project in Vancouver (YVR) airport began in July 1997. The site was important
because of the airport's strategic location in the Asia-Pacific market. YVR's airport
authority had recently built an international terminal addition specifically designed to
accommodate intransit preclearance.
The location was also significant to the repositioning of Canadian Airlines as an Asia-
Pacific carrier. 13 Canadian Airlines International Limited (CAIL) is partly owned by
American (AMR Corp.) and has significant route authorities and favourable slot times in
Asian markets in which American has little presence. The potential for feeding Asian
traffic on code-shared CAIL flights over the Vancouver hub, and onward to American's
US route system was limited only by the double-visa requirements which would be
applied to many passengers if they were required to enter Canada enroute to the US.
The YVR Corporation also pointed out on every available occasion that Vancouver was
actually several hours closer than Los Angeles or San Francisco to key Asia-Pacific
markets. Passengers from Miami or American's Latin American markets could be spared
the added travel time if their hub were used rather than the Califomia airports.
The arrangement was also supported strongly in the US. The Air Transport Association
hailed it as a 'very important step' and one that would 'establish Vancouver International
as an intransit gateway to North America') 4
The Preclearance Act of 1998
The Preclearance Act t5 was brought before Parliament for first reading in December of
1998. It contained a series of carefully crafted compromises meant to preserve Canadian
_:A working group was tasked with determining, by 1 March 1996, how 'one-stop' pre-clearance could be
achieved. Government of Canada (DFA IT) Canada tVelcomes New Preclearance Arrangements with the
US., December 22, 1995. The process that led up to the formation of this working group is described in
Blanchard pp. 174-177. The Ambassador was eager to get a new preclearance facility in Ottawa for the
primary benefit of US carriers, but describes the Canadian insistence that this be dealt with in the larger
preclearance context, including intransit preclearance, as "demanding something new at the last minute".
_;CAlL was restructured in late 1997. which included the extraction of significant concessions from its
workers and tax concessions and loan guarantees from various levels of government. Its business plan
calls for a reorientation of its capacity to better serve the Asia-Pacific market it pioneered 50 years ago.
_' Air Transport Association. (1997) ATA Supports Customs Agreement with Canada.
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sovereignty and the application of Charter rights, while allowing US Customs increased
facility to do its national duty.
The summary describes the structure of the bill explicitly. Human rights issues are
covered by the statement that the laws are administered
subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Bill of
Rights and the Canadian Human Rights Act.
No provision of American law that would be criminal under Canadian law may be
administered in Canada. Criminal matters must be dealt with by Canadian
authorities under Canadian law.
The basic framework constructed within the bill is one in which a series of enabling
provisions are made which allow US Customs to perform its functions to the extent legal
within Canadian law. Any criminal matters which may arise prosecuted under Canadian
law, and administrative penalties under the US Customs law may still be applied -
though these cannot be applied for the same offence.
The duties of the authorities of each country are occasionally interlinked, but this is
clearly defined. For example, "frisk searches" may be conducted by US Customs,
however strip searches may only be carried out under Canadian law and by Canadian
authorities. Where US Customs requires a strip search, they may detain the traveller untilCanadian authorities arrive.
Discussions and Changes in the Senate
The proposed Bill S-22 was tabled for First Reading of in the Canadian Senate in
December 1998. The Senators heard testimony, on 17 February 1999, from civil servants
from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and from
Canadian Airlines. The remainder of the stakeholders who had made their intention to.
testify known were also known to be in favour of the bill as it stood, and written
statements were called for in place of verbal testimony. Senator Grafstein noted,
however, that the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) had not vetted the bill, and suggested
that it should be asked for comment. 16
The CBA made its submission in March, noting that this was a preliminary comment, as
the association had not been involved in the drafting of the legislation before then. A
number of issues were raised, and were considered by the Senate, but despite these
concerns, the CBA made clear that it felt that "legislation that clarifies and codifies the
_5The Senate of Canada. (1998) Bill S-22. An Act authorizing the United States to preclear travellers and
goods in Canada for entry into the United States for the purposes of customs, immigration, public health,food inspection and plant and animal health.
_ Proceedings of the Standing Senate Commit-teeon Foreign Affairs Issue 2S - Evidence, p. 25.
10 Raymon J. Kaduck
Intransit Preclearance at Canadian Airports
preclearance process ... is long overdue", t7 The lack of such legislation had already raised
issues about the legality of the existing extra-territorial activities.
This having been established, the CBA stated that it could not endorse the bill in its
original form. It questioned the propriety of granting law enforcement powers to a
foreign government that was not accountable to the domestic legal system, and of
allowing search, seizure and use of force by its officers. The requirement to submit to
such authorities and the lack of provision for voluntary withdrawal from the area raised
serious Charter concerns. The lack of safeguards such as clear indication of the rights of
the passenger under Canadian law, denied "meaningful access" to the Charter rights and
freedoms. In particular, the CBA brief questioned the propriety of creating criminal
liability for persons who do not appear before the preclearance officer or for "assenting"
to the making of a deceptive oral statement.
All of these inadequacies in the bill could, in the opinion of the Bar Association, be
remedied while keeping the social benefits without "sacrificing essential rights and
freedoms or extending criminal liability unreasonably"._8 This would include a clear
definition of the duties of a preclearance officer, which is necessary in order to determine
what 'obstruction' of such duties might entail. Further definition was also required for
the manner in which US law, which might be amended at any time by the US, would be
administered if a 'conflict of laws' arose. It therefore recommended that any provision
for the enforcement of US laws on Canadian soil be deleted entirely. It expressed doubts
that the US would ever be willing to enact similar laws on its own soil and, using the
example of NAFTA, went on to suggest that the Canadian bill not be enacted until a "
reciprocal legislation was adopted in the US._9
The CBA found difficulties with the section on monetary penalties. The US levies fines
for a variety of offences and, in the previous year, there had been a well-publicized case
in Calgary airport in which US Customs was characterized as exceeding its authority in
the collection of such fines. 2° The recommendation of the CBA was that the bill be
amended to preclude the levying of US administrative fines in the preclearance area, to
ensure that there was no'legal basis for the recovery of such fines in Canada, and to
t7Canadian Bar Association. (1999) Submission on Bill S-?? The PreclearanceAct, p. 2.ss Ibid. p. 4. --
_9Ibid. p. 5-6. The North American Free Trade Agreement provisions were mirrored in the respective
domestic enabling legislations.
:oThere had been much outrage in the Canadian press over the case of a traveller who, having been
assessed a fine by Customs for possession of marijuana, was escorted to an automatic teller machine where
he withdrew the amount for the fine. Having paid it, he was then denied entry to the US, based on his
admission of possession of the substance. The fact that the individual was escorted by Customs to get the
money was 'widely mischaracterized', according to the US Ambassador, as involvin_ forcible detention
(United States Information Service. (1998) Letter from the US Ambassador to the Canadian Minister of
Foreign Affairs). Such incidents are rare, but point to the need for exact procedures at preclearance sites
allowing for the appropriate application of each countr?."s[axvs.
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ensure that travellers were apprised of their rights and obligations before entering thepreclearance area. 2t
The Charter right to counsel by a person being detained was a key aspect, but the
exclusion of non-travellers from the preclearance area was a potential conflict with this
right. CBA recommended that the legislation allow for counsel access to the area (which
is currently not allowed by US Customs), or eliminate all search, seizure and detention
powers ofpreclearance officers. CBA went on to characterize the removal of the
passenger's right to withdraw from the area as de facto detention. Under Canadian law,
persons may not be detained on suspicion alone. The official must have "an actual belief
based on reasonable and probable grounds that can be objectively reviewed,,.22
Othe_vise, since entry into the preclearance area is a voluntary activity, travellers shouldhave a right to change their minds.
CBA thought that Section 16 should be scrapped altogether. This section required that
the passenger be truthful with the preclearance officer. The intention of the provision was
that if the US officer suspected or had evidence that the passenger made an untruthful
statement, this would constitute, in itself, grounds for detention until a Canadian police
officer could be called to assist. Section 33 (as originally submitted) makes it a summary
or indictable offence under Canadian law to make a deceptive statement to a preclearance
officer, and Section 34 makes it an offense to 'obstruct' such an officer. The Bar
Association found the creation of a specific offense to be inappropriate and unnecessary,
given the other remedies available under US law, such as monetary penalties and refusal
of entry. More importantly, it created legal liabilities for anyone who p rtic_pates in ora " "
assents to' such a false declaration, whether or not they were even present when the
alleged deception occurred. These sections were regarded as naamentally flawed,,.23¢_fu 1
The enforcement powers bestowed on the preclearance officers in Sections 19-24 were
greater than those allowed to Canadian peace officers and could be exercised in an area
where there was no access to US legal safeguards and where access to Charter rights was
problematic. CBA suggested that the power to deny entry or impose monetary penalties,
coupled with the ability of US enforcement officers to intercept a person after they had
crossed into US territory were sufficient powers to accomplish their functions.
The forfeiture provisions posed problems both in Canadian law and, possibly, under US
law. The issue is that, while there were access issues with respect to the Charter, the
forfeiture would take place under Canadian law and on Canadian soil. Unlike the US Bill
of Rights, property rights are not enshrined in the Charter, and it is questionable whether
zJCBA (1999), p 7.
2: Ibid., p. 8. CBA later points out, however, that in the context of the [Canadian] Customs Act, the
suspicion of an officer that there are reasonable grounds to believe concealment of illegal goods is
sufficient to justin, a search (p. 12 cites R. v. Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 to establish that the degree of
personal privacy that may be expected at borders is lower than most situations, and that "'nationaI self-
protection is a compelling component in the calculus").
:: Ibid. pp. 16-18.
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a traveller would be able to seek US remedies. Even so, the cost of hiring a US attorney
to prosecute a case in Canada might be prohibitively high. 2_
Changes in the Senate
The Senate was clearly concemed with the legality of requiring travellers to truthfully
answer any question put to them by preclearance officers, and by the "detention" implied
by the inability to leave the area. The bill was amended to indicate that a traveller had a
right not to answer questions put to them for preclearance purposes, 2s but allowed the
preclearance officer to order the person to leave the area if they would not answer. This
order would be enforced by a Canadian officer, if necessary. It fitrther stipulated that the
refusal to answer a question was not, in itself, grounds for a search. 26
Presumably, the Senate reasoned that the right to leave the area was sufficient to address
the issue of the Charter right to counsel. If the person could withdraw from the area
without prejudice, and return having sought counsel, the Charter was not derogated
beyond reason. How this would take place in the "sterile" intransit area was not
elaborated upon.
The issues of "assent to" and "participation in" false statements were also addressed.
These references were removed from the legislation, so that only a person making actual
statements they know to be false is engaging in illegal activity. The maximum sanction
for such statements was reduced from an indictable offense with a potential for two years
in prison to a summary offense, for which the maximum penalty is $5000. In this
instance, prison cannot be imposed for default of the fine, and the false declaration does
not constitute an offence for the purposes of the Criminal Records Act.
On the issue of reciprocity raised by CBA, the Senators appear to have been somewhat
less concerned. They had heard testimony from DFAIT to the effect that the US had a
mechanism to make reciprocal arrangements for equivalent powers as it was granted by
the foreign state. 27 In any event, in its testimony before the Senate, CBA had indicated
that the clarification of the various preclearance issues and the economic importance of
,.4Ibid., p. 16-17
:5The phrase 'for preclearance purposes' is important. The CBA had been much concerned that the
questions involved should be of a material nature (Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs Issue 30 - Evidence, p. 7).
.,6Journals of the Senate, Issue 124, Wednesday, March 24, 1999.
:7Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Issue 28 - Evidence, pp. 10-11. Mr.
Preston was presumably referring to the power of the US Attorney General to authorize preclearance
facilities in the United States. Foreign officers may be authorized to "exercise such authority and perform
such duties as United States immigration officers are authorized to exercise and perform in that foreign
country under reciprocal agreement, and the,,' shall enjoy such reasonable privileges and immunities
necessa_' for the performance of their duties as the government of their count_, extends to United States
immigration officers" (USC8 Ch. 12. Immigration and Nationality Act, Subchapter I, Sec. 1103, parts (8)
and (9) Powers and duties - Powers and Duties of the Attorney General and the Commissioner).
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the bill were such that the issue of symmetrically should not impede passage of a bill,provided it did not derogate Charter rights.2S
The Senate also discussed the issue of language rights. Under the Charter section 16,
French and English are official languages. There did not seem to be any problem with
US Customs equal treatment of French-speaking persons at its current operations, but
there was agreement that some mechanism to ensure this was necessary, even if it
involved airline personnel acting as interpreters.
The issue of privacy and use of information was of some concern, and DFAIT explained
that US Customs destroys the information it collects after 24 hours under US law. The
sorts of information that Customs wanted related largely to the history of the booking and
pick,up of tickets, and the routings taken by a passenger.-'9 Certain patterns tended to be
consistent with travel patterns of drug smuggling operations.
Conclusions
The passage of the Preclearance Act will enable Canadian air carriers to compete
effectively for international business and Canadian hubs to compete with US airports on a
more even footing. This benefits consumers by allowing additional competitive
opportunities for both established and new-entrant carriers in the Asia-Pacific and North
Atlantic markets. The demonstration of intransit preclearance at Vancouver International
proved the provided useful experience in organizing the preclearance area and validatedthe business case.
The Canadian Senate approved a more restricted set ofprecelarance procedures than had
been sought by US Customs. Nonetheless, it does deliver the basic powers necessary to
interdict illegal activity on the US-Canada border, while remaining consistent with the
unfettered operation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian soil. It also
clarifies and updates an arrangement that has worked very well for nearly a halfa centuryoft ansborder air travel.
.,sProceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Issue 30, pp. 8-10._9
" The Canadmn standard for privacy applicable to government use of information is restricted in a number
of ways. For example, the Department of Justice, in its Annotated Privacy Act, cites Puccini v. Canada
(Director General, Corporate Administrative Services, Agriculture Canada), [1993(3 F.C. 557 (T.D.),
commenting "In obiter, the Court stated that when information is used to make a decision which will
directly affect an individual, that individual has the right to know the gist of the information which the
person considered or is considering in reaching the decision."
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Judging a Book by it _ Cover: The relationship bet3veen service
and safety quality in U.S. national and regional airlines
ABSTRACT
The general public perception is that service quality among U.S. airlines has declined
significantly since deregulation, however, there is continuing debate among experts on
the effect of deregulation on safety quality. Unlike safety quality, service quality is more
visible to the traveling public. It is not clear, however, whether service quality is a good
indicator of safety quality. We addressed this issue by examining the service and safety
quality of 20 U.S. regional carriers for 1991-1997. Service and safety rates were
calculated for each carrier. Then carriers were ranked on.service and safety quality.
Spearman's rho correlations were calculated on these lists. The results indicate that for
four of these seven years the Spearman's rho was significant indicating that service
quality is an excellent indicator of overall safety quality among U.S. national and
regional carriers.
In it Is1996StrategicPlan,theFederalAviationAdministration(FAA) called
ValuJetamodelstart-upairline thatprovedthattheU.S.policy of deregulationwas
soundandworkable(Schiavo,1997). OnMay 11,1996,ValuJetFlight 592crashedinto
theFloridaEvergladeskilling 105passengersand5 crewmembers.Prior to June17,
1996whentheFAA announcedtheshutdownof Valujet,theycontinuedto insistthatthe
carrierwassafe. In fact,theFAA haslonginsistedthatall U.S. carrierswereequally
safe. However,in theFall of 1996,ThomasMcSweeny,FAA Director of Aircraft
Certification,madea pointof notingthattheFAA is responsibleonly for thebasic
evaluationof airlineswho areexpectedto police,evaluate,report,andimprove
themselves(Schiavo;1997). TheFAA which isresponsiblefor establishingminimum
safetystandardsandevaluatingairlinecompliancehasconsistentlyrefusedto rank
' " " airlines or determinewhich carriers,if any,exceedminimumstandards(Nader.& Smith,
1994;Schiavo,1997;Tampa Tribune, 1998). Critics have charged that the FAA has
allowed its mission to promote air travel to take precedence over its responsibility to
create a regulatory environment that promotes 'safety (Nader & Smith, 1994; Schiavo,
1997; Roy, 1998). In fact, one of the chief questions posed by a recently commissioned
FAA study into the possible public release of safety information such as inspection and
maintenance records was _v'ould the routine release of such information increase or
decrease public confidence in the safety of air transportation?" (Roy, 1998).
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), there are four main factors
that affect the safe operation of airlines - (1) financial stability, (2) maintenance quality,
(3) managementattitude,and(4) pilot competence(GAO, 1988,1996). Unfortunately,
noneof thesefactorsarereadilyapparento thegeneraltravelingpublic. However,the
travelingpublic is in amuchbetterpositiontojudgetheservicequality of theairlines
theyfly. This raises the question of whether there is a link between the service and safety
quality of air carriers. Unlike safety, there are no minimum, federally-mandated
standards for service quality. Presumably, the market is the sole determinant of the level
of service quality that a carrier will provide. Since airlines are in some sense free to
choose the level of service quality that they provide, it is clearly possible for a carrier to
provide high levels of safety quality without also providing a similar level of service
quality. On the other hand, we might expect that managerial (and employee) attitudes
toward safety quality would be reflected in the level of service quality and that the
financial condition of the carriers would have an impact on both areas of quality.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the link between service and safety
quality. We sought to answer three questions. First, what is the level of service and
safety quality for U.S. national and regional carriers? Second, what is the relationship
between service and safety quality in these carriers? Third, can service quality levels be
used as proxy measure of national/regional carrier safety quality?
BACKGROUND
In 1978, the U.S. became the first nation in the world to deregulate it's airline




Accordingto thecontestablemarkettheory(seeBaumol,Panzar,& Willig, 1982for
furtherdiscussion),governmentsshouldseekto promotecontestsfor markets,eventhose
wherelargefirm sizeand limited competitorsexisted.Regulationwassaidto encourage
competitionbasedonservicequalityratherthanprice,limit operationalflexibility, and
createno incentivesfor improvedefficiencyandproductivity. Critics of deregulation
havesuggestedthatgovernmentpolicy nowfocusesalmostsolelyoncreatingcheap,
below-costair faresandhasresultedin destructivepricewars(Dempsey& Goetz,1992;
Woerth,1995). :
Theresponseof the airlineindustryto deregulationhasbeena long,painful
processof restructuringthat haschangedthefaceof U.S.aviation. Financialcrisisin the
early1980sledto industryconsolidationandthecreationof thehub-and-spokesystem,




Someof theresultsof this turmoilareclear. Accordingto arecentlypublished
studyon thecostcompetitivenessof internationalcarriers,themajorU.S.airlines
(revenuesover$1billion) asa wholearemorecostcompetitivethanall but someof the
lowerwageAsiancarriers(Oum& Yu, 1998). Themajor airlinesshareof passengersat
U.S.hubairportshasalsoincreasedfrom 55percentin 1985to 79percentin 1998
(DeBarros, 1998). At the same time, traffic along the spokes has been increasingly
carried by regional airlines (gross revenues less than $100 million) whose smaller
aircraft and lower cost structure presumably make these low volume routes profitable. In
fact in 1998, there are 718 U.S. airports served by regional/commuter carriers as
compared to only 216 served by major or national carriers (AvStat, 1998). Finally,
although ,the number of airlines operating in the U.S. has increased from 43 to 90 since
deregulation, more than two hundred new-entrant carriers have come and gone as a result
of bankruptcy and merger (Rosen, 1995; Shifrin, 1998). Unfortunately, these results do
not speak to changes in either service or safety quality following deregulation: Here
there is far less agreement.
Service Quality
Antidotal evidence suggests that the overall level of service quality among U.S.
carriers has declined significantly since'deregulation, however, there are no studies
actually examining the pre- and post-deregulation levels of service quality. Issues of
airline quality have primarily been addressed through surveys conducted on frequent
business flyers by such organizations as J.D. Powers and Associates. J.D. Powers and
Associates has worked with Frequent Flyer magazine for the past six years to publish
their quality survey of the major U.S. airlines. The survey provides an overall ranking as
well as individual tSests" for such categories as ease of check-in, seat comfort, gate
location, and post-flight services. However, these cross-sectional results are difficult to
duplicateandcompare.
In 1991,theAirline QualityRating(AQR) systemdevelopedby theInstituteof
Aviation Researchat Wichita StateUniversitybeganits annualreviewof airline quality.
Unlike otherquality rankings,theAQR usespublished,publicly availabledatato
constructamulti-factorweightedaverageof airline quality for the majorU.S. carriers.
This systemincludesdataonairline safety,financialstability, andconsumercomplaints.
Muchof thedatais collectedfrom theAir TravelConsumerReportpublishedquarterly
bytheDepartmentof Transportation(DOT). This methodhasseveraladvantages.First,
it providesaconsistent,longitudinalmeasureof airlinequality. Second,its resultscanbe
replicated.However,it shouldbenotedthattheAQR,which hasreporteda negative
industryaveragelevelof quality for all six yearsof its _existence,hasbeencriticizedona
numberof counts.Airlines havecomplainedabouttheweightingscheme,x,hich, for
example,assignsanegativeweight to airlineloadfactor(thepercentageof availableseats
thatarefilledby.paying passengers).A secondcriticism relatesto thenatureof the
complaintsincludedin theAQR. By andlarge,thefactorscontainedin theAir Travel
ConsumerReport,andincludedin theAQR, relateto theprovision of basicservice(i.e.
on-timepercentage,flight problems,deniedboardings,customerservice,refunds,fare
complaints,etc)notamenitiessuchasseatcomfort,easeof check-in,schedule
availability,ormealquality. This not only makesadirect comparisonbetweentheAQR
andthesurveyquality ratingsdifficult, it hasledto criticism that theAQR doesnot
accuratelyreflect factorsconsumersconsiderimportantto their satisfaction(Perkins,
1998). Thereis anotherdifferencebetweentheAQR andthesurveystudies.TheAQR
includessafetyrelatedmeasures-averageageof fleet,numberof accidents,andpilot
deviations - while surveymethodstypically donotconsidersafetyissues.
It shouldbenotedthat neithertheairline qualitysurveysnor theAQR have
addressedtheissueof serviceor safetyquality for thenationalor regionalU.S. carriers.
Like any researchdealingwith smallbusinesses,thereareproblemsrelating to data
availability thatcanbeattributedto at leasttwo factors.Thefirst is timely reportingby
smallerfirms. Thesecondis thetumoverin this typeof population. However,two
recentstudieshavecomparedservicequality betweenmajorandnational/regional
carriersin theU.S.aswell asbetweentheindividual national/regionalcarriers
themselves.Both studiesusedthecomplaintdatafrom theAir Travel ConsumerReport
to concludethatthereis asubstantialdifferencein theservicequality of major and
national/regionalcarriers.For example,Rhoades,Waguespack,andTreudt(1998)have
reportedthat U.S.major carriersaveraged6 complaintsper 10,000departuresin 1996
while U.S:national/regionalcarriersaveraged3 complaintsper'1,000departures.There
was:also substantial variation between national/regional carriers. Two national/regional
can:iers posted 1996 complaint rates lower than the major carriers while several other
national/regional carriers had rates far higher than the industry average for this group. In
a second study, Rhoades and Waguespack (1999a) concluded that there were statistically




While there has been little debate about the effect of deregulation on service
quality, its effect on safety quality has been hotly debated. Two studies have examined
pre- and post-deregulation accident rates. Both studies have reported a substantial
decline in the overall accident rate (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Rose 1989,1990). Oster
and Zorn (1989) addressed the possible reasons for the decline by reviewing the primary
cause of pre- and post-deregulation accidents. They reported an overall decline of 54
percent in total accidents per million departures, with a 71 percent reduction in accidents
initiated by equipment failure. However, it is not clear, for example, whether the decline
in equipment failure is due to improved equipment reliability and design, maintenance
quality:or both. Kennet (1990) has found that although the length of time between engine
maintenance has increased since deregulation there has been no effect on engine failure.
This would suggest that equipment design is largely responsible for the decline in .
accidents attributed to equipment failure. If equipment design and reliability have
- improved, then the fact that the U.S. fleet is aging raises some concern. In 1988, only 28
' percent ofthe,U.S, fleet were over 20 years old. By 2000,40 percent of the fleet is
projected to be over 20 years old (Schiavo, 1997). The average age of the fleet flown by
regional carriers tends to be even older than their major carrier counterparts (Wilson,
1997). In addition, after sharp declines in accident rates during the 1950s and 1960s
attributable to improved jet engine reliability, the accident rate has leveled off in recent
years at approximately 3 to 4 percent annually (Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 1996). Several
studies have also reported a recent increase in the rate of accidents which may reflect
either normal variation in accident rates, lagged effects of reduced maintenance, or some
othercause(Rose,1990;1992).
Researchinto airline safetyhasfocusedon fourareasof concem:financial
stability,maintenancequality, pilot competence,andmanagementattitude(GAO, 1988)
Financial Stability. A number of researchers have argued that safety
expenditures are an investment because they yield returns over time and that it is
plausible that unprofitable or insolvent airlines would reduce their level of investment in
maintenance and safety (Graham & Bowes, 1979; Lee, . 1996). It is also possible that
financial issues might cause carriers to defer maintenance expenditures either due to the
direct cost of such maintenance or the need to keep the aircraft in-service (Roland, 1997).
Carriers can invest in safety by 1) scheduling maintenance more frequently, 2) using
newer equipment to reduce the probability of equipment failure, 3) relying on more
experienced personnel, 4) implementing more intensive training programs, and 5)-
purchasing newer aircraft that have more advanced safety technology (Rose, 1990). In
short, Lee (1996) has suggested that aviation safety is a direct function of the amount of
money spent.
Rose (1990, 1992) has reported that lower operating profit margins are associated
with higher accident and incident rates in the following year. This relationship is even
stronger for regional carriers than their major carrier counterparts. There are several
possible explanations for these results. First, regional carriers tend to outsource a great
deal of their maintenance because their fleet size often does not make it economical to
investin theequipmentnecessaryto servicetheir own aircraft.This outsourcingmay
createcertainquality problems. Second,theaverageageof theaircraft flown by regional
carriersis substantiallyolder thanmostmajorcarriers(Wilson, 1997). Third, the
experiencelevel (andpay levels)of regionalflight crewsis generallylower thanmajor
carriers(Aviation Week& SpaceTechnology,1999). Finally, the averagelifespanof
mostregionalcarriersmaynot permit themto institutionalizethepracticeof safety
(Kanafani& Keeler, 1989).
Not all researchersagreethatregionalornew entrantcarriershavelowersafety
performance.Kanafani and Keeler (1989) found no difference in safety levels and, in ,
fact, reported that new entrants appear to be spending more resources on maintenance
than the large established carriers. Whether this higher spending is a consequence the
age of their fleet or attributable to higher safety standards was not addressed.
Maintenance quality. The most commonly used measure.of maintenance quality
has been the level ofmaintenance expense. Several factors that can increase the_level of
maintenance expenditure are the age of the aircraft in the carriers fleet, the type and mix
of aircraft in the fleet, and the level of maintenance outsourcing (GAO 1988; O 'roole,
1992). While smaller carriers have not previously been required to report their
maintenance costs, the General Accounting Office has reported that carriers who spent
more on maintenance between 1955 and 1983 actually had a higher accident rate than
other airlines. One explanation for this result is the fact that older aircraft have higher
maintenance costs and are more likely to be involved in accidents.
Pilot Competence. The FAA (1995) has reported that 60-80 percent of all
airplane accidents are caused by human error. While air traffic control accounts for some
of these errors, it is the flight crew that is responsible for the majority of accidents
attributable to human error (GAO, 1988). Pilot competence is a function of training,
experience, capability, and attitude. Although airlines are required to maintain FAA
approved training programs, the GAO (1988) has found that there is wide variation in
training methods. Compared to major carders, the experience level (and pay levels) of
regional carriers is generally much lower. The most recent survey by Aviation Week and
Space Technology reported that national/regional pilots can expect to make on average
one-half to one-third the salary of their maj or carrier counterparts (Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 1999). Still, it remains difficult to assess the competence of pilots and
difficult to link flight experience to accident rate (GAO, 1988). _ •-., ,
Management attitude. The attitude of airline mana.gers toward safety has been
cited in numerous studies as an important factor in assessing the overall safety of an - .
airline (Banfe, 1992; GAO, 1988; Lee, 1996). According to Lee (1996), it is also clearly
possible for an unsafe company to increase its operational safety for minimal costs by
improving organizational factors such as communications and personnel selection and
local factors such as workplace shfety consciousness. ' Banfe (1992) has found that the
intellegence of an organizations structure and its management are key factors in firm
success. Unfortunately, experts agree that management attitude is judgmental and
subjective making it difficult to quantify.
Linking Service and Safety Quality
It is perhaps this difficult to quantify n'aanagement attitude ' that provides the link
between service and safety quality. Studies of Total Quality Management and ISO 9000
quality programs consistently cite the presence of a ciuality culture 'and top management
support as critical to the success of any quality program (Deming, 1982; Koo, Koo, &
Tao, 1998; Mallak, Bringelson, & Lyth, 1997 ). These attitudes are expected to
permeate the organization and affect everything that it does. Our question was Can
organizations create a quality culture that extends to only some aspects of their operation
and not to others?" Is it possible for a carrier to be rated highly on safety quality and not
on service quality? ' . "
:, METHOD
This study included data on 20 U.S. regional carriers in operation between 1991
•and 1997. :For.our purposes, a national/regional carrier is defined asone having operating
revenues less than $1 billion. Of these carriers_ twelve were not.in operation for the entire
period. Some carriers started operation during this period (ex. Vanguard, Kiwi, Western
Pacific). Other carriers were either acquired (Ex. Carnival, ValuJet) or ceased scheduled
operation (ex. Kiwi, Western Pacific). Data for this study was collected from three
sources. The Department of Transportation Is Air Travel Consumer Keport was the
source for consumer complaints. It includes the following categories: ticketing, refund,
fare, advertising, customer service, credit, and other. Unfortunately, carriers with less
than 10 total complaints are not reported separately but included in an bther U.S.
airlines" category.Sinceit wasnotpossibleto determinetheactualnumberof
complaintsfor carriersin this lastcategory,it wastreatedasamissingvalue.TheFAAs
onlinesafetydatabaseswereusedtocollectinformationonaccidents,incidents,andnear
mid-aircollisions. Dataonpilot deviationswascollecteddirectly from the FAAs Office
of SystemSafety. Total departuresperyearwerecollectedfrom theBureauof
TransportationStatistics.
Serviceandsafetyrateswerecalculatedoverallandby yearfor all carriers. The
servicequality raterepresentsthesumof all complaintsdivided by total yearly departures
andcanbe interpretedasthenumberof qualityproblemsperdeparture- i.e. a service
quality rateof 0.005325wouldtranslateinto 5 servicequality problemsper 1000
departures.Thesafetyquality raterepresentsthesumof all accidents,incidents,near
mid-aircollisions,andpilot deviationsdividedby totalyearly departuresand canbe :.
interpretedin a mannersimilar to theservicequality rate. Correlationswere calculated
betweenserviceandsafetyaveragesfor eachcarrierandeach.yearof the study. Since
both ratesweredividedby departures,wetreaiedtheaveragesasmatchedpairsand
comparedthemeansby yearandcarrierusingthepairedt-test. Becausepairedt-test
calculationswith fewerthan fourobservationsprovedto beunstable,carrierswith less
thanfour observationswerenot included. Finally, thecarrierswererankedby yearand
overallmeansfor bothserviceandsafetyquality. Theserankedlist werethencompared
usingtheSpearman'srho correlation.If eachcarrierssafetyrank is identical to their
servicerank,thentheSpearman'srhowould yield aperfect1.0. We would then
concludethat servicequalityprovidesconsumerswith anexcellentproxy'of carriersafety
quality. Thelower theSpearman'srho, thegreaterthedifferencebetweentheserviceand
safetyqualityof regional carders and the less validity service quality has as a measure of
safety quality.
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 report the calculated service and safety quality rates respectively.
For all years of the study, the safety rate is lower (better) than the service rate. When
these safety rates are compared to those reported by Rhoades and Waguespack (1999)i
national/regional carriers do not perform as well as their U.S. major counterparts. For
example, the overall safety rate for national/regional carriers was two safety problems per
10,000 departures while the overall safety rate for major carriers was eight problems per
100,000. Table 3 reports the correlations and results of the paired t-test by year
.............................................
Insert Table 1 & 2 about here
and overall .for the national/regional carders. For all but three years of the study, the
correlation between the average service and safety quality rate was significant. The
difference between the service and safety means was significant only for one year (1996).
Thus, we conclude that there is no statistical difference between the service and safety
quality means for the remaining years. The difference between the overall service and
safety mean was also significant.
InsertTable3 abouthere
Table 4 presents the number of observations, correlations, and t-values by carrier
for all carriers with three or more reported yearly values. Four carriers (Air South,
Alaska, Reno Air, and Tower) recorded a negative correlation between service and safety
quality. The t-value was statistically significant for five carriers (Alaska, Carnival,
Comair, Hawaiian, and Tower) indicating that their mean levels of service and safety
quality are statistically different. Table 5 reports the number of yearly observations and
the results of the Spearman's rho test. The Spearman's rho was statistically significant
Insert Table 5 about here
for the years 1994-1997. The overall Spearman's rho was also significant. The.
Spearman's rho test indicates that for these years there is a statistically significant, strong
correlation between the service quality ranking of U.S:national/regional carriers and their
safety quality ranking.
Discussion
We began this study by asking whether U.S. air travelers could use their
impression of the service quality of the national/regional carriers they fly to judge the
safety quality of those same carriers. The answer is yes. For those years where we
obtaineddataon twelve ormorecarriers,thereis astrong,statisticallysignificant
relationshipbetweentheserviceandsafetyquality rankingsof nationalandregional
carriers. While therelationshipisnot aperfectone,wedid not obtainaSpearman'srho
below .54while thehighestvaluewas.87. We hadarguedthat'quality' is anattitudethat





safetyrankingsfor theninemajorU.S. carriersin theirstudy. What accountsfor this
differencein findings? Severalfactorsmayindividuallyor collectively contributeto the
observeddifferences.First, themajorcarriersasagrouptendto bemorehomogeneous.
in termsof their serviceandsafetyquality thanregionalcarriers. Accordingto Rhoades_
andWaguespack(1999b),asagroup,majorcarriersalsohaveserviceandsafetyrates
well abovetheindustryaveragefor thenational/regional.carrierscalculatedin ;this study
(ex. Overall major service rate for 1991-1997 was 7 problems per 10,000 departures as
compared to 3 per 1,000 for national/regional carriers. Overall, safety rate for the majors
was 8 problems per 100,000 departures compared to 2 problems perl 0,000 for
national/regional carriers). Second, the average lifespan of the major carriers is far
higher than their national/regional counterparts. This has potentially allowed them more
time to institutionalize safety/service practices. Third, by their very nature regional
carriers do not compete directly with many of their so-called regional counterparts while
themajorU.S. carriersdocompetein virtually all their rivalsmarkets. This competition
couldencouragethemajor carriersto eitherdifferentiatethemselvesby offering a higher
level of service than similar carriers in the target market or adopt the same level of
service offered by other market competitors. In some sense, national/regional carders
have no comparable strategic group member to benchmark their performance. Finally,
in order to operate carders must meet minimum safety levels, but no such levels exist for
service quality. New entrant carriers are more likely to focus on safety quality first and
hope that passengers lured by cheap fares will accept lower levels of service quality.
This study is not without its limitations. The complaints gathered from .the Air
Travel Consumers Report deal primarily with issues of basic service, that is the ability to
issues tickets and refunds correctly and in a timely manner, to avoid flight problems and
overbooking, and to deal honestly and politely with consumers in advertising, marketing,
and flight operations. Although there is a category for other complaints, the Report does
not specifically address areas of quality such as meals, seat comfort, and in-fiight ,
entertainment. However, in the case of national/regional carriers, this emphasis on basic
service issues is probably more appropriate. Regional carriers as a general rule seek to
compete by trading off amenities for lower fares. Many such carriers offer no-frill,
single-class service.
There are also several questions that might be raised over the calculation of our
safety rates. We chose to treat accidents, incidents, near midair collisions, and pilot
deviations as equal safety events. Obviously, from a passenger perspective an accident
wouldberatedfar worsethanapilot deviation,however,it is notclearto theauthorsthat
anaccidentis abetter indicatorof theoveralllevel of airline safetythanapilot deviation
or incident. Accidentsarefortunatelyrareoccurrencesandoftentheresultof multiple
factors. In theabsenceof compellingevidenceof therelationshipbetweenthe four types
of safetyeventsusedin this study,weoptedfor theequalweighting.
Thereareanumberof practicalimplicationsto bedrawnfrom thisresearchfor
managersaswell aspassengers.Servicequality mattersnot simply becauseit sells
tickets. It is partof a total qualityattitudethat hasthepotentialto affectall aspectsof
airlineoperation.Providingbasic,timely,consistentservicerequiresthesameattention
to detailthatmaintenanceandflight operationsdo. It isa matterof processdevelopment,
training,implementation,tracking,andcontinuousimprovement.If a carriercan
institutionalizeaquality processfor safeoperations,thentheyhavethetoolsandskillsto
do thesamething with theservicesideof their operation.Achievingservicequalitydoes
notnecessarilyrequirecarriersto hire gourmetchefsto designtheirmeals.A greatmeal
doesnot.makeup for anoverbookedflight, lost bag,or deceptiveadvertising...:
Thereareseveralfutureavenuesof researchthatextendthisstudy. Thefirst is an "
examination of the relationship between service/safety quality and financial performance.
A second area of research would be to focus on factors that might either encourage or
discourage the development of quality processes in regional carriers such as
organizational age, competition, financial stability, and managerial expertise.
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1. Introduction
Unfortunately, the expected bear hug by the major airlines has begun ...
Three of the [major airlines] are now offering fares in AccessAir markets
that are one-third below our fares - and far below both their normal fares
and their costs. If continued, these fares will force us out of business, l
The notion that our actions were anticompetitive just doesn't pass the
giggle test 2
The reactions of established air carriers to new entry has been a contentious issue
in the United States over the past several years. They are a focus of proposed US
Department of Transportation guidelines that would restrict "exclusionary" or predatory
practices by air carriers, a Justice Department antitrust suit against American Airlines,
and a study by the National Academy of Science's Transportation Research Board into
competitive practices in the US airline industry, instituted at the behest of Congress)
The crux of the issue is whether the responses by established carriers to new entry onto
routes are normal competitive reactions or predatory reactions designed to drive the new
carriers out of markets.
There have been a number of studies conducted into the issue of predation in the
airline industry. These studies have reached differing conclusions. For example, using
Canadian data, Tomaszewska (1997) concluded that there was evidence of predation over
a two year period in a major Canadian market. On the other hand, Dresner and Windle
(1999), in their broad study of US air markets, found little evidence of any practices by
major incumbent carriers against smaller new entrants that could be deemed predatory.
t Roger Ferguson, the president of start-up air carrier AccessAir, quoted in Swoboda (1999a).
2American Airlines spokesman Chris Chiames, quoted in Swoboda (1999b).





dataon981 reactionsto entryby incumbentcarriers,weassessthe impactof thesecartier
andmarketspecificfactorson incumbentpriceresponsesfollowing entryboth in the
short runandthelongerrun. Theresultsfrom theanalysiscanbeusedto helppredictthe
likely reactionsto entryby incumbentcarriers,andarethereforeusefulto airline
managers.Theresultsarealsousefulto policymakerssincethey describethe marketand
firm characteristicsthataremostlikely to leadto largepricecutsby incumbents,bethey
termedpredatoryor just competitive.
Therestof thepaperis structuredasfollows: Section2 providesabrief reviewof
thetheoreticalliteratureunderlyingouranalysisandcommentson thetheoretical
contributionof thepaper. Section3presentsourmodelanddescribesthedatausedin the
analysis.Section4 describestheresultsfrom theanalysis.Finally, Section5 draws
conclusionsandpresentssomeimplicationsto managersandpolicymakers.
¢
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Contribution
The literature on competitive reactions and responses generally comes from three
research sources: industrial organization economics (IO), strategy, and marketing. An
important feature of the industrial organization literature (as outlined, for example, by
Scherer and Ross (1990)) is its emphasis on the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm. 4 The paradigm implies that a new entrant may have an important impact on
4The paradigm holds that performance depends upon the conduct of sellers and buyers (in such matters as
pricing behavior, interftrm cooperation, product strategy and advertising, research and development).
marketpricesif it pricesaggressivelyin orderto stimulatedemandfor its
products/services.In theairline industry,the aggressivepricing maytrigger an
aggressiveresponsefrom incumbentcarriers.DresnerandWindle (1999), usingdata
fi'omtheU.S.domesticairline industry,foundevidenceconfirming this hypothesis.The
authorsfoundthatthe largestpricecutsby incumbentsin responseto entry camewhen
entrantspricedtheir servicesatdeepdiscountsto prevailingprices. In otherwords,deep
pricecutsby new entrantstriggereddeepprice discountsby incumbentcompetitors.
In contrastto the industrialorganizationliterature,thestrategyliterature is
concernedmoredirectly with theactionsandreactions(responses)usedby each
competitor.According to thestrategyliterature,thetypeof reactionsusedby rival firms
(e.g.,fight or retreat)dependon factorssuchasthe action-firm's reputation(Smith,
Grimm andGarmon1992),thethreat/scope/magnitudeof actions(Smith, Grimm and
Gannon,1992;Smith,Grimm, GarmonandChen1991),the importanceof a marketto
thefirm (ChenandMacMillan, 1992;ChenandMiller, 1994),andtheperformanceof
firms (Smith,Grimm, GannonandChen,1991;Smith,Grimm andGarmon1992).
Empiricalmarketingresearchon incumbentreactionto entry is limited but tends
to trackclosely theapproachesusedin thestrategyliterature.Robinson(1988)explained
reactions(usingareactionindex)asafunctionof theentrant'sstrategy,incumbent
characteristics,andindustrycharacteristics.Gatignon,AndersonandHelsen(1989)
positedthat interfirm differencesin competitivereactionsto entrycanbepredictedby
Conduct, in turn, depends upon the structure of the relevant market (characterized by the number of
competitors, product differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structure, vertical integration and diversification)
while market structure is affected by a variety of basic conditions of supply and demand (such as price
elasticity, growth rate, substitutes, technology and legal framework). Hence, the degree of rivalry among
f'n-ms in an industry is, at least indirectly, a function of market structure.
observing the elasticity of each market mix variable; for example, competitors will
retaliate with their effective marketing mix "weapons" and retreat with their ineffective
marketing instruments.
As in the strategy and marketing literature, this paper takes into account entrant,
incumbent, and market characteristics in assessing competitive reactions. However, the
research for this paper improves on existing models in three areas. First, in much of the
existing literature, many different kinds of actions/reactions - including price cuts, entry,
advertising, the formation of alliances or mergers - are generalized into a generic
"action/reaction" variable. Treating price cuts and alliance formation as equivalent
actions may hide very different strategies employed by firms. In this research, we use a
specific measure of price cuts to assess reactions to entry. Secondly, this paper more
accurately measures the degree of an incumbent's responses than previous work. Much
of the existing literature focuses on the direction of responses and response time. In this
paper, we accurately measure the level of response (i.e., the magnitude of a price cut).
Finally, most literature addresses only short-run reactions while ignoring longer-run
reactions. In this paper, we examine both short and longer run reactions. This is
important since firms may react vigorously (e.g., large price cuts) in the short run, only to
retreat (e.g., by raising prices) in the longer run. The longer run reactions will provide_a
much better indication of long run equilibrium market conditions.
3. Model and Data
The general model used to analyze responses to entry on U.S. airline routes is as
follows:
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RESPONSE = f (ENTRYSTRATEGY, ENTRANTFACTORS,
INCUMBENT FACTORS, MARKET FACTORS) (1)
where:
• Response to entry is either the short or long run price cut initiated by an incumbent
carrier in response to the entry by a new carrier on a route;
• Entry Strategy is a vector of variables reflecting the strategy used by the new entrant
including the pricing and capacity strategy of the new entrant;
• Entrant Factors is a vector of variables assessing the qualities of the entrant that might
affect the response of the incumbent (e.g., financial strength of entrant);
• Incumbent Factors is a vector of variables related to the incumbent that might affect
the incumbent's response (e.g., market position of the incumbent on the route); and,
Market Factors is a vector of market or industry variables that might affect the
incumbent's response (e.g., barriers to entry on a route).
Data were gathered from the Department of Transportation's Database la on all
entries into the top 500 origin and destination markets (as of the second quarter of 1997)
that tookplace from the third quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of 1997. 5 A total of
543 entries from 40 airlines were available for analysis. 6 Of this total, 151 entries were
s Database la excludes commuter carriers. Following Windle and Dresner (1995), entry had to meet a two
part test. In the quarter before entry, a carrier had to have less than a five percent market share on a route.
Secondly, entry had to increase the carrier's market share by at least five percentage points to a level above
five percent of total passengers. Other definitions were considered (e.g., market share less than 10 percent
increasing by at least 5 percentage points) but a review of the data indicated that these other definitions
resulted in actual entries being missed or the number of entries being overestimated.
6 There were a number of entries that were excluded before arriving at the 543 total. These included cases
where the entrant's code was not known (30 cases) and seasonal routes where a carrier entered a route on a
regular basis for a season and then exited (4 cases). As well, after examining the data, 70 cases that met
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by major (i.e., pre-deregulation) carriers, 63 by Southwest Airlines, and 329 by 32 other
smaller carriers. The overall exit rate (within a year of entry) for the new entrants was
17.3 percent; 27.8 percent for the majors, 0 percent for Southwest, and 15.8 percent for
the smaller carriers. 7
Data were also gathered on incumbent responses to each of the 543 entries. A
carrier was considered an incumbent on a route if it had a minimum 10 percent market
share prior to entry by another carrier and maintained at least a 10 percent market share in
the quarter following entry, s As well, a maximum of 3 incumbents (the largest 3) were
analyzed for each entry event. This criteria resulted in 981 incumbent observations; 730
from majors, 51 from Southwest, and 200 from other carriers.
Table 1 provides a list of variables for each of the constructs in our model as well
as a description as to how the variables are operationalized. Each of the variables is
discussed briefly below:
a) Response to Entry (Dependent Variable)
Short and Long Term Price Cuts by Incumbent: The dependent variable in each of our
¢
models is the incumbent's price cut (or increase) in response to entry. In the short nan
model, the price cut is measured as the average incumbent's price on a route in the
quarter before entry less the incumbent's average price in the quarter following entry
(i.e., PiQ.I - PiQ+I, where Q is the quarter of entry). In the longer run model, the average
incumbent's price four quarters following entry is subtracted from the average price in
our entry criteria were excluded because at a closer look, they appeared to be just market share fluctuations
(e.g., market shares over successive quarters of 2%, 7%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 3%, etc.).
7 The exit rate for the smaller carriers excludes 11 "exits" due to the takeover of Morris Air's routes by
Southwest Airlines and 14 exits due to the grounding of ValuJet by the Department of Transportation. If
these exits were counted, the exit rate for the smaller carriers would rise to 24.1 percent.
s If an incumbent exited from a route in the same quarter as entry, no data where available on that
incumbent for analysis.
the quarter before entry (i.e., PiQ. 1 - PiQ+4). In either case, the larger the price cut, the
more aggressive the reaction to entry.
b) Entry Strategy
Price Cut of Entrant: The average price cut of the entrant in the quarter after entry (i.e.,
PiQ.I - PeQ+I) is an independent variable in the model. All else held equal, it was thought
the greater the entrant's price cut, the greater the incumbent's price cut. 9
Scale of Entry: Entry scale was measured by the number of passengers carried by the
entrant in the quarter following entry, t° It was thought that a greater entry scale would
trigger a larger price cut by the incumbent.t t
Routing: We attempted to control for the quality of service offered by the new entrant by
measuring the average number of flight segments on routes offered by the new entrant.
In general, it was thought that fewer flight segments (e.g., more non-stop routings)
offered by the new entrant would result in larger price cuts.
c) Entrant Factors
Operating Cost Structure of Entrant: One of the characteristics of the entrant that could
affect the reaction of the incumbent is the entrant's cost structure (measured by operating
cost per seat-mile in the calendar year before entry). An incumbent may be intimidated
by a low cost entrant and respond passively (small price cut), thereby ceding market
9 The average price cut in the quarter following entry was used for both the short and longer run models.
We considered using the average entrant's price cut four quarters following entry for the longer run model
but would lose 24 percent of our observations if we did so. This is because 24 percent of the new entrants
had exited their new routes by four quarters after entry, so price information was not available.
t0An alternative measure would have been the number of seats offered by the entrant in the quarter
following entry. Seat totals, however, were not available to the researchers.
it Note, that although we argue that greater entry scale will trigger a larger price cut by the incumbent, a
case could be made for the opposite position; that is, large entrants will intimidate incumbents thereby
triggering less aggressive responses (i.e., smaller price cuts). Since most of the "expectations" on
coefficient signs can be argued either way, we do not present formal hypotheses. Rather, we state our
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share, or, on the other hand, may try to deter the low cost cartier by responding
aggressively with large price cuts.
Size of Entrant: The size of the entrant (measured by total revenues in the calendar year
before entry) may also affect the reaction of the incumbent. Large entrants may, in many
cases, have a large store of resources to withstand competitive battles. Therefore,
incumbents may not choose to fight price wars with large entrants, therefore responding
to entry with relatively small price cuts.
Reputation of Entrant: The reputation of an entrant (measured by number of complaints
per 100,000 passengers registered with the Department of Transportation) may also
influence incumbent response. In the ease of an entrant with a good reputation among
customers, an incumbent may have to respond with relatively larger price cuts (all else
being equal) to compete against the entrant.
Ability to Remain on the Route: In the long run, the ability of a new entrant to remain on
a route will affect the response of the incumbent. It was thought that ira new entrant
failed to remain on a route (dummy variable coded 1), then the price cut of the incumbent
would be smaller. In other words, if the entrant leaves the market, the incumbent may be
able to raise prices to a level close to its pre-entry price.
d) Incumbent Factors
Operating Cost Structure of Incumbent, Size of Incumbent, Reputation of Incumbent:
Data on these variables were collected for the incumbent, as well, with the arguments
similar to those presented above. The lower the operating cost of the incumbent, the
expectations based on our understanding of the industry and our reading of the literature knowing that valid
arguments could often be made in the opposite direction.
greaterits size,andthebetterits reputation,thesmallerit wasthoughtwouldbe the price
cut by the incumbent in response to entry.
Importance of Route to Incumbent: Data were gathered on the route market share of the
incumbent in the quarter prior to entry. It was thought that all else held equal, that the
greater the incumbent's market share (i.e., the more important the route to the
incumbent), the larger its price cut following entry.
e) Market Factors
Barriers to Entry: It was thought that if barriers to entry existed on a route, then the
magnitude of the price cut by the incumbent might be smaller. An important market
barrier might be if either or both ends of a route are at slot controlled airports. Slot
controls at a major airport (e.g., O'Hare in Chicago) could imply that new entrants have
to offer service from a secondary airport (e.g., Midway in Chicago). e If the incumbent
airline's service is primarily from the city's major airport, then it might not have to adjust
prices to the same extent as it would if competition was from the major airport. As a
result, a dummy variable for having a slot controlled airport at either end of a route was
included.
Competitive Routings Available: Another market factor that could affect the incumbent's
price cuts is if competitive routings are available. In this case, if there are alternate
airports close to the airport entered, then the incumbent may not cut prices as much as it
might otherwise. The incumbent may choose to switch flights to nearby airports, rather
_2It should be noted that Database la records traffic for city to city routes, rather than airport to airport
routes, but that city def'mitions are inconsistent. For example, Washington Reagan National and
Washington Dulles traffic are lumped together as Washington traffic but Los Angeles International traffic
is not lumped together with Long Beach or Orange County traffic.
thanto cut pricesandaggressivelycompeteagainstthenew entrant.
variablewasincludedfor citieswith multipleairports.13
Therefore,adummy
Basedonthediscussionabove,Equations2 and3presentthe shortrun andlong
runoperationalmodelsto beestimated.
Incumbent's Short Run Price Cut (PIQ.1 - PtQ+I) = 130+ 131Entrant's Price Cut
('PiQ-I -- PeQ+I) + 132 Entrant's Passengers Q+1 + 133Entrant's Flight Segments +
[34Entrant's Cost + 135Entrant's Revenues + 136Entrant's Complaints +
[37Incumbent's Cost + 138Incumbent's Revenues + 139Incumbent's Complaints +
1310Incumbent's Market Share Qq + 13tl Slot-Controlled Airport + 1312Multiple
Airport City
(2)
Incumbent's Longer Run Price Cut (PIQ.1 - PIQ+4) = 130+ 131Entrant's Price Cut
(PiQ-I -- PeQ+t) + [32 Entrant's Passengers Q+1+ 133Entrant's Flight Segments +
[34Entrant's Cost + [35 Entrant's Revenues + [36Entrant's Complaints + (3)
137Incumbent's Cost + 13sIncumbent's Revenues + 139Incumbent's Complaints +
1310Incumbent's Market Share Q-I + [311Slot-Controlled Airport +
[312Multiple Airport City + 1313Entrant Failed on Route
The models vary only in their dependent variables and the addition to the longer run
model of a dummy variable for the entrant failing to remain on the route.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables in the model. Some of the
more interesting observations from Table 2 are as follows:
• The incumbent's average short run price cut of $12.93 following entry was only 28
percent of the size of the entrant's average price cut of $46.12.
13The metropolitan areas coded with more than one competing airport were the following: New York (La
Guardia, JFK, and Newark), Washington (BWI, Dulles, and Reagan National), Chicago (O'Hare and
Midway), Dallas (DFW and Love Field), Houston (George Bush International and Hobby), Miami (Miami,
Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach), San Francisco (San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose), and Los
Angeles (Los Angeles, Burbank, Orange County/Santa Ana, Long Beach, and Ontario).
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• Theincumbent'saveragelongerrunpricecutof $14.06washigher thanthe
incumbent'saverageshortrunpricecut, indicatingthat incumbentswerenot ableto
raisetheir pricesback to pre-entrylevelsin thefour quartersfollowing entry.
• On average,the incumbent'soperatingcostat $.093perpassenger-milewasslightly
lower thantheentrant'saverageoperatingcostof$. 106perpassenger-mile.
• In termsof revenues,the incumbentswere,on average,almost3 timesaslargeasthe
newentrants.
• Entrants had a passenger complaint rate more than four times the complaint rate of
the incumbents.
• On average, incumbents had 43.2 percent of route market share prior to service by the
new entrant.
• An entrant failed to remain on its new route for four quarters in 24 percent of our
observations.
In the next section, we present the results from our two models.
4. Results
The two models were estimated both in linear and log-linear forms. As the results
from the linear and log-linear models were similar, only the logged results are presented
in Table 3._4 The coefficient estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. The results
14Note that there were fewer observations (867 compared to 971) in the longer run model. The longer nan
model required the measurement of incumbent reactions four quarters after entry (compared to one quarter
for the short run model). Since our last panel of data was the second quarter of 1997, the last entry events
for the longer run estimation could be no later than the second quarter of 1996.
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showthatanumberof thevariablesin theregressionweresignificantdeterminantsof the
incumbent'spricecut following entry.
Thecoefficient for Entrant'sPriceCutwaspositiveandsignificant in boththe
shortrun andlong runestimations,indicatingthatthelargertheentrant'sprice cut,the
largertheshortandlonger runpricecutof the incumbent.The shortrun result is in
conformancewith DresnerandWindle's (1999)conclusionthat amajor determinantof
incumbentreactionto entry is thepricechargedby thenew entrant. Theshort run
coefficientestimateof 0.415andthelongerrun estimateof 0.379imply that a 1percent
pricecutby anew entrantwill triggertheincumbentto respondwith a0.4percent
(approximate)shortandlongrunprice cut,all otherfactorsheldconstant.As an
example,if theaverageincumbentpriceprior to entryis $100,andtheentrantcutsprices
by $13(theaveragefor our sample),onecouldexpectthe incumbentto cut pricesby
about$5.20(i.e.,40percentof $13).
Thecoefficientfor Entrant'sPassengerswaspositiveandsignificantonly in the
longerrun regression.Thepositivecoefficientof.031 implies thatin the longerrun, the
incumbentcutspricesby about.03percentfor every1percentincreasein marketshare
gainedby thenew entrant. In theshortrun, theentrant'smarketshare(i.e., ameasureof
scaleof entry)hasno significant impacton thepricecutof the incumbent.
Thecoefficientfor Entrant'sFlight Segmentswasnegativeandsigaaificantin the
shortrunestimationandinsignificant in the longerrunestimation. Thenegativeand
significantshortrun result impliesthatin thetime periodimmediatelyfollowing entry,an
incumbentwill cutpricesto agreaterdegreeif theentrantis offering servicewith fewer
stops(i.e., betterservice).
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Thecoefficient for Entrant'sCostwasnegativeandsignificant in both theshort
runandlongerrun estimations.Theseresultsimply thatincumbentprice cutsin response
to entryarelower if entrantshavehighercosts,evenaftercontrolling for all of theother
variablesin themodel. As apracticalexample,whenalow costcarriersuchas
SouthwestAirlines entersaroute,incumbentswill cutpricesmoreaggressivelythan
whenhighercostcarriersenterthemarket,evenafter controllingfor the entrant'sinitial
pricecut.
Thecoefficient for Entrant'sRevenueswaspositiveandsignificant in theshort
run regressionandnegativeandsignificantin the longerrun regression.Entrant's
Revenuesis aproxy for thesizeof thenew entrant.This interestingresultimplies that
whenlargercarriersenteramarket,incumbentswill respondwith largerprice cuts(as
comparedto whensmallercarriersenteramarket)indicatinganaggressiveresponse.
Thisresult (i.e., aggressivepriceresponseto largenewentrants)wascontraryto oura
priori expectations.However,in the longerrun, incumbentsdopricelessaggressively,as
expected,in responseto entryby largercarriers.
Thecoefficient for Entrant'sComplaintswasinsignificant in theshort run
regressionandnegativeandsignificantin the longerrun regression.Entrant's
Complaintswasusedasaproxy for thereputationof theentrant. Thenegativeand
significantcoefficient implies,asexpected,that entrantswith poorerreputations(i.e.,
greaternumbersof complaints)will causesmalleror lessaggressiveprice cutsby the
incumbentin responseto entry.
Thecoefficient for Incumbent'sCostwasnot significant in eitherestimation,
while thecoefficient for Incumbent'sRevenueswasnegativeandsignificant in theshort
13
run andinsignificantin the longerrunestimation.Thenegativecoefficientfor
Incumbent'sRevenuesimpliesthatlargerincumbentswill reactlessaggressively(in
termsof smallerprice cuts)following entry,at leastin theshortrun.
Thecoefficientfor Incumbent'sMarketSharewasnegativeandweakly
significantin both theshortandlongrunestimations.This somewhatsurprisingresult
impliesthat incumbentprice cutswill besmallerif theyhaveahighermarketshareprior
to entry. It wasthoughtthattheoppositecasemightbetrue;thatis thatincumbentswith
high marketsharesona routewouldcompetemoreaggressivelywith new entrantsin
orderto defendtheirmarketshare.However,it maybethatcarrierswith high market
shareshavetheability to respondmoreselectivelyto pricecutsthando low marketshare
incumbents,cutingpricesononly a limitednumberof seats.
Thecoefficientfor slotcontrolledairportswasnegativeandsignificant for bothof
theestimations.Thisresult implies,asexpected,thatincumbentscut pricesto a lesser
extentwhentherearebarriersto entry(i.e., slotcontrols)atoneor both routeendpoints.
Finally, aninterestingresultwasthatthecoefficientfor EntrantFailedonRoute
wasinsignificantin the longerrunestimation.It wasthoughtif anew entrantfailedto
remainonaroute thatanincumbentwouldhaveroomto raiseits priceback to or closeto
previouslevels(implying anegativeandsignificantcoefficient). However,theresults
showthatthefailureof anewentrantonaroutehadnosignificanteffecton the longer
runprice cutof the incumbent.
Table4 providesasummaryof theresults.As indicatedin thetable,in theshort
run, incumbentstendto price cutmoreaggressivelywhentheentrant'sprice cut is large,
theentrantis offeringmoredirectserviceon theroute,theentrant'scoststructureis low,
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theentrantis large,the incumbentis small,the incumbent'smarketshareis small,andthe
airportsat both routeendpointsarenotslot controlled. In the longerrun, the incumbents
pricecut moreaggressivelywhentheentrant'sinitial pricecut is large,the entrantcarries
morepassengerson theroute,theentrant'scoststructureis low, theentrantis small,the
entranthasapoorreputationin termsof numberof complaints,the incumbent'smarket
shareprior to entrywas low, andbothrouteendpointsarenot at slot controlledairports.
Surprisingly,the failureof thenewentrantto remainon theroutehadno effecton the
incumbent'slong runprice cut.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the factors contributing to
competitive reactions by incumbent airlines both in the short run and the longer run.
Using data on 981 incumbent reactions to entry in the U.S. airline industry between 1991
and 1997, we found several factors that have a significant impact on the level of
incumbent price cut in response to entry.
Both in the short and longer run, the size of the entrant's price cut was found to be
the most significant determinant of the size of the incumbent's price cut. Although this
result may indicate that the major determinant of an incumbent's price reaction is "to be
competitive", other results suggest that larger, more aggressive, price cuts may by used
by incumbents against smaller, low cost carrier, especially in the longer run. Our longer
run results indicate that incumbents cut price more aggressively when the entrant's cost
structure is low and the entrant is small; i.e., the characteristics of smaller, low cost
carriers. Since policymakers generally wish to promote entry by small, low cost carriers,
this result in discouraging. On the other hand, our longer run results indicate that even if
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the entrant is forced to withdraw from a route, prices do not rise back up to pre-entry
levels. In fact, the failure of an entrant to remain on a route had no significant effect on
long term prices.
From an airline management viewpoint, our results point to characteristics of
potential entry routes that may trigger either an aggressive or passive response by
incumbents. Managers of airlines considering new entry may want to choose routes
where there are barriers to entry, for example, in the form of slot controlled airports, at
one or both endpoints. We found that when carriers entered these type of routes, that the
incumbent responses were less severe than would otherwise be expected. On the other
hand, new entrants may want to avoid routes where there are no dominant incumbents
(i.e., incumbents all have low market shares) since incumbents with low market shares
tend to price cut more aggressively in response to entry.
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Table 1: Variables Used in Econometric Model
Construct Variable Operational Variable





Short and Longer Term Price Cut of
Incumbent
Price Cut of Entrant
Scale of Entry
Routing
Operating Cost Structure of Entrant
Size of Entrant
Reputation of Entrant
Ability to Remain on Route (for long
run response only)
Operating Cost Structure of Incumbent
Size of Incumbent •
Reputation of Incumbent
Importance of Route to Incumbent
Barriers to Entry
Competitive Routings Available
Avg. Incumbent's Price Q-I - Avg.
Incumbent's Price Q+I (Short Term) or
Q+4 (Longer Term)
Avg. Incumbent's Price Q-1 -Avg.
Entrant's Price Q+I
No. of Passengers Carried by Entrant in
Q+I
No. of Flight Segments on Route
Entrant's Operating Cost Per Seat-Mile
in the Calendar Year Before Entry
Total Revenues of Entrant in the
Calendar Year Before Entry
No. of Customer Complaints per
100,000 Passengers Registered by the
Dept. of Transportation in the Calendar
Year Before Entry
Dummy Variable Coded 1 if Entrant
Failed to Remain on Route for 1 Year
and 0 Otherwise
Incumbent's Operating Cost Per Seat-
Mile in the Calendar Year Before Entry
Total Revenues of Incumbent in the
Calendar Year Before Entry
No. of Customer Complaints per
100,000 Passengers Registered by the
Dept. of Transportation in the Calendar
Year Before Entry
Route Market Share of the Incumbent
Q-1
Dummy Variable Equal to 1 if there is
a Slot-Controlled Airport at Either
Route Endpoint
Dummy Variable Equal to 1 if there is
a Multiple Airport City at Either End of
the Route.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
12.93 37.42Short Run Incumbent's Price Cut
(Dollars)
Longer Run Incumbent's Price Cut
(Dollars)




Entrant's Revenues (Thousands of
Dollars)
Entrant's Complaints (per 100,000
Passengers)
Incumbent's Cost (S/Pass-Mile)
Incumbent's Revenues (Thousands of
Dollars)
Incumbent's Complaints (per 100,000"
Passengers)
Incumbent's Market Share (%)
Slot-Controlled Airport (% of
Observations)
Multiple Airport City (% of
Observations)

















Table 3: Estimation Results - Dependent Variable is Incumbent's Price Cut
Variable Short Run
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant -0.370 ^ 0.161








Entrant's Flight -0.160" 0.034 -0.027 0.044
Segments
-0.079" 0.015 -0.038 ^ 0.019




Entrant's -0.005 -0.008 -0.046" 0.010
Complaints
-0.029 0.041 -0.023 0.054




Incumbent's 0.011 0.012 0.004 0.016
Complaints
Incumbent's -0.020 # 0.012 -0.025 # 0.015
Market Share
Slot-Controlled -0.076" 0.021 -0.090" 0.028
Airport
Multiple Airport 0.008 0.015 -0.006 0.020
City







" Significant at the .01 level. ^ Significant at the .05 level. # Significant at the .10 level.
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Table 4: Summary of Results
Factor Short Run Effect Longer Run Effect
Larger entrant price cut
Entrant gains more
passengers on route



















are in cities with multiple
airports
Entrant failed to remain on
route
Larger incumbent price cut
No significant effect
Smaller incumbent price cut
Smaller incumbent price cut
Larger incumbent price cut
No significant effect
No significant effect
Smaller incumbent price cut
No significant effect
Smaller incumbent price cut
Smaller incumbent price cut
No significant effect
Not applicable
Larger incumbent price cut
Larger incumbent price cut
No significant effect
Smaller incumbent price cut
Smaller incumbent price cut




Smaller incumbent price cut
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the real number of passengers carried in each fare
class (and thus the total revenue) by two airlines operating the same route but having some
differences (natural market share, knowledge of the market, prices, connecting passengers...)
and using different systems to manage their aircraft loading.
To do that, a has been achieved in ENAC. Its first version (monopoly route) has been built in
the framework of the PHARE European project (training for Eastern and Central Europe
countries), improved in a second version and now a third one z. In all cases, the simulator
consist of three main units:
- the demand forecast unit. According to a number of parameters which can be chosen
by the simulator user, this unit can generate a large variety of curves "number of
passengers versus time of booking". With reference to this curve and to each airlines
market knowledge, this unit also performs an appraisal of each airlines forecasted
curves.
the real demand generator. The real demand (for each class) is generated randomly in
relation to the parameters chosen in the former unit and their standard error.
the inventory management unit. Different systems can be used to manage the booking
process : static (fixed capacity for each class), Automatic dynamic (nesting) or Yield
management. This unit simulates the answer of each system to a real and a forecasted
demand combination, to determine the number of passengers per fare class.
Actually a 4thversion is studied in cooperation with Airbus Industry.
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- Revenue gaps obtained on a same marketfluctuate in a large range: 1 versus 3 level
so, largely more than the cost gaps, especially if we take into account only controllable
costs.
- More the technique used, the statistic knowledge of the demand seems the main issue in
this field.
Improving its revenue needs two conditions : having a perfect knowledge of the market
and operate a sophisticate yield management system. Then, the airline has to increase
the number of both connecting passengers (hub and spoke network) and high
contribution passengers (marketing tools).
Fare war has always negative impacts on revenues. Meanwhile, the dominant airline is
less affected by this war than its challenger.
In fact, it seems that entering or staying in a market dominating by a major airline
(hub, good knowledge, loyal passengers) is quite impossible without drastic losses. The




L 'objectif de ce papier est d'estimer le trafic (classe par classe) et donc les recettes de 2
compagnies adriennes exploitant la m_me route mais avec des dventuelles diffdrences de
demande ou d'offre (part de marchd naturelle, connaissance du marchd, tarifs, passagers en
correspondance, part de trafic affaires .... ) ou/et de systbme de gestion de capacit6.
Pour cela, un simulateur de yield management a dtd construit ?t l 'ENAC. Sa premibre version
(route desservie par une seule compagnie) ddvelopp_e dans le cadre du programme PHARE
(formation des compagnies adriennes des PECO) a dt_ amdlior6e par une deuxibme et
maintenant une troisikme version:. Dans chaque version, ce simulateur comprend 3 parties :
- un module "prdvision de la demande ". En fonction de nombreux paramktres, tous
pouvant _tre fixds par l'utilisateur du simulateur, ce module gdnbre une grande varidtd
de courbes "hombre de demande de rdservation en fonction du temps ". En r_f6rence h
cette courbe, et de la connaissance du march_ de chaque compagnie, ce module simule
aussi la prdvision pouvant _tre faite par chaque opdrateur.
- un gdndrateur de la demande rdelle. La demande (pour chaque classe) est g_ndrde
aldatoirement en fonction des paramdtres choisis prdcddemment et de leurs dcarts type.
- le module "gestion de capacitd". Diffdrents syst_mes peuvent _tre utilisds dans cette
ddmarche." statique (la capacitd de chaque classe est fixe), dynamique et automatique
(nesting) ou Yield management. Ce module simule les Hsultantes (trafic et recettes) de
chaque systbme ?t un grand hombre de simulations (demande rdelle et prdvisions de
chaque compagnie).
Les rdsultats trouvds sont particulibrement intdressants :
- les dcarts de recette sur un m_me marchd peuvent varier dans de larges proportions, de
1 d 3, soit beaucoup plus que les dcarts de cozit surtout si l 'on se limite h la partie
"contr6lable" des co_ts.
- Plus que la technique utilisde la connaissance statistique de la demande parait
l 'dldment essentiel.
- Amdliorer sa recette ndcessite ndanmoins de rdunir deux conditions ." conna_tre le
parfaitement le marchd et disposer d'un outil de type yield management. Les 2 voies h
suivre sont alors, l'accroissement du hombre de passager en correspondance (rdseau
hub & spoke) et de la part de passagers haute contribution (marketing).
- La guerre tarifaire a toujours des r_sultats ndgatifs cependant, la compagnie leader
(plus de passagers affaires et/ou de correspondances, meilleur connaissanee:..) souffre
nettement moins que son challenger.
- Enfait, il semble que l 'entrde ou le maintien sur un marchd desservipar une compagnie
historiquement bien implantde et possddant donc une bonne connaissance de celui-cL
des passagers fiddlisds et des correspondances est pratiquement impossible sans pertes
colossales. Le seul moyen de limiter l 'dcart de revenu est.., de faire pareil avec l 'aide
d'un partenaire hd m_me compagnie major.
2 Une 4 6rae version est 8tudi6e en collaboration avec Airbus lndustrie.
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95...) with an economic stake less important than its indirect impacts. This situation and the
requirement to protect a new-born activity has given it an unique regulatory framework
(ICAO 96, OCDE 89, Bresson 93 et 95) creating co-operation between airlines.
The numerous modifications of the activity, either quantitative (maturation, infrastructures
modification of the activity saturation...) or qualitative (users and product segmentation), and
the technological improvements (production but also distribution) have transformed this state
controlled co-operation in tooth and nail fighting.
With this background, each airline has to use comparative advantages to stay in the field.
Three of them (Bresson 98) can be enumerated:
Historical advantages which are linked to traffic rights (due to bilateral agreements),
airport rights (mainly but not only slots), and marketing rights thanks to Frequent Flyer
Program or special agreements with travel agencies.
Lower production costs often for external reasons. For example, the level of personnel
cost depends on the airline headquarters location.
Finally, higher revenues which seem the most controllable way to improve the result of
an airline.
According to this short analysis, handling and optimizing their revenues becomes one of the
main objectives of an airline. To do this, number of capacity management systems can be
used and yield management is the most sophisticated one. In the literature, we found some
interesting papers on this subject but these mainly relate to yield management theory (for
example Daudel and al 94, Wei 97 or Sinsou 99). In fact, it's very difficult to evaluate the
yield management benefit in this way since too many parameters must be taken into account.
Only simulation can be used to obtain this appraisal. MIT team of Professor Belobaba (i.e.
Belobaba and al 97, Belobaba 96...) have worked on this subject and set out (i.e. Belobaba
and al 97, Belobaba 96...) interesting works.
We have tried to do so in ENAC first as a pedagogical objective: simulating different
scenarios to give for example a measure of revenue management involvement. A first
simulator has been obtained in the framework of the PHARE European project and used to
train the personnel of some Eastern European Airlines. This first version was limited to the
simulation of the impact of the technique used to book the aircraft (Yield management, other
inventory management system or, no system...) on a monopoly market. In this case, all our
simulations allow us to say that, the yield management system is a very efficient revenue
booster tool, but its performances are so much more important when:
- The demand is higher in regard to the supply. A condition all the easier to fulfil since
the airline can complete its flights with many connecting passengers.
- The airline has a leadership on one or several domestic markets, giving it a large "high
contribution traffic".
- The airline has a very complete knowledge of the market.
Soon, it seems that this representation is too simple because, in fact, there are often two, or
more airlines in the market, each of them characterized by its size (and so its past market
share), its supply, its range of fare and, its typical demand (i.e. connecting passengers).
For this reason, we have produced, with a group of students, a second simulator. Then, to take
into account all interactions between parameters and results, a third version (this one is used
here) has been built this spring. A fourth one is actually in development in cooperation with
Airbus Industry.
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A yield management simulator has to include three different units.
1.1. The forecasted demand unit
At the beginning of the booking process of a flight (we assume 3 months before departure),
all airlines have to forecast the number of passengers at take off for each fare class or (better
but more difficult), the associated curves "number of passengers versus time". The main
problem in this appraisal is, of course, the accuracy of the forecast. In fact, this accuracy
depends on two parameters.
- the market fluctuation which is common to all airlines.
- the knowledge of the market possessed by the forecaster. Contrary to the first
parameter, this one is quite different from one airline to the others.
In respect to the diversity of these two factors, we have decided, for each class, to perform the
valuation of the forecast demand in two steps.
1.1.1 the "ideal curve".
We suppose, in this step, that the forecaster has a perfect knowledge of the market. Then, each
curve can be described by a number of parameters:
Three specific points. Each of them is characterized by its axis X value (time before
take off) and its Y-axis value (number of passengers who has already booked a seat or
try to do so). Two of these three points are fixed on X-axis: beginning of the booking
process (point 1) and beginning of the registration process (point 3). The third one
(point 2) can be chosen between the two other points. It's supposed to be an inflexion
point (change in the curve concavity).
- The curve concavity between each couple of consecutive points (1-2 and 2-3).
- Finally, the so-called go-show and no-show passengers who must be, respectively, add
and subtract to the "beginning registration process" traffic to get the traffic at take off.
The user of the simulator can easily choose any value for each parameter. He can also fix all
the associated standard errors reflecting market fluctuations.
Finally, according to these numerous assumptions, he can choose, for each fare class, any
possible booking process curve.
In the version of the simulator used here, 5 fare classes are available.
- C fare class. The highest contribution local passengers (point to point) use this class.
We generally suppose that the demand is flat at the beginning of the booking process
but, some days before departure (inflexion point), its growth rate becomes high.
- K fare class. This one is the lowest contribution local passengers one. At the opposite
of C class, the demand (simulated by fare restrictions) is strong a long time before
departure but very flat after the infiexion point.
Y fare class. "Average contribution" local passengers use it. So its curve i_i supposed
to have a quite steady growth rate.
Short haul connecting passengers class. It's a combination of the 3 former classes
but its curve is close to C class one.
Long haul connecting passengers class. It's also a mixture of the 3 local passenger
classes but its curve seems close to Y or K class ones.
Graph 1 next page is an example of curves linked to a complete choose of assumptions.
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Graph1:Demandperclass
1.1.2 Each airline forecasted curve.
The gap between the ideal curve and each airlines real curve depends on the level of
knowledge the airline has acquired. The level which is the synthesis of a number of items as
its experience (or its partners one) of the market, its investments in obtaining data (MIDT).
We can characterize this knowledge by a figure, which is, the standard error of its forecast.
Then, we can proceed to a random pull each "airline forecasted curve" parameters in relation
to the "ideal curve" value (assumptions performed before) and this new factor. These new
curves (one per fare class) could be quite different to the former ones.
1.2. The real demand generator
1.2.1 The global demand.
To perform a simulation, we must know the real curve, which can be quite different to the
former ones (including the ideal curves since the market is fluctuated). In fact, to reduce the
computer time, we have summed up each curve to 15 points steadily spread over the X-axis.
For each class and each of the 15 points, the real value is the result of a random pull taking
into account the "ideal curve" value and the standard error of the demand for this fare class.
To have a significant leaning, it's necessary to proceed to a large number of simulations with
the same parameters (random pull of the real demand). Moreover, to compare the result of
each group of simulations, it's necessary to have not only the same real demand but, the same
airlines forecasted curves. To do that, we have created and stored one hundred of each set of
data. Each set includes, for each class all values associated to the real demand and each
airlines forecasted curves.
1.2.2 Each airlines demand.
Until now, we have not spoken of market share, as in each case, our reference has been the
whole demand. In the inventory process (1.3), each airline has to handle its own demand and,
in addition, a part of the demand that the other airlines cannot satisfy.
Each airlines market share is supposed to be linked to two elements the simulator user can
change.
Its natural market share. This figure is the synthesis of a lot of issues: history of the
market, airline brand, frequency, aircraft used, network... Since all market segments
(i.e. connection) are not always operated, the sum of each airlines natural market share
can be lower (or higher) than 1.
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and over-bookingcosts.Yet eachairline can choosedifferent prices. In this cases,
threeeffectsmustbesimulated.
Variationof its naturaltraffic (Total traffic x Naturalmarketshare)
Variationof otherairlinesnaturaltraffic.
- Transferof traffic betweenairlines.
We have simulatedthis price effect by two new assumptionsfor each class:direct
elasticity to price and transferelasticity.The result is the real marketsharefor each
airline. Of course,asfor naturalmarketshares,the sumof realmarketsharescanbe
different(lower butalso,farewar,higher)than1.
With thesenewelements,we canknow,for eachsimulation,eachairlineandeachfareclass:
- thedemand(totaldemandx realmarketshare)
- the forecast performed at the beginning of the booking process(total forecastx
appraisalof its realmarketshare).
An important issue is the way eachairline forecastsits real market shareand then, it's
demandcurve.Sincethis demandis not only its own one but alsoa part of its competitors
ones,theairline hasto modulateits initial forecastby a ratio. We havesimulatedthis ratioby
an "aggressivitylevel" the value of which canbe chosenbetween0 (only own demandis
considered)and 1(thewholedemandis takeninto account).
1.3. Inventory management unit
This is the heart of our simulator. Each airline is now facing a demand and it has to define the
booking limits for each fare class. Each reservation recorded alters this initial inventory. In
this process, called inventory control, different methodologies can be used. We have
simulated 6 of them and in each couple of simulations, the user can choose, for each airline,
one or another of those methods. But, before describing those methods, let us explain the
general issue of this process.
1.3.1 Generalities and common assumptions.
1.3.1.1 Capacity allocation.
In each method (except one), it's necessary to make a first allocation of capacity. This first
allocation, based on forecasted demand, can stay steady (static methodology) or can be
changed according to the real level of the demand (dynamic methodology).
Two methods can be used to determine this first allocation.
- Standard. The capacity is allocated, from the highest to the lowest contribution fare
class, in regard to the forecasted demand, the standard error of its valuation and a
confident rate. The same way is used to determine overbooking rate.
Yield Management. In this case, the optimal number of units to protect for each class
is obtained by a comparison of each class of incremental passenger revenue
expectation. This one, for an additional seat, is equal to the product of the fare
associated (Ri) by the probability (Pi) that such an additional unit will be sold in this
category. So the balance between passenger class A and passenger class B can be
write: Rb* Pb >Ra* Pa
To determine the overbooking rate, the same methodology is used. For allocating an
additive over-capacity seat, the comparison is made between the revenue of this
additive seat (the best Ri*P i ) and the cost link to a probability of overbooking
(Coverbooking*Poverbooking)
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Whenall thecapacityallocatedto aspecificclassis sold, it's notpossibleto bookanyanother
seat.We havesupposedthat, in this case,the deniedpassengerstry to find a seatin another
airline in thesamefareclass.
Then, thereal demandof eachairline is in fact the additionof its real demand(improperly
predicted)and,thedeniedpassengersof otherairlines(unpredicted).
1.3.2 Different inventory control methods.
For each airline, the user can choose among 6 inventory control methods:
- FCFS (First come, first served) passengers acceptance rule. In this case, all demand of
booking is agreed until the aircraft is full.
- Standard static. The first allocation is made by standard method (1.3.1.1), and this
initial allocation is never changed during the booking process.
- Yield Management Static. Like standard static, the first allocation, computerized this
time with yield management concept, is never changed during the booking process.
Standard nesting. This is the simplest dynamic method, capacities are nested. It
means that the real total capacity allocated to a class j is equal to Cj+ ZC i Pi<Pj (with
C i first allocation of Class i computerized by yield management concept). After a
booking in class j, the number of seats allocated to class j and all classes with a higher
contribution is reduced by one unit.
Ci "_ Ci-1 VClasses with Pi>=Pj
- Protective nesting. Capacities are nested as before, but this time, after a booking in
any class, the number of seats allocated to all classes is reduced by one unit.
C i "_ Ci-1 VClasses
- Yield Management. This time, using the yield management concept, the allocation is
computerized after each booking (more exactly, at the end of each period).
2. First results - Basic case and variation
Since a lot of parameters can be chosen, it's not easy to fix a basic case. We do that with some
assumptions:
- Two similar airlines operate the route. Their traffic is mainly local since any airport
linked is not a hub. Their fares are equal, as the capacity of their aircraft (120 seats)
and their market shares. In fact only their knowledge of the market is different, airline
A is supposed to have a better experience.
- The cumulative demand (for 100 simulations) is close to the total capacity.
Respectively: 22 595 passengers and 24 000 seats, so the maximum load factor is 94%.
This total demand can be pigeonholed as follows:
Y K Short C
Connect
14.3% 33.6% 42.2% 2.7% 7.3%
Since, each airline has an imperfect knowledge of the market, each forecast (by




- a lot of simulationswith ahighertraffic (all segmentsor a partof it)
a lot of simulationswith afarevariation(airline A, B or bothairlines)...
Each time, the result includesa lot of figures:for eachairline, traffic andrevenuegenerated
for eachfareclassandoverbookingpassengersfor 100flights.A sumupof thesemainresults
andtheassociatedcommentsarereportedin thefollowing paragraphs.
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At first sight, these results are quite surprising: if the two airlines use the same system, the
best global revenue is obtained when this system is FCFS... In fact, this result is due to a
level of the demand very close to the supply, so there are not many denied passengers. If we
performed the same simulation with respectively, 20% and 40% more traffic (see below), the











This is in fact a confirmation of the first former important result (Yield Management
simulator 1.0): Higher is the demand in regard to the supply, better is the yield
management.
If the two airlines have very close revenue when they both use FCFS, airline A earns more
(between 4 and 8%) than airline B when they both use a real inventory control system. The
highest gap is obtained when they have both implemented a yield management system. In this
case, A revenue is higher than its FCFS one (4.1% more) while B revenue is lower (3,6%
less). This is also the confirmation of a former result (Yield Management version 1): Better is
the market knowledge, better is the yield management system.
We have obtained all those results with both airlines "aggressivity ratio" equal to 0. How do
they do this if ratios have a different value?
In this case, even if only one ratio is different from 0 and whatever inventory management
system used (except FCFS), the two revenues decrease and, this decrease is
much more important when the ratio value is higher.
more important for the most aggressive airline.
not symmetrical: for two symmetric couple of values; airline B decrease is greater than
that of airline A.
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Traffic Revenue (103)
Airline A ! AirlineB i Total Airline A ! Airline B I Total
' _!18 _.23_
AirlineA 10782 11343 I 22t25 9114 i 9118 :_!:_!_+_
Airline B 11 499 I 9 721 ]ii!211220 8 509 I 9 043 :!_1t7_552_
The best total revenue has been obtained when airline A uses yield management but, in this
case, both revenues (A and B) are equal. On the contrary, if airline B uses yield management,
the total revenue is lower but there is a gap between the two airlines. This quite surprising
result can be explained by the problem of the market knowledge. In fact, yield management
analysis is disturbed by the gap between the real demand and the forecasted one. But since
each airlines real demand is the total of its own and the denied passengers of the other
airlines, this disruption is all the higher because other airlines filter their passengers.
Two variations can be made:
- With a non-zero aggressivity ratio. The two graphs below (two cases) show each
airline revenue versus the agressivity ratio of the airline using yield management. The
gap between the two airlines grows like this ratio, but, this improvement can be higher
for airline A (a revenue level not far from 11 millions of FF) than for airline B (the
revenue stays around 10 millions FF).
A Y.M - B FCFS A FCFS - B Y.M
Revenue versus A Agresslvlty Revenue versus B Agrslllvhry
i A£Whle B _"*"_
A/#/| r,_ A
With different traffic levels (see below). If traffic grows, total revenue (in both cases)
stays steady but, while the revenue of the airline using yield management increases,
revenue for the other airline decreases and the gap grows.
ATraffiC 20% ATraffic 40%
ARevenue Revenue ARevenue Revenue
A Uses YM 19,0 18,9
Airline A +14% 10,5 +24% 11,3
Airline B -6% 8,5 -17% 7,6
B Uses YM 18,1 18,6
Airline A - 13,0% 7,5 -20% 6,8
Airline B +18,0% 10,6 +30% 11,8



















AirlineA i Airline B } Total
9221 ! 8263 _8_
9 195i s391 i
9276 i 7656 i 1_!9_
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With thetwo formervariations(agressivityandtraffic), resultsarequitedifferent:
If airline A is more aggressive,like in 1.1.1, the two revenuesstay steady then
decrease.
If traffic grows,eachairline improvesits revenue.The bestimprovementis for A and
then,thegapA-B increases.
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These results really show the knowledge advantage. Contrary to the former simulations, it's
not the yield management user who has the best result, but always airline A whatever system
(except FCFS). The gap is between 2 and 10%!
As a conclusion, yield management is a very competitive system which can give a wider
benefit especially if:
The potential traffic (demand) is high in regard tothe supply.
The knowledge of this demand is accurate. For that reason, it's interesting to take into
account the opponents inventory systems to choose a level of aggressivity.
It's now interesting to study different ways to improve the potential traffic and then the yield
management benefit. In fact there are three ways:
- Decrease fare and then increase low-contribution traffic.
- Create a hub and spoke network (alone or with partner) to improve connecting traffic.
- Simulate high contribution traffic with FFP or other marketing tools. Contrary to the
other ways, in this case, the total high-contribution traffic stays steady but, each airline
market share moves.
These three ways have been simulated and the results are described in next chapters.
3. Fare leverage.
In this chapter, we have studied the impact of a fare cutting. Since the elasticity of the high
contribution class is very small, this reduction has been done for only two fares: K (from
500FF base case to 300FF) and Y (from 900FF base case to 800FF). Two cases of simulation
have been performed: one airline decreases its fares, both airlines do this.
3.1. Only one airline decreases its fare.
If only airline B decreases its fares and both airlines use an inventory management system, the
results for almost all simulation (whatever couple of yield management systems) are close.
Each airline has a worse result: around -20% for airline B and -5% for airline A. The best
result has been observed when the two airlines used yield management, in this case, the
figures are respectively -18% & -1%.
The results are very similar if only airline A decreases its fares. Nevertheless, the losses of
airline A are lower than the former case airline B ones (between 3 and 4%).
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verydifferent:3 cases
None of the two airlines uses an inventory management system. In this case, losses of
the airline decreasing its fare are very wide (around -40%) while its opponent
improves its revenue (around +10%).
Only one airline uses an inventory management system (supposed to be yield
management) and it is this airline which decides to decrease its fares. The results of the
two likely cases are quite different (see below).
Airline A Airline B
A YM decreases its fares -6% -10%
B YM decreases its fares -17% -1%
Like the former 2.2 result this array seems quite surprising, with a worse market
knowledge, airline B stands up better to a fare war.
In fact, if we suppose now a non-zero aggressivity ratio, the results (see below) are
very different. With a fare cutting and an aggressivity ratio equal to 1, airline A
improves its revenue while airline B damages its one. The symmetric scenario (B
decreases its fares), the implementation like the damage is smaller.
YM aggressivity Airline A Airline B
A YM decreases its fares +20% -17%
B YM decreases its fares -6% +4%
Reference same scenario with aggressivity 0
Only one airline uses an inventory management system (supposed to be yield
management) but it's the other airline which decides to decrease its fares. In the two
cases (A or B), the results are similar, the fare cutting down airline has a drastic loss of
revenue (around - 40%) while the other improves it's own (around 10%)
3.2 Both airlines decrease their fares.
If both airlines use an inventory management system, they all have around 20% revenue cuts.
However in all simulations (whatever the couple of inventory management system), three
remarks can be made:
- The loss is lower for airline A (between 3 and 5%).
- The best results have been obtained for airline A when it used yield management, but
for airline B with protective nesting.
- The best result for airline B (a loss of 19,3%) is worse than the worst result of airline A
(-17,8%).
If both airlines use FCFS, they all have a drastic 30% cutting down of their revenue.
Finally, if only one airline uses an inventory management system (Yield management) and the
other FCFS, the result are unsymmetrical. While the revenue of the yield management user
stays quite steady, the other one has a wide loss (around 40%). This conclusion can be made




If A is the yield managementuser,it hasgot 10,5million FF revenue(oneof the best
one)andthenan implementationof 15%(in regardto basiccasewith a 0 aggressivity
ratio)while B hasit's worst4,3million FFrevenue(-60%).
If B is theyield managementuser,it hasgota 9,4million FF revenue(improvementof
2% in referenceto basiccase)whileA hasa5 million FFone(-50%).
As a conclusionto this chapter,farewar is not really a competitiveway to boost revenue,
especiallyif both airlineshavean inventorymanagementsystem.In this case,the better the
marketknowledge, the lower thedamage.
Nevertheless,if only oneairline usesacapacitymanagementsystem,it canhavea benefitby
decreasingits faresespeciallyif its knowledgeof themarketis betterthanits opponentsand,
its farecuttinghasbeenmadewith a capacitymanagementaggressivity.For its opponent,no
changeof thefarestructureseemsthebestway to bearupagainstthis offensive.
4. Hub & Spoke operations - Connecting passengers growth.
If at least one of the connected airports is a hub, the result can be quite different since a
supplementary traffic must be taken into account: connecting passengers (long & short haul
ones). In this chapter, we have simulated this situation in three cases: only one airline (A or
B) operates a hub and both airlines have a hub and spoke network.
Of course, the simulator can be used with different levels of connection. Here, we have
decided to choose, in each case, only one level: in regard to the basic case, about 3 times more
connecting passengers. This increasing of connecting passengers gives also an improvement
of the total traffic.
4.1 Airline A operates a hub airport.
If airline A uses yield management, its total revenue is always (whatever B inventory
management system) better than 11,4 million of FF (level never reaches until now). The best
result (11,9 million FF) has been obtained when B uses FCFS. Airline B, whatever its
inventory management system, has always the same re_'enue (between 7,8 and 7,9 million of
FF), and then has got no benefit by using costly yield management.
If now airline A chooses another inventory management, its revenue varies in a lower range:
between 9,2 (protective nesting) and 10,9 (standard nesting). At the opposite, airline B
revenues stay in the same former 7,8-7,9 range.
4.2 Airline B operates a hub airport.
The symmetrical former assumption (airline B uses yield management) gives a worse result.
This time, B revenue stays always lower than 1 lmillions of FF (A uses FCFS) and in fact a
narrow 9,6-9,7 range, 2 million or 20% less than before! More interesting, if airline A revenue
stays almost always in the former 7,8-8 range, it reaches 8,7 million FF if A is a yield
management user. Contrary to the former case, yield management gives a wide benefit to A
(non-hub operator). These two results show an interesting measure of the market knowledge
impact.
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4.3 Both airlines operate hub airports.
Three groups of simulations have been used: both airlines use the same inventory
management system, only airline A (then B) uses yield management while airline B (then A)
uses another system.
In the first case, the only difference between the two airlines (same demand, same price) is
their market knowledge. Nevertheless, excepting FCFS simulation (each airline has got a 9,5
million FF revenue), airline A always has better results (between 7% and 18%) than B. The
wider gap is obtained when both airlines are yield management users. In this simulation,
airline A earn 11,7 million of FF while A has only a 10 million FF revenue.
If only A uses yield management, the gap between the two airlines grows and reaches 45% if
B uses FCFS. In this last case A revenue has the top 12,2 million FF value.
If the only yield management user is now airline B, the results are very different. When A
uses FCFS, B revenue reaches only 11,4 and the gap is narrower than before. In all other case,
A earns more than B though the latter uses a more sophisticated system. This is a new
measure of the market knowledge impact.
The conclusion of this chapter is very different to chapter 3 one. At the opposite of fare war,
development of connecting traffic is a very efficient way to boost its revenue. In this case,
yield management is a very interesting tool but, its output depends a lot on the airline market
knowledge. In fact, it seems quite as beneficial to improve this knowledge as to improve its
inventory management system.
5. Improvement of high contribution market share.
Until now, each airline has had the same "natural market share" and then, their only
differences were market knowledge, or strategic decisions such as price cutting pr hub
implementation. In this chapter, the two airlines are quite different. One of them has been
supposed to have a wider "high contribution passengers market share" thanks to its better
brand, its higher number of frequency or its passengers loyalty improved by an efficient
frequent flyer program.
Two groups of simulations have been performed: the highest "high contribution passengers
market share" airline is either A or B. In the two cases, the same assumption of market share
has been made: 75% and 25% in spite of the former 50-50%.
5.1 Airline A has a wider "high contribution passengers market share"
Whatever the pair of inventory management systems, all simulations give the same result: in
regard to basic case (see below), airline A improves its result in spite of a traffic reduction
while airline B improves its traffic but damages its revenue.
For airline A, the best results are obtained with yield management. In these cases and
whatever the system used by B, A earns almost 10 million FF and the gap A-B varies between
15 and 33%.
This remark is unsymmetrical, for B and whatever the system used by A, the best results are
obtained with FCFS. To this way, when A operates yield management system, the narrower
gap A-B (15%) is obtained with B FCFS user.
Finally, turning down the non-efficient standard static system, for both airlines, protective
nesting is the worst system.
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5.2 Airline B has a wider "high contribution passengers market share".
Two main differences must be noticed in this unlikely scenario:
- All improvements (traffic and B revenues) are lower than before while all losses
revenue and B traffic) are higher.
- The worst result is not always those of A. For example, if the two airlines use yield
management, in spite of its higher high contribution passengers market share, B earns
less than A. In fact, the B best result has been obtained when both airlines use FCFS.
Revenue ARevenue (1)
Airline A I Airline B Airline A [ Airline B
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passengers market share ratio = B in regard to A results
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Symmetricratios (comparison5.1 and 5.2 simulations)show clearly the marketknowledge
impact.ExceptingwhenbothairlinesuseFCFS:
The highestmarketsharerevenueis between10and 17% lower whenthe observed
airline is B.
- Thelowestmarketsharerevenueis alsolowerwhentheobservedairline is B, thegap
reaches12,5%whenthetwo airlinesuseyield management.
Thischapterconfirmsformerones,goodmarketknowledgeis essentialsinceit is anecessary
conditionof yield managementefficiency.
6. Real cases.
In a real air transport market, unlike the basic case, airlines natural market shares are often
quite different. In fact, the leader airline often enjoys cumulative advantages like high
contribution and connecting passengers market share, market knowledge...
For these motives, we have performed a number of simulations with new assumptions: airline
A with a better market knowledge operates a hub and spoke organization (Chapter 4), has got
a higher C class passengers market share (chapter 5) and has implemented a yield
management system. In this situation (see below), the revenue gap is close to 1/3 whatever the
























We have asked ourselves about different B strategies to react against this important handicap.
Four of them have been successively studied:
6. 1 B uses a smaller aircraft
If airline B decreases its aircraft capacity (100 in spite of 120 seats), we have obtained two
type of results:
- B uses FCFS. A improves its revenue (2,8%), B damages drastically its one (21%),
probably more than its costs.
- B uses an inventory management system. A improves weakly (between 0,3% and
0,5%) its revenues. B damages its one (around 10%) but, since its capacity and then its
traffic decreases, this lowering comes with a yield (around 6%) improvement. The best
B result has been got when it uses protective nesting.
Then, this strategy (very protective) can be used only to protect specific situation not really to
enter in a new one.
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6.213 cuts down itsJares
Both airlines have a revenue decreasing:
- between -0,7% and -1,3% for airline A (except a 1,6% improvement when B uses
FCFS)
- but nearly-20% (even -35% with FCFS) forairlineB.
A new time,thisstrategyseems without any interest.
6.3 B improves its connections by another airline agreement
This agreement increases the route traffic and then both airlines improve their revenues:
between 1 and 2% for airline A.
- More than 10% (but only 3,3% with FCFS) for B. The best result (12,5%
improvement) has been obtained with yield management.
This time, this strategy seems quite interesting for B. Moreover, in the long term, an
improvement of both its market knowledge and its high contribution market share could be
obtained and more easily thanks to its partner.
6.4 Combination of 6.3 and 6.2
Excepting when B uses FCFS (B revenue decreases drastically from 30% while A one
improves weakly) both airlines keep its revenue quite steady (between -1 and +3%).
Meanwhile, since B result has been got with a weaker B traffic, next improvement could be
easily foreseen with a better market knowledge.
7. Conclusion - next developments.
This number of simulations confirms our model 1 (monopoly route) simulator: yield
management can generate a revenue improvement but widens this improvement. Thus, with
exactly the same market (same hundred demand curves), the gap between the all couple of
results can reach a 1 versus 3 level[ Some figures:
- The maximum revenue (12,8 million of FF) has been obtained by Airline A (real case
and B using FCFS).
The minimum one (4,7 million FF) is around three time less (real case, Airline B using
YM and cutting down its fares).
If we examine the total earning of two airlines, it fluctuates from 12,8 millions of FF
(both airline cuts their fares) to 21 millions (real case, B using standard nesting and
obtaining a partner agreement to code-share).
These figures are of course to a wider extent than operation costs, especially if we take into
account, in these last ones only controllable items... Then, we can confirm our former
assumption: optimizing revenue has to be the main airline objective.
Another interesting conclusion is linked to the market knowledge function. This one seems
more important than the management inventory technique itself. Thus, in numerous cases:
- Airline B (supposed to have a quite unperfected market knowledge) has no interest to
use yield management (FCFS gives it a best result).
- Airline A with less favorable conditions than B but a better market knowledge has
better results.
In all symmetrical scenario, Airline A earnings are better than B ones.
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When the two main conditions (good market knowledgeand implementationof a yield
man.agementsystem)arefulfilled, anairline(to improveits revenue)hasinterestin increasing
its high contributionmarketshareandthe numberof its connectingpassengers.In this case
(real case?),it canenjoy a morethanone-thirdrevenuebenefitversusits opponents!For this
one,thereis only oneway to showresistance:do thesamewith apartner.
On the contrary, farewarsalwayscomewith drasticrevenuedecreases.Eachtime, airline B
(with the worst market knowledge) lost more than A and then, fare war seemsonly an
interestingmediumterm way to keepa new airline from enteringthe marketdominatedby
anotherairline.
Finally, if wesumup theseformerremarks,it seemsquiteimpossibleto enteramarketlinked
to amajorairline hub if theentrantis not associatedwith anothermajorairline...
All thesesimulationshavebeenperformedon thesamemarket(a typical short-mediumintra-
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inventory management system. This valuation has been performed in a variety of cases: level
of fhe demand versus the supply, fluctuation of the demand, knowledge of the market, fare
level number of connecting passengers... In each case, to have a strong evaluation a great
number of simulations have been performed showing mainly the market knowledge impact.
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Abstract
Following relaxation of economic regulation in many aviation markets, the competition
amongst airlines has intensified in recent years. This has resulted in improvements in
airline products, especially in the in-flight services. One of the areas on which airlines
have focused their attention is the provision of personal In-Flight Entertainment 0FE). In
1998, airlines spent $1.8 billion on IFE. However, the industry is faced with a number of
questions in relation to such levels of investment: Are the investments justified? Does
IFE influence passengers' choice of airline? Does IFE have a revenue generating
potential? What does the future hold as far as the IFE services are concerned? This paper
addresses these questions based on a passengers survey and literature review. The results
indicate that while IFE is not amongst the primary factors affecting passengers' choice, it
contributes greatly to passengers' satisfaction with airline services. While provision of
IFE can currently act as a differentiating factor, in the future it will become part of
passenger' expectations. It has also become apparent that, while IFE has the potential to
generate some revenue, it would not be enough to cover the total costs associated with the
installation and running of IFE systems. The impact of IFE would be felt, indirectly,
through increase in passenger loyalty which should have a positive impact on airline
revenues.
Keywords: airline passenger preferences, in-flight entertainment, product
differentiation
1 Introduction
With the increase in the level of competition in most air transport markets, airlines are
continuously seeking ways of differentiating their product from one another. In recent
years, one of the areas for product differentiation has been the development of In-Flight
Entertainment (IFE), in which airlines are investing a huge sum of money. The increase
in the IFE expenditure has been due to airlines moving away from the old overhead
distributed services to video and audio systems which are installed in the back or the
armrest of individual seats. Table 1 shows a sharp increase in airline industry expenditure
on IFE and related communications in recent years.
In early 1990, airlines were spending $1,800 per seat for their IFE systems, in 1998
$6,000. In the year 2000, the expenditure per seat on IFE is expected to reach $10,000
(Airline Business,1999). Airbus estimated that IFE accounts for 2% of overall costs of
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aircraft. It mustalsobebornein mind thatsuchinvestmentsaretypically written offover
threeto five yearsperiod.









Sou.rcc: World Airline Entertainment Association (WAEA), 1999
IFE is also a considerable weight factor, as it has been estimated that over the last 10
years 6 kilos have been added to every seat in aircraft equipped with such systems (Kelly,
1999).
Airlines generally develop product and services to achieve three goals; a) to satisfy
customers needs and requirements: b) to meet the company's corporate objectives, or in
other words satisfy shareholders by producing profits and c) to out-perform the
competitors through product differentiation. Therefore, such a heavy investment by
airlines in IFE systems raises a number of questions in relation to the role and the impact
of IFE in the total airline product, which are as follows:
• How important is IFE in passengers' choice of airlines?
• Do passengers really appreciate IFE?
• Does IFE increase passengers' loyalty?
• Does IFE have a revenue generating potential?
• Are passengers prepared to pay for.IFE?, and, if so, how much?
• What about the reliability of IFE systems and its impact on passengers?
• What are the implications of not having an IFE?
• What about the future role of IFE in airlines' product plan?
This paper addresses the above questions based on a passenger survey carried out in the
UK in summer of 1998 and extensive literature survey on the subject. Unlike most other
literature on the subject, the paper reflects passenger views on IFE rather than airline or
supplier views. As mentioned in the Inflight Annual Handbook (1999), it is not very
clear whether the technology is driving the demand for the systems, or demand dictating
the technology in the area of IFE development.
To address the above questions, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part
provides a brief overview of current IFE systems, the second or the main body of the
paper analyses the passenger survey results, and finally in the third part conclusions are
drawn about the role of IFE in airline product design.
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2 Current in-flight Entertainment Systems
Entertaining passengers, especially on long haul flights, is not a new concept. As there
are some evidence that IFE, in 1930s, included live singers, musicians and fashion shows
(Kelly, 1999). However the technological revolution in IFE has taken place in the last
decade. With the arrival of miniature TV screens in the consumer market, the idea of
providing them the during the flight was initiated. The first personal screen video system
was tested on a Northwest Airlines' Boeing 747 in June 1988. The pioneering airlines in
providing personal IFE tend to offer these services in their first and business class cabins.
However Emirates was the first airline to offer IFE in all passenger classes in 1992.
Virgin Atlantic and Singapore Airlines also provide personal IFE in all their cabins.
The current IFE systems include screen based, audio and communication systems. The
screen based products include video systems enabling passengers watching movies, news
and sports. This system has progressed into video-on-demand, allowing passengers to
control when they watch the movies. Air map display is another product, allowing
passengers to locate their flight en route. Exterior-view cameras also enable passengers to
have the pilot's forward view on take-off and landing on their personal TV screens.
Other screen-based facilities includes gambling, computer games, destination
information,financial services, and shopping catalogTtes.
Audio systems includes different types of music channels and special programmes
recorded for the airlines, such as interviews with public figures, authors and celebraties.
Communication systems includes mainly business facilities such as telephones,
facsimile and in-seat power supplies.
The IFE suppliers and manufacturers are continuously working on developing new
systems. Most recent developments includes the provision of the digital versatile disk
(DV'D), which would improve picture, sound quality and provide greater capacity and
durability, compared with tapes. This system is supposed to be more reliable, compact
and lighter than traditional tape players (Flight international, 1999). For more information
in relation to future technological development in IFE systems see Whelan, 1999.
One of the key factors in provision of IFE is the reliability of the systems. In mid 1990,
airlines experienced serious reliability problems with the systems. Currently, the
suppliers of the systems offer 98% reliability which means on average the remaining 2%
passengers would have a problem with their IFE system. This could mount to a relatively
large number of unhappy passengers on a wide body jet aircraft carrying 400 people, over
a period of time.
Having highlighted the current products offered by airlines in their IFE programme, the
next chapter discusses passengers perception of such systems.
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3 The Passenger Survey
A sample of 100 passengers were surveyed by means of postal questionnaires and
interviews. The questionnaire was designed to establish the passengers' travel behaviour
and their experience with current IFE products and services.
The rest of this section discusses the results of the survey in order to address the
questions raised in Section 1, by focusing on three most important areas discussed above:
3.1 Passenger perceptions of IFE
As discussed in Section 1, one of the objectives of providing a service or product is to
meet the customer needs. In that context it was important to establish to what extent IFE
affects a passenger's choice of airline.
The results of the survey indicated that, while the most influential factors affecting
business passengers were reliability, punctuality, seating comfort and 'schedules, for
leisure passengers price was the most important factor. Although IFE was one of the
amongst factors influencing the choice of passengers it was not regarded as one of the
most important ones (Figure 1).
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The findings were very much in line with the IATA's Corporate Air Travellers Survey
illustrated in Figure 2. As shown, IFE does not feature as a strong influencing factor
amongst other factors.
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A similar survey, carried out by SPA.FAX Consulting for both business and economy
class passengers, also gives IFE a lower priority in factors affecting airline choice (PIER,
1998). Clearly it is hard to imagine that passengers would give a high priority to
provision o fiFE in their choice of carrier. If everything is equal, perhaps IFE could play a
role to tip the balance towards a competing cartier with such systems.
Sometimes it is argued that what passengers actually state as their preferences are not the
same as their revealed preferences. In other words, passengers may enjoy IFE but when
their opinion is sought about it, they give it a low priority. To establish whether
passengers actually regard IFE as an important in-flight product feature on long haul
flights, they were asked about their most preferred activities during the flights. The
results are illustrated in Figure 3. As can be seen, relaxing is the most preferred activity.
This is in line with an American Express survey, 1999, which indicated that 54% of
business passengers like to relax while flying while 26% work during the flight. The
most preferred activity after relaxing and sleeping was being entertained. The result is in
line with the trend in public attitude towards entertainment. The entertainment industry is
amongst the fastest growing industries. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that
people not only like to be entertained on the ground but also in the air, especially during
long haul flights. Being entertained in economy class during long flights is even more
important. This is due to seat configuration in most airlines' economy class cabin which
makes it difficult to sleep or relax.






Figure 3: Prefered Activities on Long Haul
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When the respondents were asked what is their most preferred type of in-flight
programme, movies were ranked by over 80 percent of passengers as the most popular
one. This explains the trend in airlines offering of up to 22 video channels, with an
average of 52 film titles per year on screens of up to 36cm in size. Singapore Airlines
offers the largest TV screen in the industry in their first class.
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The preference for various IFE features were recorded in an IATA survey of business
passengers As can be seen in Table 2, power sockets for computers, e-mail and intemet
are given priority. To ensure that the business passengers survey of most desirable IFE
facilities is in line with what they really prefer, airlines can assign a small number of their
cabin crew to pay special attention to business passengers behaviour in relation to their
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activities during flights There is some anecdotal evidence that while business
passengers state that they would like all the business facilities possible in the air, in
reality they prefer to relax and watch movies. Therefore, it would be very useful to
compare their stated preference with their revealed preference in a systematic and
structured way.
Table 2: Most Desirable IFE Facilities
Facilities (0=not interested, 5=very interested)
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IATA Corporate Air Travel Survey, 1997 data
The respondents were also asked which aspects they felt were improved most amongst all
the in-flight products, in recent years. The results are summarised in Figure 5. It could
be seen that IFE was perceived by passengers as the most improved feature of in-flight
products.
Figure 5: Passengers' Perception of In-Flight Product
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The results of passenger perception of IFE indicates that while IFE is not one of the
crucial factors affecting their choice of airlines, they appreciate it during the long haul
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flights. Also IFE appears to be addressing passengers' needs in relation to their
preference for relaxing and being entertained during long haul flights,
3.2 Passengers' willingness to pay for IFE services
As stated in section 1, the second objective of provision of any products or services is to
meet shareholders requirements which is generating sufficient revenue not only to cover
costs but to generate additional profit. In order to establish whether IFE has the potential
to generate revenue from passengers, the respondent were asked if they were prepared to
pay to watch movies. Movies were felt to be the programme with most potential to
generate revenue, as it was the most preferred IFE programme by the passengers (see
Figure 4). The majority stated that they are prepared to pay to watch a movie. While
nearly 50% of respondents were happy to pay under $3, only 20% stated they would pay
between $3 to $7. Based on the cost of installing IFE and the fact that they are written off
over a period of 3 to 5 years (as discussed in Section 1), unless the majority of
passengers are prepared to pay more than $3, the scheme could actually increase the costs
to airlines due to need for the collection of money and the required administration.
Swissair for example recently experimented with a charge for movies, but with limited
success.
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Respondents were also asked if they consider $10 per minute as a reasonable charge for a
telephone call on-board an aircraft. Almost 80% of passengers stated that it is not a
reasonable charge, the rest felt it is reasonable only in an emergency. When they were
asked what is a fair charge, it appeared that $2 to $3 is what the majority were prepared to
pay per minute. It appears that, by lowering the call charges, more passengers will use the
telephone for a longer period of time. This would be very much in line with people's
behaviour in relation to the usage of mobile phones on the _ound. As the price of call by
mobile phones dropped over the past years, its usage increased greatly to the extent that a
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large proportion of population in developed and even developing countries have a mobile
phones. Therefore, it is not surprising that JetPhone has reduced it telephone charges for
Air France's passengers towards the end of 1998. It introduced a simplified pricing
structure by charging for domestic calls 1OFF per minute, 20FF for European calls and
30FF per minutes for the rest of the world (Inflight, March 1999).
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The results of the survey with regard to the revenue generation potential of IFE for two
most popular IFE products, movies and telephones, indicates that it cannot be considered
as a source of revenue to the extent to cover the full costs of the system, including a
profit. Although it has been mentioned that advertising and gambling could have a better
potential for generating revenue, gambling does not appear to be very popular amongst a
large proportion of passengers (see Table 2).
3.3 The role of IFE as a differentiating tool
The third objective of any product provisions, as stated in Section 1, is to out-perform the
competitors. Currently there are three groups of airlines in relation to their attitude to the
provision of lFE. One group consist of those airlines which consider IFE as a verystrong
differentiating tool. These airlines have invested heavily in such systems. A prime
example would be Singapore Airlines which has been nominated as the best provider of
IFE in the industry (World Business Class Survey, 1998). SIA's most recent
development in their IFE, called Kris World, includes the provision of cinema quality
sound with standard stereo headphones (Outlook, 1999). Other carriers which have used
IFE to differentiate their products from the competition include Emirate Airlines, Virgin
Atlantic, Malaysian Airlines, Swissair and Lauda Air.
Another group of airlines consists of carriers that are undecided about the strength of IFE
as an effective differentiating factor.
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The third group of airlines includesthose that are currently focusing on other areas of
product provision to catch-up with more progressive airlines. Therefore, lIFE is by no
means on the top of their list of product development or improvements.
In order to address the question oflFE as product differentiator, one needs to establish the
position oflFE on passengers' map of airline product features. To do so, airline products
are divided into four categories of core, expected, augmented and potential features. Core
product consist of those element of airline service which make the organisation an airline
such as aircraft type, schedules and a safe and reliable transport of passengers. Expected
products are those product features that are additional to the core product, and almost all
traditional airlines provide them, such as provision of food and drink during the flights.
Expected products are those features that add value to passengers and are beyond
passengers' expectation. These are those features that are provided by a number of
airlines and used as differentiating factors. Potential products are those product features
which are currently planned for future provision such as shower room on board, gym, etc.
As illustrated in Figure 6, IFE could currently be placed in the augmented part of airline
products. This is because there are a large number of airlines that do not offer IFE,
especially in economy class.
Figure 8: Position of IFE on Passengers' Map of Airline Product
r .............. =
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As the number of airlines offering such systems increases the position of WE in
passengers map of airline product moves towards the expected product features.
Therefore it could be said that IFE is currently a product differentiator. As mentioned in
Section 1, the reliability of the systems is very important. When the systems do not
perform as expected it can in fact create a negative image in passengers mind. A flight
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can become very unpleasant when passengers with faulty personal IFE system see fellow
passengers are enjoying different programmes offered by the system.
In the future, as stated by marketing director of British Airways (WAEA, 1999), the
industry will face competition in the area of quality and range of IFE as opposed to just
the provision of the system. It is also very likely that the provision of personal IFE be
used as a differentiating factor in medium haul flights of between 4 to 7 hours.
4 Conclusions
Based on the passenger survey and other literature on the subject the following
conclusions are drawn on the questions raised in Section 1.
IFE is not a primary factor affecting passenger choice of airlines. However, passengers
appreciate the provision of IFE, especially on long haul flights. Provision of IFE will
meet passengers' needs to relax and be entertained during long haul flights.
IFE enhances the airline service, image and brand. Of course it is not a substitute for
poor services in other areas of an airline's product plan. However, if the airline core
product, namely, the transport of passengers in a reliable, efficient and safe manner
meets customer satisfaction, the provision of IFE could enhance the airlines' image.
Although passengers increasingly appreciate the provision of IFE during long haul
flights, they do not appear to be prepared to pay for it to the extent to cover the full
costs of the systems. More over, since many airlines do not charge their passengers
for IFE, it is increasingly hard for others to introduce charges.
IFE currently provides product differentiation; however, in the future it will become
part of expected product features in all classes. In that case the question in relation to
IFE would not be about how much revenue it generates but how much revenue would
be lost due to the lack of IFE.
The key issues in relation to IFE are its reliability, simplicity of its operation by
passengers and availability on all aircraft fleets to the chosen destinations. Unreliable
IFE can damage the image of an airline, and create a poor perception in passengers'
mind.
The technology will certainly drive the demand for IFE. The introduction of the digital
versatile disk (DVD) is an example in the case. The majority of airlines will eventually
install personal IFE in their aircraft. While, currently, the airlines with advance IFE can
reap the benefit of having such systems, in the future the differentiation will come fi'om
the quality and the range of services offered by IFE systems.
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STATISTICAL APPROACH FOR EVALUATION OF AIRPORT PAVEMENT
FUNCTIONAL LIFE.
By Prof. Alexandr P. Stepushin, Ph.D., D.Sc.





ABSTRACT: The paper covers procedure for predicting of concrete airport
pavements functional life reflecting statistical properties of design variables.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the Construction Rules (1) concrete pavements are designed to
adequately serve a predicted number of load applications for twenty years prescribed
design life at the lowest possible initial and maintenance costs. Analysis of concrete
pavements performance show that real serviceability age at civilian airports of
Russian Federation differ from 3 to 30 years. Construction rules (1) reflect only a
realistic degree of variation in flexural strength of concrete and do ignore stochastic
nature of other main variables: gross aircraft mass, slab thickness, elastic modulus of
concrete, coefficient of subgrade reaction, number of load applications expected from
specific volume of mixed traffic and its distribution pattern.
Procedure proposed here was developed from a study and correlation of
deterministic design methodology (1) existing plate theory on bending moments in
concrete pavements due to loads and warping, gypothethis of Miner, fatigue concept
and theory of stochastic functions.
EXISTING PRACTICE
Deterministic design procedure include comparison of bending moments caused by
aircraft loads at the outside edge of a concrete pavement and ultimate bending
moment for given slab thickness using the following equation.
m d <- m u (1)
where rod- bending moment in concrete slab caused by the design aircraft
main gear arrangement at the outside edge of slab
m d - m c • k (2)
mc - bending moment in concrete slab caused by design aircraft
main gear wheels at the interior of the slab;
k - factor to convert bending moment increase at the outside edge;
m,, - ultimate bending moment for given slab thickness, flexural




Yc - factor to convert concrete strength increase with age and
warping stresses;
Ruth - design modulus of rupture;




Flexural fatigue research show that under continued repetitions of loads
failure of concrete beams occurs at stresses ratios of less than unity. Flexural fatigue
of concrete is reflected in construction rules (1) methology by selection of load
repetition factor K,, based on number of the heaviest aircraft undercarriage wheel
passes expected during the pavement design life
K,, 2 lg U,¢= (4)
6
where • Ud - expected number of the heaviest aircraft main gear wheel load
applications for design age of the pavement.
It should be noted that equation (4) corresponds with PCA fatigue research
results published in 1973 (2) and may be expressed as follow.
y(x) y(x
y =1 10 6 0,5
(5)
where y (Ni) - stress ratio
fiN'l=,, CrN, =1 lgN
R 12 (6)
7(N
CrN, -- repetitive stress;
R - mean flexural strength of concrete;
N - number of repetitions to cause concrete flexural fatigue
failure.
= I. 10 6) - stress ratio permitting 1. 10 6 repetitions without
loss in fatigue resistance.
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From equation ( 6 ) one can calculate number of repetitions Ni to cause
flexural rupture under stress O-N,
NCrgz - 10 [1-r(Nz)] (7)
Under real pavement performance conditions stress ratio 3' (Ni) of concrete
depends on stochastic nature of design variables which effect on the bending
moments in slab.
STATISTICAL APPROACH
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average bending moment in concrete stab caused by the
heaviest aircraft main gear arrangement;
average bending moment due to temperature gradient on the
top and the bottom surfaces of slab; : .
average ultimate bending moment computed for given . '
slab thickness and design modulus, of rupture of concrete;
statistical coefficient to account combined harmfull effect of
variability of wheel loads, number of applications, flexural
strength and modulus of elasticity of concrete, modulus of




Zp - standardized normal variant for P level of pavement reliability;
DM:-- variance of bending moment caused by designed gear load.
4
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VM,,=
M,, (12)
= •SR + _ "Sh + "S,,
(13)
SFd, SEu, Sh, S_, SA, SR, Su - standard deviations of wheel load, modulus
elasticity of concrete, slab thickness, modulus of subgrade
reaction, amplitude of temperature, flexural strength of .
concrete and number of loading; ....
0M- first partial, derivative of stochastic function of bending
" 0 moments with respect to the means of random variables:
wheel load Fd, modulus of elasticity of concrete Eb, thickness
of slab h, coefficient of subgrade reaction Ks, amplitude of
pavement surface temperature A, flexural strength of concrete
R and number of load applications U
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-0,005247po
(17)
OMt = 0,0874_hE b A
Oh (18)
c3Mt = 0,0437 c_h 2 •
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c3U
__ __") __
= -0,0724c_ 1R. h-/U (23)
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oil - coefficient to convert concrete flexural strength increase with age.
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(24)
Summary detrimental effect D under special aircraft traffic mix pattem
expressed by Miner's law
(25)
where N_i - number of stress repetitions at outside edge of slab
for a specific aircraft main undercarriage wheels for the
design life ..
Nor i - n(365 - Tf )k,, i "n o . U i "Pi(x (26)
Where n - pavement functional life;
Tf- number of days in the year when subgrade is in frozen condition.
Kni - coefficient to convert the effect of particular aircraft landing
gear to the effect of landing gear of design aircraft;
no - number of tandem gears;
Ui - number of daily departures of particular aircraft;
Pi(x) - probability to account transverse distribution of particular
aircraft main gear loading, FIG. 1;














where f(.)c, x--7,Sxi )-normal distribution function;
x i and Sxi - mean and standard deviation of aircraft wheel-
paths from pavement centerline or guideline
marking;
x - distance from longitudinal axis (centerline orguideline
marking) of pavement to design section of slab, where load
repetitions are determined;
b - design traffic width
b = d + 2R i (30)
d- distance between centers of contactareas of dual wheels;
Ri- radius of main undercarriage wheel contact area for specific
aircraft
(31)
Mi .g .k m
F_¢i = . k d .y f
1"lm • tl w
(32)
Fdi- wheel load for specific aircraft;
M - average take-off mass for specific aircraft;
g - acceleration of gravity;
K m -- portion of the main legs loads;
K d-- coefficient to reflect load application impact;
7y - coefficient to reflect wings lift;
nm- number of main undercarriage legs;
n,v - number of wheels in main leg undercarriage assembly.
As an example probabilities Pi(x) calculated by formulas (27)-(32) for
specific aircraft are presented in figure 2.
Substitution formulas (24) and (26) to (25) gives following equation to
determine airport concrete pavement functional life
01 £kn Pi( ),, n = 1 _ 65 noiu i • x (33)
i=1
Proposed equation allows more precisely evaluate: number of load applications
expected during pavement life from specific volume of mixed'.traffic, its distribution
pattern, variability of gross aircraft mass, flexural strength, and elastic modulus of
concrete, coefficient of subgrade reaction, slab thickness, amplitude of surface
pavement temperature, number of stress repetitions and given reliability level of
pavement structure.
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
To investigate the influence of statistical variability of design parameters
and given probability level on the concrete pavement functional life numerical
analysis was performed under following conditions:
- concrete slab thickness h = 0,30 ;
FIG. 1. Lateral distribution of aircraft wheel-paths: B_v - track width;
Bp- pavement width; Bc -width of shoulder
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coefficient of variation of slab thickness
average flexural strength of concrete
variation of concrete flexural strength
g h =0,10;
R=5,13 p ; coefficient of
V R =0,135;
average modulus elasticity of concrete Eb =3,24.10 4 p ;
coefficient of variation of modulus of elasticity of concrete
gE =0,135;
average coefficient of subgrade reaction K s = 51,6 / 3.
coefficient of subgrade reaction gKs =0,30;
average amplitude of concrete surface pavement temperature
=7,55 °C; coefficient of variation of amplitude gA=0,33;
designed aircraft type - -86; average take-off mass/'_ =206 t;
coefficient of take-off mass variation V M=0,05;
average daily number of take- off Ui =60; coefficient of daily take
off number variation Vu=O, lO;
number of tandem axes - 2; , _ ..
maximum probability of main wheels passes _. @ =0,83, FIG. 2.
Values of statistical coefficient Kp calculated by formulas (9)- (23)
by computer program are given in Table 1. '


















The results of numerical analysis are illustrated in FIG.3.
ll
FIG.3. Predicted concrete pavement life age as function of stress ratio
Y(N and given probability level P
As given probability P level and stress ratio Y(N) increase functional
concrete pavement life decrease. The higher given probability level the lower
functional life of pavement at constant stress ratio y(/,q . At stress ratio value
Y(N =0,5 and given probability level P = 0,95 predicted functional pavement
life is 15 years. As stress ratio Y(N increases to 0,65 predicted functional life
of concrete pavement downwards to threeand a half years.
CONCLUSION
It is shown that functional life of concrete pavements depends on
statistical variability of mechanical properties of materials, aircraft traffic,mix
loads and environmental condition. That is why to predict pavement service life
till cracking of concrete due to fatigue consumption will take place can be
implemented only with certain probability. Procedure proposed in this paper is
may be considered as first step towards statistical approach in that direction. The
results of that approach also underline the significance of quality control and
statistical evaluations of test data of construction materials used for a particular
airport pavement's project. The use of statistical approach provides more
realistic data to the cost estimator for a new particular project or pavement
overlay design. Probability distribution pattern for different traffic mix (FIG.2)
and statistical coefficient values, calculated for various regions of Russian
Federation are proposed for adjustment to aerodrome's construction rules to
overcome shortcomings of existing deterministic methodology.
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It is important to note that functional pavement life define the moment of
initial process of cracking causedby stress repetitions in a critical traffic width
where the probability of design aircraft main leg wheels passesis maximum.
That is why proposed procedure requires modification to reflect cracking
propagation in concrete slabs after initial cracks have developed. Also it is of
interest to compare numerical value of functional life received by statistical
approach to real serviceability age of concrete pavements designed by
conventional deterministic methodology. Statistical analysis have shown that
average serviceability age of concrete pavements in Russian Federationairports
is 11 years. That result has a good compromise with statistical approach at
desired probability level P = 0,95.
REFERENCES
1. Construction rules SNIP 2.05.08-85. Aerodromes, 1985, p.58.
2. Paccard R.G. Design of Concrete Airport Pavement. Portland Cement
Association. Skokie Illinois. 1973. P.61.
3. Stepushin A.P. Statistical approach to airport rigid pavement design
with a given reliability level. Research issue MADI. Airport








































" • 0% _i D0
° • • °




,___" __--: .. .......... ____
"_" :;" st"" ..t,..




• , . • .- ": __*.
45 --- m*




...... II I I I I II I
I i II






























The Propensity of Business Travellers to use Low Cost, Short Haul Airlines
Keith J Mason
Abstract
The liberalisation of air transport regulations in the EU has led to the introduction of a number of new
airlines serving short haul point to point routes (e.g. Easyjet, Ryanair, Debonair, Virgin Express, Go,
and others). While some of these routes are clearly leisure oriented, anecdotal evidence suggests
that a significant number of travellers are using these services for business related trips. A number
of recent studies suggest that pressure is being brought to bear on business travellers to reduce
travel expenditure (IATA (1997), Bender and Stephenson (1998), Mason (1998)). This paper details
a stated preference survey of European business travellers to assess the propensity for business
travellers to use short haul low cost airlines. The survey will assess the utility placed by travellers on
pdce, airline reward schemes, flight frequency and in-flight comfort service attributes. The study will
examine the effect of company size on traveller's selection of these utilities by drawing a sample of
business travellers.
Introduction
The completion of the single market for air transport within the EU has lead to significant changes in
the airline industry. Perhaps the most visible demonstration of these changes is the establishment of
a number of low fare, no or low frill airlines similar to those found in the US where such airlines
account for some 25% of domestic US travel (Cassani, 1999, O'Toole, 1999).
While the principal target audience for these airlines is the price sensitive leisure traveller, there is
some evidence that short haul business travellers are also prepared to use such services. Given the
importance of the business travel market to traditional scheduled airlines, any move towards low cost
services by a significant sector of the business travel market will have a dramatic effect on the
scheduled aidine industry in Europe. This paper, therefore, attempts to evaluate the propensity for
business travellers to use low cost, low fdlls airlines in EU short haul markets.
European Business Travel
The completion of the single market for sc:heduled airline services in the EU has meant that any
community established airline has the rights to fly between any two EU points. Following
liberalisation, new entrant activity into duopoly markets has been relatively small. In 1992 only 4% of
European routes in 1992 had more than two operators, and by 1997 this figure had only risen to 7%.
On the densest routes, however, the increase in competition has been more dramatic with the
proportion of routes with three of more competitors more than doubling to 26% (CAA, 1998a).
Fourteen new start-up airlines began operations between March 1995 and September 1996 (Jones,
1996). Low cost, no or low frills airlines including Ryanair, easy Jet, Virgin Express and Debonair
have introduced the most routes. British Airways has also established a low cost wholly owned
subsidiary, Go, which started trading in May 1998 to compete in this new and popular sector of the
market. These airlines can afford to offer some very low fares by adopting a low cost strategy similar
to the one pioneered by Southwest Airlines in the US. This activity has been particulady visible in
the UK where low cost airline traffic (both EU and domestic) has risen from less than 2 million
passengers in 1994 to over 7 million in 1998, and is estimated to rise to 9 million in 1999 (Morrell,
1999). Mainly operating from Luton and Stansted airports, these low cost airlines accounted for 15%
of all traffic from London airports in 1998 (CAA, 1998b). The provision of new low fare alternatives
are present in a market in which there is a high number of short haul business travellers. The UK
CA.A survey statistics show that 32% of all terminating passengers at the London airports are
business passengers, a much higher proportion of short haul travel is business related. Table 1
shows principal short haul destinations from the UK to Europe. Overall. 48% of all passengers are
travelling on business.
3_x 2_ possible combinations of options were possible with the vanables and levels adopted for the
study, making 24 product designs to be evaluated by respondents. To reduce the combinations to a
manageable number SPSS was used to develop an orthogonal design with eight product offerings to
be evaluated by each respondent with an additional two hold out products that could be used to test
the reliability of the results attained.
To evaluate the ten product designs (eight in the study and the two hold-outs) respondents were
asked to rate the likelihood of choosing each product on a ten point scale each product, with a score
of 1 indicating "very unlikely to choose the service" and 10 indicating "very likely to choose the
service". Adopting a rating scale increased the data collected than would have been achieved by
using a discrete choice model, it was viewed as being easier to complete in a self-completion survey
administration method which had to be adopted given the nature of air travel with passengers arrive
at the airport in waves. The researcher selected to administer the survey forms at two London
airports, Stansted and Luton.
A pilot study of 10 respondents was performed prior to the full administration of the survey. Self
completion of the survey form was found to take in the region of three minutes. The data were
analysed using multiple linear regression. An adjusted R2 of 0.48 was attained which was deemed
to be acceptable for SP analysis. Three of the four variables were included in the stepwise produced
model which was then use to predict the respondents scores for the hold out services. The model
produced was:-
Score = 4.119 + (-0.0267 * Price) + (2.011 * In-flight product) + (0. 719 * Frequency)
A correlation between the actual ratings given to the hold-out product designs and the model was
0.58, To test the reliability of the attitude scale the survey was performed on the pilot group a second
time and the correlation between the original scores given and the score given in the re-test was
0.69. These tests of reliability on the stated preference instrument and on the attitude scale used
within it were deemed acceptable.
The data were collected at Stansted Airport and London Luton Airport during a four day period during
March 1999. Passengers of a traditional scheduled airline were surveyed at Stansted while
passengers of a low cost airline were surveyed at Luton. 449 usable survey forms were collected
(214 at Stansted and 234 at Luton). Some differences in the demographic and behavioural profiles of
the two groups of respondents were observed. However, agreement to survey the passengers was
attained on the understanding that any analysis would be made on aggregate data, and so these
commercially sensitive differences are not presented in this paper. What can be noted is that when a
dummy variable for departure airport was included in the regression analysis, a significant t-statistic
for this variable was not attained. This indicates that differences in responses to the stated
preference section of the survey could not be attributed to the type of airline (traditional or low cost)
being used by the business travellers.
Results
The demographic profile of the respondents were similar to previous studies of short haul business
travellers in Europe. 33.0% of respondents described themselves as company directors with 30.1%
indicating that they were employed as senior managers, while another 20.5% worked in "other
management" positions. Together this means 83.6% of respondents fell into the A or B social
classifications. This finding is very similar to a 1997 study of business travellers which found 86.9%
of business travellers at Stansted were in the same social classifications (Mason, 1998). 26.7% of
respondents worked in very small companies (with less than 25 employees). 14.7% of respondents
worked in companies with between 25 and 100 employees, while a further 20.0% of the sample
worked in medium sizd companies (up to 1000 employees). The remaining 38.5% of respondents
indicated that they worked for companies with more than 1000 employees. This corporate profile is
not very similar to the previous study in which 57% of the sample worked for companies with more
than 1000 employees. This anomaly may be explained as this sample was taken on passengers of
both traditional carriers and low cost airlines, wnereas the earlier study was on performed solely on
passengers of traditional carriers. I_ is poss_blethat a targer proportion of business travellers using
It is the with addition of additional in-flight comfort and benefits, along with the additional frequencies,
that the price rise becomes acceptable to the market (table 5).
Table 6: Scenario Analysis for In-flight Comfort and Frequencies
Scenario Class FFP Freq Price Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1 1 0 2 100 5.838 5.302 5.219 4.681
2 2 0 5 150 6.934 6.883 6.775 6.776
Change in attractiveness 15.81% 22.96% 22.96% 30.92%
In a final example, table 6 demonstrates the effects of a £25 price dse, with the introduction of FFP
rewards. The price rise is unattractive to the travellers working for companies with less than 100
employees, however there is only a marginal difference in the third group and the model Indicates
that this change would be attractive to those working for the largest companies.
Table 6: Scenario Analysis for FFP Rewards
Scenario Class FFP Freq Price Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
1 1 0 . 3 150 4.849 4.392 4.504 4.128
2 1 1 3 175 4.295 3.845 4.449 4.183
Change in attractiveness -12.91% -14.21% -1.22% 1.30%
Discussion
Although the findings in this paper are not surprising, they support the view made in the literature that
low cost aidines would be more attractive to travellers working for small and medium sized
companies, and provides original evidence of the effect of company size in the purchase decision
process for short haul business air travel. The findings provide useful marketing information to
aidine managers for both low cost and traditional airlines. The models derived can be used to assess
the effects of changes in price, in-flight comfort, frequency, and FFP rewards on the market. Of
course changes in product provision will also affect airline costs and these have not been considered
here. More importantly the research allows furthei" consideration of the likely adoption of low cost
airline services by EU business travellers. The models of the four market groups, selected on the
basis of the size of the company that the traveller works for, can be used to assess the likely changes
in market attraction to changes in product offerings. However, these models must be built into an
aggregate model of the market so that changes in market attractiveness can be extrapolated to
assess changes in demand and consumption. To do this a profile needs to be developed.that splits
the market into the four grouping used to develop the models in this paper, and also the number of
trips taken by each group. These data are not readily available. Of course, the sample taken for this
research could be used, however, the profiles of the sample did not seem to be truly representative
of the entire short haul business market, as noted earlier. As the market is in change it would seem
that further work can be undertaken in this area to develop a predictive model of the short haul
business travel market in Europe.
The research shows that the introduction of low cost airlines in Europe has attracted a significant
proportion of the market. Liberalisation in this sector in Europe has provided greater competition and
choice which has revealed the short haul business traveller to be more price sensitive than historical
evidence would suggest, and the models derived here support this view.
Model for companies with more than 1000 employees
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